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## **Soviet Union**

### ***Political Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

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### **Burlatskiy, Shakhnazarov View Supreme Soviet Work**

*90un0157A LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian  
No 43, 25 Oct 89 p 1*

[Article by F. Burlatskiy and G. Shakhnazarov, USSR People's Deputies: "About Parliamentary Efficiency"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet has committed itself to the people to adopt a package of laws and decisions at this session that are of paramount significance to the settlement of a number of critical social and national disputes and the renewal of our entire social and state structure. Four weeks of meetings have transpired, and a well-founded concern arises—will it be possible to meet this commitment?

The progress of the preparation of the draft laws and resolutions, and especially of the debates, highlights the problem of improving the mechanism of activity of the Soviet parliament. Measures such as these suggest themselves.

First, just as it is accepted in all parliaments, the center of gravity in the preparation of laws and decisions should actually be transferred to committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet and its chambers. They are expected to work efficiently and in an organized way, taking into account all reasonable proposals of the deputies that are turned over for a minimum of a week, and to submit only those drafts to the session that are well and thoroughly prepared.

Second. Each draft must undergo the earnest expert examination of scholars, first and foremost of lawyers, and the government. In France, for example, there is a special institution—the State Council, which is made up of 300 prominent lawyers; not one draft law can be adopted without its findings. We have an institute at the Supreme Soviet, the Institute of the State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and scientific-research establishments attached to the departments. It was supposed that each committee and commission, in addition, would have its own active body of experts. This question must be decided quickly. Preliminary expert examination by specialists should become the rule and not the exception.

Third. The consideration of draft laws at the sessions, again as is accepted everywhere, must be of a specific and business-like nature. If a new amendment is submitted, then, obviously, it is necessary to explain why it was not presented in advance to a committee or a commission. It is no less important that it be clearly formulated, and not set forth in the form of a general wish or simply a critical comment.

It seems that general debates should be opened only on the reports of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the government, or the ministries, concerning fundamental directions of policy. Particularly in those cases where there really is an urgent need for a collective exchange of opinions. As for questions of economic and political strategy, then it would be advisable to discuss

them within the scope of the club of the USSR People's Deputies, which has already been talked about at the session.

Fourth. It would not be a bad idea for all of us deputies to look into increasing our professional knowledge. The deputies do not speak in committees and in sessions in their former roles—laborers, peasants, party workers, executives, writers, and scientists, but as parliamentarians. Our material is the law, and not discourse about one or another problem, which can be done successfully in the press, on television, or at meetings of work collectives, and during meetings with the voters.

Haste, passion, and publicity—these are the very worst advisers in lawmaking. In this connection, it would be worthwhile to discuss the question about the advisability of televising all meetings of the sessions. It may be that it is enough to give relatively detailed TV information about the main thing. Then many temptations for speakers will fall away, not to mention the economies that will result—television spends hundreds of millions of rubles on these transmissions—and the reductions in losses resulting from a lowering of TV viewer labor productivity. Incidentally, no country in the world transmits all meetings of parliament over TV. And this is not an accident! Indeed, even the interest of the television viewers, to the extent that parliamentary work becomes commonplace, will drop.

On the other hand, the opportunity would be provided for the public to be present in the galleries at meetings of the parliament, which, again, is accepted everywhere.

Fifth. The laws must be as brief as possible. A standard of conduct, the means for applying it, and sanctions for nonfulfillment. Less about general principles—they are well-known. And propaganda has to be eliminated entirely. Laws are not prepared for the professionals, and not for the managerial staff, but for the people. They must enter the people's consciousness and political culture.

One little amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not do so badly in ensuring opportunities both for the press and television. Nevertheless, attempts are being made to include in the draft Law on the Press and Mass Media, which we are presently preparing, even standards that define the mutual relations inside the editorial offices of newspapers and publishing houses, and in television and radio. This might fully enter the ethical code of journalism, being adopted, for example, in the Union of Journalists of the USSR, or in the internal rules of one or another organization.

Then many questions will be clarified beforehand that, strictly, do not concern a law, but instructions, and the need for long discussions of details will disappear.

In addition, in certain cases it would be possible to examine the draft law together with the supplement—decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers that guarantee its practical implementation. For example, this would be advisable in considering the Law on Entry Into and Departure from the USSR, where practical questions are



very important: procedures for drawing up applications, passports, visas, money conversion, etc.

Incidentally, there should be a more accurate differentiation between the prerogatives of parliament, which adopts not only laws but also resolutions, and the rights of the USSR Council of Ministers and other executive organs for ensuring the fulfillment of laws and a determination of rules of activity. I doubt whether it is necessary for parliament to assume the resolution of current, although also very important questions, over which, moreover, sharp controversy arises among the deputies themselves. Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's, and to god that which is god's...

Finally, the last point. Should we strive to comprehend that which is incomprehensible, in other words, to define in laws the behavior of people in all facets of life? The

principle has been proclaimed in our country: What is not prohibited is permissible. Let us make this a standard of life. Democratic practice will gradually take shape in our country that is based on precedents, judicial decisions, and new standards of political culture of our citizens and officials. The system of education and the mass media—in its way a “fourth estate” in the state (along with the legislative, executive, and judicial)—will promote the development of common law, which is adopted by everyone as an immutable code of social order.

There are probably a good many other ways of preventing the transformation of the Soviet parliament into a talkathon and averting new disappointments in public opinion that result from an inefficient decision-making mechanism. We should get thoroughly involved in improving the methods and style of legislative work.

### Vyalyas Assesses Estonian Political Situation at Party Plenum

18001665 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 2 Sep 89 pp 1-2

[Speech by V. Vyalyas, first secretary of the Estonian CP Central Committee, at the 15th Estonian CP Central Committee Plenum held 1 September 1989: "On the Tasks of the Estonian Communist Party in Stabilizing the Political Situation in the Republic"]

[Text] Comrades!

Allow me to discuss in my speech the sociopolitical situation that has developed up to the present time in our republic, what we hope to hear, and your viewpoints.

The immediate occasion for convening the plenum, as you know, was the declaration of the CPSU Central Committee, "On the Situation in the Soviet Baltic Republics." Today we must jointly work out our stance toward it and our plan of action. This party document of 28 August of this year was also discussed in the Estonian CP Central Committee Buro and I reported its provisions on that same day on Estonian television and radio. The same appeal of the Estonian CP Central Committee Buro to the residents of Estonia was published in the press. On 29 August the Central Committee Buro met with the first secretaries of the gorkoms [city committees] and raykoms [rayon committees] where they discussed the aforementioned document. This document has already been discussed by many party organizations, social organizations, fraternal unions, the Academy of Sciences, Vuzes, and boards of social movements, and documents have been adopted which have expressed their viewpoints.

But allow me to begin an analysis of the situation somewhat from a distance.

First of all it should probably be emphasized that it is principally wrong to consider the processes taking place in Estonia in isolation from the overall course of restructuring in the USSR. There is no doubt that each republic and each region has its own peculiarities, but what has been achieved during the course of restructuring or what is about to be achieved largely coincides. There are common possibilities for creating a new society which restructuring has opened up for all of us and we also have in common many difficulties which the restructuring movement is encountering. And, finally, we have one more thing in common, a more clearly visible feature—in our national republic both political and social and ideological problems very frequently assume an ethnic shading. This is the case here.

If we look back, that hot summer of 1988 was marked by a sharp upsurge of the ethnic self-awareness of the Estonians. Having experienced the possibility of free ethnic development that was created by restructuring, the Estonian people first of all tried to achieve clarity about themselves, about their concerns and problems, and about their destiny. This could be called a period of clarification when everyone was moved by a need to express the crucial

problems about which they had to remain silent in previous decades. The people felt the joy of liberation, they felt themselves to be a nation. Along with this one must say that at the same time the majority of residents of Estonia of other nationalities on the eve of the 19th All-Union Party Congress were prepared to support and did support the action for the communist party of Estonia and the republic leadership. Let us just recall the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee of the the Estonian CP when we first articulated the current political course of the republic party organization. Was there anyone who opposed it at that time, did protest rallies and strikes break out? No, nothing of the kind occurred. Today when we return in our thoughts to 1988 we can ask: was this an ethnic awakening? I think that it was since this movement was not directed against any other ethnic group and, which is extremely important, the entire movement was consolidated by a positive program—the idea of the republic's economic independence, economic accountability [khozaschet] for the Estonian SSR.

Let us take a look at these same processes from a different point of view. How was all this seen by those who do not belong to the Estonian ethnic group? Did everyone understand it in the same way? The great optimism that gripped the republic's indigenous ethnic groups and the domination of ethnic problems sometimes left the non-Estonian population and the sidelines of the social revolution that had begun. The feeling of alienation was increased even more by the uncoordinated actions of information channels using various languages in a situation which the Estonian-language press went further and further and the Russian-language press did not keep up, and sometimes did not try to adequately elucidate and interpret what was taking place in the republic. And we know that the majority of the non-Estonian population of the republic, because of the language barrier, is not able to keep up with the Estonian language press, television, and radio. Thus the Russian-speaking population began to feel unconfident and did not develop a clear understanding of what was happening and were not learning how to understand all this. The lack of adequate information contributed even more to the appearance of verbal information or, in other words, various rumors. The political explanatory work did not offer the proper support either. Let us say frankly that during that period there were and there still are large gaps in the ideological and political work of the republic party organization.

The negative process that was taking place at that time—the growing alienation of the Estonian-speaking and Russian-speaking population—was exacerbated during the entire subsequent period. One can also say that while during the 11th Plenum perhaps there was a small group of people who had tried to find in the provisions of the plenum a subtext that actually was not there, now we know the presumptions that pertained at that time both to the draft laws and the documents, including party documents.

Although the declaration of the CPSU Central Committee was immediately evoked by the events that took

place in the Baltic union republics on 23 August, the political situation in the republic was acute even before then and reached its apogee during the political strikes that gripped the union enterprises. The situation was caused by a number of circumstances:

The USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the decision of the Supreme Soviet that supported the Self-Managing Estonia [IME] program in practice led to a new phase in the consolidation both of restructuring and anti-restructuring forces throughout the Soviet Union. In a situation where the conservative forces were driven into a blind alley by a recognition of the fact that the USSR Supreme Soviet was accepting one of the most important landmarks of the course toward restructuring in the Baltic union republics—sovereignty, self-determination, the attitude toward the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the IME—they felt that the start of their hopes of finding support in the central authority, the USSR Supreme Soviet had come to the defense of the sovereignty of the republics and the principle of self-determination of nations as understood in Leninist teachings. Conservative forces frequently began to look at the process of renewal taking place in the republic as discrimination against ethnic minorities. Unfortunately, a significant social base had taken form for this both in Estonia and in the Baltic republics as a whole. Unfortunately, we were too late in recognizing how critical and deep the feelings of mistrust of the nonindigenous population were and we were too late in enlisting them in the preparation of the draft laws.

In this situation the Law on Elections to Local Soviets that was being discussed in the session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet became the straw that broke the camel's back with respect to the mistrust of the non-Estonian citizens. It should be recognized that before the adoption of the law on citizenship which united all residents of Estonia such a step was extremely risky. But through reasonable compromises the conflict could have been avoided. The Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet entered on that path by curtailing the session at the suggestion of a group of deputies.

The recess in the session and the search for a compromise were completely justified and made it possible to calmly reach a solution which was just within reach. But the strike committees could not see any real possibilities and began a political strike which led to an aggravation of the situation and to a radicalization of the demands from both sides.

In this situation the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Editorial Commission, which was unable to hold on to its previous moderate position which would have appreciably stabilized the situation, did not act consistently enough.

The new wave of strikes aggravated the situation even more and political mistakes were made by both sides. Thus a political crisis arose.

In the democratic world political strikes are a last measure before utilizing destructive means. Because

they are so extreme they have never contributed to adopting compromises or constructive solutions; they are more likely to lead existing structures to an impasse and demand the adoption of solutions that are inadequate to the situation. They appear rarely, since it is impossible to build a future with a constant threat of strikes. This is why politics and economics are separate from one another in a democratic society. Strikes are organized, as a rule, only in economics. On the other hand, it should be recognized that the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet which adopted its decision on 10 August also made an obvious mistake.

In a situation in which the residency requirement adopted in the Law on Elections left a certain part of the people who have come to Estonia in recent years without the right to vote, in the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet this was interpreted as a violation of the rights of USSR citizens. The competency climate for a passive right to vote was understood as an ethnic requirement. Public opinion in the West was also critical of the Estonian SSR Law on Elections to Local Soviets. The proper background for this was created by the tendentious articles and interviews in the foreign mass media.

In a situation like this which was complicated on the one hand and explosive on the other, Estonia ended up the key point in restructuring throughout the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, throughout the Soviet Union there was a lot of one-sided and politically unbalanced information which instead of contributing to the removal of tension and the search for reasonable dialogue, exacerbated the contradiction even more. This, along with the rumors and fabrications, considerably changed public opinion against Estonia, and this could not be appreciably affected by the late concrete steps taken by the Estonian government and Supreme Soviet for restoring a feeling of security among the Russian-speaking population (the Commission for Accounting for Minority Opinion under the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the propaganda work for easing the tension, and the negotiations with the strike committee).

On 14 August a Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet headed by Comrade G. Tarazevich, who had repeatedly spoken here with representatives of various social movements and strike committees, arrived in the republic in order to familiarize themselves with the situation. Working with them we managed to stop the strikes on the territory of the republic. Here one must honestly say that the strikers tried to paralyze vitally important parts of the republic's economy to which they have real access since in our republic strikes in energy and transportation are not prohibited by law.

The halting of the strikes was accompanied by a decline of the high social tension and the events of 23 August, "the Baltic Way," and other measures took place in Estonia in peaceful, democratic surroundings in which the voices of extremist groupings were not heard in spite of their trying to reinforce them. Obviously the people were aware that moderation and politic behavior are

factors which will serve for evaluation in order to understand the measures that are being taken and will make it possible to avoid unnecessary political and emotional tension in an atmosphere that is heated to begin with. There is not a single conflict or disturbance of public order in spite of the fact that hundreds of thousands of people participated in the measures. One can state that it was the measures of 23 August that demonstrated the people's moderation and at the same time became firm evidence that the people will not allow the party to deviate from the course toward renewal.

In this situation the appearance of the declaration of the CPSU Central Committee was unexpected for the public of the Estonian SSR. We understand the concern expressed in this document and the disturbance about the processes taking place in the Baltic republics. Our attitude toward the preliminary conditions for free and democratic development of the national republics that were created by the CPSU Central Committee during the course of restructuring is respectful and hopeful. "Restructuring has become favorable soil for rapid growth of ethnic self-awareness of the peoples," it says in the Declaration of the CPSU Central Committee, "and it has given them confidence that they will be able to independently solve problems of their own political, socioeconomic, and cultural life." We understand and share the concern expressed in the document in connection with the fact that the appeals to secede from the USSR were not only inappropriate but also deeply unstabilized the political situation. In the struggle that is now in progress throughout the Soviet Union between restructuring forces on the one hand and conservatives and also extremists on the other, such appeals, even if they come from very small extremist groupings, give nourishment to destructive forces that deny Soviet power.

At the same time we cannot bypass the fact that certain formulations obviously do not pertain to us and their literal reading and interpretation by various parties can aggravate the political situation in Estonia. On the one hand the fact is that the activity of extreme groupings is not and cannot be in the future a major or decisive aspect in the process of restructuring. This does not mean that we underestimate this serious political situation even to a small degree. Therefore in our social situation we do not understand the words of the declaration to the effect that somebody or something is threatening the "viability" of our people. On the other hand, here one cannot be limited to one nationalistic stream. At this point the great power chauvinistic extreme, whose positions are reflected by certain representatives both of Intermovement and of the strike committee, has no less of a social influence. We are speaking about three different union republics, each of which has its own uniqueness and certain of its own both persistent and immediate problems and its own national composition which is different from the others, and they cannot all be covered by one political designation. In this connection we can say today that Estonia has no mass organizations consisting mainly or completely of Estonians or movements which would call for disorder on the

streets, conflicts among citizens, or destabilization of the economy. In Estonia people understand that weakening and undermining ties with other republics in the union would lead our economy, science, and many other spheres of life into an impasse.

In forming Estonia's political future one can proceed only from the objective reality. The key issue in Estonia's problems is the achievement of real sovereignty. We see this achievement primarily in a radical political reform and democratization of all of our social structure as a prerequisite for self-determination of the Estonian people as part of the USSR. The course that has been undertaken by the party toward restructuring is oriented toward this and only on this path is it possible to create political situation which will give us a feeling of confidence that in the multinational socialist union the situation of Estonia and other national republics will be socially and economically sovereign. This is indicated by the draft of the platform of the CPSU for the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on International Relations and also the Declaration of the CPSU Central Committee about which we are speaking.

As is usually the case in a tense situation, in recent months one could note different attitudes toward restructuring, IME, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Various groups of the population invest various meanings in these concepts. While the majority of the society saw in these signs a further development of democratization and a course toward renewal and deepening of sovereignty, for conservative forces these were signs of deviation from socialism and a denial of socialist values. Now and in the future, both in its program of actions and its current affairs the party should achieve a state whereby dialogue will provide a field of development.

Objectively the extremists (both nationalists and conservatives) not only reinforce one another but join together in their attitude toward the future of the restructuring. Their activity destabilizes the situation and is objectively directed against restructuring. It is certainly no accident that both of the extreme movements have entered on the path of active denial of local soviet power, organizing alternative power structures. These extremes have existed for a long time and the only problem has been a broad base for them. In a rapidly changing situation simplistic solutions are attractive and profitable. But politically they are unfeasible, especially if they do not take into account the interest, as it were, of the other side. The splitting of Estonia into two opposing communities is simple but as a result both Estonians and other ethnic groups suffer.

Taking into account the continuing polarization of the conservatives and restructuring forces throughout the Soviet Union, our duty is to provide a social base for renewal on both the Estonians and non-Estonians. It is not easy to do this since new social forces have made their way into politics. Restructuring has caused a marked increase in civic activity and a number of new social movements have appeared in the complicated political situation.

It is easy for one group or another to proclaim itself to be a social movement. In fact, they are transformed into a political force only when they receive support from a fairly large number of people. To do this it is necessary to have an idea that has sufficient force of influence and to reflect social interest or to have a strong organization. As of today in Estonia there are about two dozen new social organizations and movements. The first that was able to identify itself socially was the People's Front which even last year clearly identified itself with the Estonian people. But now because of the appearance of new societies, associations, and alliances the People's Front is again looking for a place among the organizations that have arisen and is increasingly becoming a movement that consolidates them and thus is close to the center of political forces.

The United Council of Labor Collectives and the Union of Labor Collectives rely on the existing economic structure. The former unites mainly labor collectives of enterprises directly under union jurisdiction and the latter was formed on the basis of enterprises under republic jurisdiction. Along with them appeared a third association—the Agrarian Union, which reflects the interests of rural residents and workers of collectives involved in agriculture. After the strikes there was a marked shift of the United Council of Labor Collectives in the direction of the center of political forces, which creates prerequisites for more active participation in the IME and can turn it into a significant partner in cooperation for continuing the political and economic reforms.

In the traditional spectrum of political forces a significant place is occupied by the "Green" movement which has broad public support and whose goals of including the environment and the associated alleviation of the feeling of social unprotectedness are justified in all ways. It would be bad if on behalf of ultrapoliticized slogans of the moment the major problems that are so important to the people were forgotten.

A special political block is formed by the so-called fundamentalists. There are two types of them in Estonia.

The Estonian National Independence Party [PNNE], the Christian union and leadership of the Society for the Protection of Monuments of Ancient Times see the solution to their problems only in a rejection of the existing policy. They unwaveringly defend the viewpoint that Estonia's future destiny can be determined only by citizens of the Estonian republic and their posterity. In the words of the PNNE, the committees of citizens of Estonia are elected according to the legal and not the political indicator, and representatives of the nonindigenous population can participate in them but only with an advisory vote. It is clear that this is a blind alley which will not make it possible to solve the real problems facing Estonia. Speaking of the separation of the Estonian SSR from the Soviet Union, they completely fail to pay attention to the real picture of the world or even the firm resistance to this on the part of many groups of the population of Estonia, including residents of Estonia

belonging to other nationalities. Not to mention the fact that the severance of economic ties with the USSR would put Estonia into an extremely difficult situation. At the same time, this path is not internationally recognized. It is difficult to believe that the PNNE and the leadership of the Society for the Protection of the Monuments of Ancient Time do not understand this. The movement for the committees of citizens of Estonia could be evaluated rather as a purely propagandistic one whose goal is to gain followers.

The PNNE and the organizations associated with it do not consider the existing state structure to be legal. Therefore it is natural that they are not accepted by the political structure of our society and are not registered as a political organization.

The advantage of the extreme forces consists in that their platform is extremely simple. But in this simplicity lies their weakness as well. These platforms are absolutely unrealistic. Unfortunately, this is not taken into account.

The other extreme is formed by many representatives of Intermovement and the strike committees. They do not recognize the Estonian SSR as a full-fledged subject of the Soviet federation. They do not want to understand the ethnic group's right to self-determination or the Estonian SSR as a form of statehood for the Estonian people. In essence, they raise doubts about the right for Estonia's problems to be solved in Estonia. Here is also the reason why their activity frequently evokes a very negative attitude among Estonians. Their declarations and statements and also their demands frequently sound like ultimatums and accuse the republic leadership of nationalism and separatism as well as discrimination against the Russian-speaking residents. This bloc also has its proponents. The appearance of these proponents is conditioned by objective and subjective factors. The main social one is the non-Estonians' lack of confidence in their social future. There is only one way of overcoming this—dialogue based on mutual understanding.

Many sociological polls assert that because of the latest events the authority of the the Estonian CP among the population has increased appreciably by now. Both in previous critical situations and now not only Estonians but also the majority of non-Estonians look with hope to the Central Committee of the the Estonian CP and the republic government. It is natural that they expect us to show consistency, responsibility, and action.

One can state without exaggeration that in the current situation the communist party of Estonia is the basis for intrarepublic national and political stabilization.

Unfortunately we have been forced to admit that the the Estonian CP has not been able to consistently implement the policy of bringing various ethnic groups closer together. A political mechanism is now being developed for accounting for minority opinions. One can say with confidence that the majority of Russian-speaking population and above all those who support the policy of realism are actually standing on the sidelines of public policy. During the strikes it became clear that certain

party secretaries lost their authority and certain of them openly spoke out against the line of the the Estonian CP. It was quite unjustified that frequently our ideologists were not able to give convincing answers to direct questions from the workers.

For a long time we discussed what was separating us. The time has come to arrive at a recognition of precisely which goals actually unite us. It is time for us to develop convincing ways of solving problems and mechanisms for the policy of compromise that everyone understands. This requires resolute actions on the part of the the Estonian CP. The time has come to come out with our program. At the same time it is clear that the current structure of the the Estonian CP and partially the management agencies do not correspond to the new tasks and we cannot go on like this any longer. It seems that after the adoption of the program it will be necessary to conduct a reorganization of the apparatus of the the Estonian CP. Its current structure and composition must be brought in line with the new tasks after changing the structure of the current party apparatus which is largely a command structure and not one adapted to restructuring.

Under the conditions of the democratization of social life the models of party behavior must change. Only under conditions of unlimited monopoly of party power was it possible to drop to the level of the dogma of having only one opinion. Under the conditions of democracy and a diversity of social forces, this can no longer continue. The democratic party tries to draw to itself people who think alike according to a unified ideological program and at the same time it gets rid of those who compromise the party. The basis for belonging to the party and cooperating with it are the program and regulations of the party, and under normal conditions the party purifies itself on this basis. Only this kind of behavior is promising and meets the requirements of a democratic society.

The development of democracy in a society is inseparably linked to further democratization of party life. Intraparty democracy should be a model of the democracy that is developing in the society. In reality the party has lagged behind the centrist forms of management in many respects, while diversity of ideas and political views have begun to develop in the society. The polarization of political forces in the republic has also led to the appearance of various opinions within the the Estonian CP and we must be understanding about these, discuss them, and draw conclusions. In the draft of the theses of the program of action of the the Estonian CP brought up for the discussion of communists it is noted that during the process of democratization of intraparty life it is necessary to recognize as natural a multiplicity of opinions and positions, including intraparty discussions and the creation of intraparty platforms. Tomorrow in Tallinn there will be a republic conference of secretaries of local party organizations. Essentially this will begin the intraparty discussion of the leadership position of the the Estonian CP in the process of restructuring in the

republic. I ask that members of the the Estonian CP Central Committee express their opinions even today as to whether or not it is necessary to establish more clearly the procedure for conducting intraparty discussions.

An indispensable part of intraparty democracy is the formation of drafts of decisions of higher party organs on the basis of initiatives and proposals of lower organs, with principally different positions before the adoption of the decision it becomes clear how many communists support one idea or another. Up to this point the party has made decisions on the will of the majority, but the logical result of democratization should also be the accounting for the opinions of the minority. But we have achieved a practice whereby some of the party organizations make decisions without bowing to the position of the the Estonian CP Central Committee. In essence we are dealing with opposition activity, which paralyzes party management. And we must discuss this issue: how far can the party diverge in questions of democratization and allow opposition while the political situation in the republic is becoming more crucial and the broad masses are expecting resolute actions from the party?

Democracy awakened the activity of the masses in the society. Practically all residents of the republic want to influence in one way or another the so-called public policy, the solution to union and republic problems, but at the same time in the local party organizations and also at the level of many gorkoms and raykoms they sometimes forget about their specific tasks, organizational work, and questions of sharing responsibility and bearing responsibility. The local party organizations must show a great deal of interest in the work of the economic services of their institutions and the question of how preparations are proceeding for work under the conditions of the IME. It is very important here to promptly inform the labor collectives of the prospective solutions to important problems of labor and life. Party raykoms and gorkoms should devote special attention to those collectives under union jurisdiction which within the framework of the IME will be transferred to republic jurisdiction. Report and election meetings are beginning in the party organizations. Here it is important to discuss questions of ideological-political and organizational unity of the party, the ethics of the behavior of the communists and a tolerant attitude toward various opinions, and a fundamental reorganization of their work. It is very important above all for the party organizations to provide a clear-cut assessment of the main path of stabilization of the political situation in the republic: a combination of various interests through the parliamentary form and the need to carry out direct laws, even if they do not like one law or another. Ultimatums and political strikes lead to anarchy and chaos, and it is necessary to set up a legal, political and economic barrier against this. The gorkoms and raykoms of the the Estonian CP must engage more energetically in political questions of administrative reform and preparations for elections to local soviets and they must organize discussion of the draft of the program of action of the the Estonian CP and an analysis of opinions. It is important

to organize lectures on interethnic relations in the collectives, discussions, consultations, and explanations of the the Estonian CP national policy.

It seems to me that during past decades we have largely lost our ability to speak openly with the people in simple language. Recently I met with one village resident who told me about how in 1949 he had discussed world problems with Nikolay Karotamm while sitting on a cart. But how many of today's meetings with party workers will people remember 40 years from now?

More members of the the Estonian CP Central Committee could be invited to speak in the collectives so as to explain to the workers the humane nature of the republic's course toward restructuring and its correspondence to the objective interests of all the residents. The the Estonian CP Central Committee and the party gorkoms and raykoms should devote more attention to improvement of the style of party work and the organization of cooperative of released party workers and elected members of party organs and the aktiv. Local party units have expressed just critical remarks about the fact that their proposals which have been submitted to the Central Committee are not taken into account. Apparently the problem is that in order to take into account all the opposing opinions, the divisions of the the Estonian CP Central Committee must take measures to make party work public and explain the reasons for the negative reaction to the proposals that have been made. Human attention should not be burdened by large problems in party work.

An analysis of the events of recent months shows that in spite of the efforts of the the Estonian CP, a tense confrontation of various forces has taken form. The deliberate aggravation of the situation by certain social movements has played a role here. But the main reason is still that the purely political processes and the recognition of the interests of various forces are a long way from determining the social and economic renewal. The obvious disproportion between political and economic development and its deepening can lead the society out of its balance. Therefore it is necessary to take the first step of the political reform immediately and create legal guarantees for the aspirations of the residents of Estonia for sovereignty and protection as well as prerequisites for forming democratic national representative organs.

The Estonian CP Central Committee Buro thinks that in order to complete the first stage of the political reform it is necessary to consistently adopt a package of laws that take into account the interests of various social and ethnic groups, laws on citizenship, referendum, migration and protection of minority rights. Only if one law counterbalances others is it possible to achieve the support of all by the majority.

Unfortunately up to this point we have adopted laws without sufficient preliminary dialogue among political forces which is why resistance has formed in the Supreme Soviet and when laws are adopted there is

frequently no possibility of normal political maneuvering. Moreover, we do not have the mechanism for political dialogue.

Now in the USSR Supreme Soviet we have created commissions which include representatives of various ethnic groups and movements. Upon completion of work the commissions should bring up disputed provisions of the law for public discussion. Not in the offices but in public discussion is where reasonable compromise should originate, and the formulation of these in the law and the approval by the Supreme Soviet is largely parliamentary work.

Naturally, the Estonian CP Central Committee is participating actively in this work. In order to prepare the necessary draft laws the Estonian CP Central Committee has formed a political commission with four subcommissions. In charge of the latter are comrades Titma (Political Support for the Law on Citizenship), Sillari (the Introduction of the Migration Service), Chetvergova (Support of the Rights of National Minorities) and Raydla (Preparation of the Law on Referendums). Naturally, the commissions also include representatives of all possible groups whose interests can be affected by these laws. The formation of political commissions under the Central Committee should be the norm with important legislative initiatives.

It is reasonable even now to form under the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet a consultative counsel of those forces which support peaceful and parliamentary methods of activity. One wishes to believe that this organ will become one of the most important forms of leadership of political processes for a relatively long period of time.

It is clear that the laws will remain on paper unless there are real socioeconomic guarantees. The the Estonian CP has always held the viewpoint that the basis for a law-governed state and Estonian statehood is the IME. As of today the stage of the formation and recognition of the IME as an economic concept of restructuring is complete. Restructuring forces throughout the Soviet Union have come to the conclusion that in the area of economics there are no alternatives to the IME. Therefore attempts to stir up political passions around this should be simply regarded as a desire on the part of conservative forces to halt the process of restructuring.

Therefore at the center of the economic policy of the the Estonian CP should be a changeover to the IME. Each worker, labor collective, and economic organ should translate the basic principles of the IME into the language of concrete deeds. And this, as life shows, proceeds far from smoothly. They are expecting not words but deeds from us.

Now the central problem of the economic policy is the changeover of union enterprises into republic jurisdiction. The polemics around this promise to be heated, since a change in the position of union enterprises affects the interests of thousands of people.



And the strikes that have taken place recently were one of the manifestations of the growing tension around this.

As we know, the leaders of many union enterprises are against changing over to republic jurisdiction. Naturally this opposition is based on objective factors as well. But the main one is the fear of the difficulties generated by restructuring. Instead of preparing their enterprise and its workers for work under the new management conditions, they frequently try to impede the process of changing over and turn the workers against the new management conditions. Incredible rumors have been started about the difficulties that will follow after changing over to republic jurisdiction, beginning with mass firings of workers and ending with the breaking down of the enterprises.

Planning and management agencies which up to this point still draw up the plans in the solitude of their offices are also to blame for the appearance of such an unhealthy situation. Under the conditions of restructuring it should be natural that the plans for changing over are drawn up openly, enlisting representatives of the labor collectives in this. This provides a possibility of taking into account more fully the specifics of one enterprise or another and psychologically preparing the workers for the new management conditions. In order to avoid political tension, the economic transformations at union enterprises should be based on the principles of interest and voluntary participation of the workers. It is necessary to seriously consider the creation under the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers of a joint committee of the STK and OSTK. One must say that all the responsibility for a constructive solution to the aforementioned problems lies with the Estonian Council of Ministers and its leadership.

As early as the 14th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia we emphasize the need to turn restructuring in the direction of concrete problems. But, obviously, at that time we could not precisely determine what was impeding this. Today we are prepared to admit that in spite of our unquestioned successes we have not yet on a single level renewed the authority structures that have taken form in Estonia over the decades. But without breaking them it is impossible to bring the economic and sociopolitical reforms to the area of practical affairs. A key issue of the policy of the the Estonian CP should be consistent decentralization of authority and control of all spheres of social life. The means of production must be returned to the producer, the land—to the farmers, and the power—to the people.

One of the most essential prerequisites for changing over to the IME is an administrative reform. It should not be a campaign for simply replacing slogans and drawing new boundaries. The elected local soviets should be real organs of self-management and leadership which will take on a large part of the functions of authority that are now concentrated in the center. The administrative reform will make it possible to disperse the concentrated political tension in the center and place at least part of the responsibility for providing for political stability on

the regional authority and management agencies. There is no doubt that then they and the local party organizations will begin to deal directly with the problems that are within their competence. The transfer of the functions of social policy and monetary funds to local soviets will ultimately make it possible to get rid of residual financing and will make the social policy truly humane. Taking into account the inevitable economic and social tension that will accompany the initial stage of the IME, this social policy will make it possible even in the near future to essentially stabilize the society.

The administrative reform is the first concrete attempt to begin the reform of the society according to the democratic principle "From Below to Above" and with extensive participation of the masses of people. Local self-management will create a stable basis for the political system of Estonia as a whole. By proceeding only along this path, we will be able to create an effective parliament in which the tone will be set by people involved with real problems of our life and in which purely ideological differences will be pushed into the background.

Unfortunately, the the Estonian CP has remained on the sidelines of this important area of modern Estonian policy. When preparing for the administrative reform, the rayon and city party committees and also the divisions for organizational, party, and personnel work and state and law of the the Estonian CP did not display the proper activity. Naturally, the role of the party here should be consultative. The basic weight and responsibility lies primarily with the presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, its commissions, and the republic government.

We should also discuss certain burning problems of ideological work.

We have repeatedly heard serious criticism about our ideological service and the role of the mass media in the current difficult period is being subjected to criticism.

I should also note here that in a number of the latest events we have managed to maintain peace and equanimity largely because of the restrained tone of the press. In general features journalists have conducted themselves responsibly in these circumstances, calming down emotions.

At the same time it must be stated that there were poorly thought out statements which did not contribute to easing the dangerous standoff.

Sometimes when you look at our categorical and quick-tempered commentaries you get the feeling that they are concerned primarily about looking original and less about comprehensively interpreting the events they are discussing. We should like to see in our journalists a more critical attitude toward themselves and less emotion regarding individual facts.

The leaders of the press will have to think about whom they give unlimited possibilities for advertising their questionable viewpoints.



Of course we are far from demanding the establishment of total control in the old manner over everything that is published by the mass media. But we must become more familiar with the positions of the Communist Party of Estonia regarding important issues. Now the situation seems to be that in the shadow of glasnost and pluralism of opinions the party approaches sometimes disappear altogether. This also means serious criticism of the ideological division of the the Estonian CP Central Committee. We hope that in the near future there will be more regular radio and television programs that provide an opportunity to constantly and clearly become familiar with the positions of the party and show the viewpoint of the the Estonian CP on problems of the republic in all spheres. Esteemed members of the Central Committee! Your word here should carry more weight. We must overcome the fear of expressing our opinions in the press.

Esteemed comrades! Our plan today should also express a viewpoint with respect to the program directions for the activity of the Communist Party of Estonia. As you recall, their development began in the local party organizations and also in the city and rayon committees which as early as last autumn suggested developing a the Estonian CP program. This was followed by the draft developed by the four first secretaries of raykoms and gorkoms with the help of the Tartu scholars which was published in the newspaper EDAZI of 30 and 31 March. Then followed the preliminary developments in the the Estonian CP Central Committee and at the 16th Plenum of the the Estonian CP a decision was made to begin to develop a program of action for the the Estonian CP. After several months a work group consisting of well-known scholars and party workers worked under the the Estonian CP Central Committee. It also submitted a draft for preliminary familiarization with the program directions. Our task is to present it for intraparty discussion, thus enlisting all party organizations of the republic in the development of the program. We shall begin this with the first basic party unit—the local party organization. Tomorrow there will be a republic meeting of secretaries of local organizations on this subject.

What are the basic factors that are motivating us to develop our own program of action? There are several of them. First of all the fact that during the course of restructuring a number of social movements appeared. The the Estonian CP Central Committee welcomes any manifestation of citizen activity and any movement that helps restructuring. As a party which includes representatives of all large social groups, as well as representatives of various nationalities, the the Estonian CP must express the interests of all of them, both general and particular. The latter are the basis for compromises.

The future of the multinational soviet society will depend largely on how we manage to take into account the economic and political peculiarities of various

republics and their national, cultural and political traditions. In other words success can be produced only by multivariant development and a policy that takes local conditions into account.

In order to be the leading force in its republic the Communist Party of the union republic must have its own program which contains an evaluation of the existing situation and determines the basic directions for the development of restructuring in Estonia and the limits of independence of the the Estonian CP and also proposes its own vision of the future of Estonia.

Another prerequisite for the development of our own program is that the course toward decentralization of authority relations requires similar changes in the party leadership as well. From the sovereignty of the union republic it follows that the Communist Party should also express and realize the basic interests of the republic. For it is clear that while preserving the previous style of relations between the party center and the periphery the the Estonian CP will inevitably lose the confidence of the people. Only by reflecting the interests of the republic population will we be able to provide for consolidation of the basic social forces and national groups around the party and for true party authority.

In order to be at the head of restructuring the party must be completely democratic both in its goals and composition and in its tasks. Thus the program should also reflect democratization of the the Estonian CP itself and the moral forms of party life and also responsibility should be clearly expressed.

We hope that the discussion of the program in the local party organizations and then in the plenums of the party gorkoms and raykoms will develop into a broad political discussion during the course of which each party organization will submit its suggestions to improve the program and will find its place in the current fairly complex political situation.

In parallel with this the program commission of the the Estonian CP will continue its work and will generalize the proposals that come in from the local areas and develop a final text of the program.

The 11th Plenum of the the Estonian CP Central Committee held in September of last year returned to us our faith in the possibility of real restructuring in Estonia, we should like very much to hope that today's plenum will help to consolidate the forces of the the Estonian CP in order to solve these problems and improve the situation in the party as well as force us to feel keenly that the authority and effectiveness of the party will depend on our, the communists', wisdom, our labor, responsibility, honor, and conviction—for no other path has been provided for us.

## Estonian CP CC Plenum Discussion of Vyalyas Speech

### Allik on T. Made, Media Coverage

18001666A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in  
Russian 3 Sep 89 p 2

[Speech by Ya. Allik, first secretary of the Vilyandiskiy Estonian CP Raykom, at the 15th Estonian CP Central Committee Plenum held 1 September 1989]

[Text] I do not know whether there is any point in my speaking now: in any case those proposals which I made here 4 months ago have not been given any attention. I was especially struck by the fact that recently in one speech, it seems it was by Comrade Yarovoy and today in the speech by Comrade Vyalyas there was an idea that our Central Committee should convene, as it were, at the negotiating round table an advisory council of various social movements.

I think this idea was included in the decree of our May Plenum. But I cannot say why the Central Committee does not fulfill its decrees. But we Mulgimaas people are stubborn and therefore today I shall try to speak about something in the same spirit. I should probably begin with that with which the commissars ended at the preceding plenum: one part of the population is being fooled while another part is being frightened. This tactic has continued and expanded over the past 4 months. Now the CPSU Central Committee has decided to turn everything upside down and begin to frighten the side which up to this point had been fooled and to fool those who had previously been frightened. But the CPSU Central Committee and Yevgeniy Kogan must understand that it is impossible to create a feeling of confidence in the non-Estonians and achieve economic success by frightening the Estonians in Estonia. This tactic is no better than the previous one and also leads to an impasse.

What really frightens me in the social atmosphere of the republic is the lack of ethics, political culture, and elementary human decency in our social life. And we, possibly not aware of it each time, have begun to shake the ethical principle the lack of which leads social life into chaos. In recent years Estonian television and the newspaper EDAZI have begun to make a popular hero out of Tiyt Made. He has been given the forum for appealing to the voters and accusing the deputies who signed a letter of protest against him and also the possibility of condemning Andres Kyunk for allegedly selling out his pen to Estonian communists. And the evaluations of the representative Tiyt Made from the television screen act with a great deal of authority on tens of thousands of people.

All this is what has shaken me: I thought that we still had some kind of limit beyond which a person would feel a natural sense of shame and there should be a feeling of moral solidarity with people and colleagues.

T. Made is an experienced politician and he is professionally impeccable. His purpose is to increase the

tension in interethnic relations to the extreme and evoke a negative reaction against Estonia abroad, one which he has already fully achieved in the Soviet Union. But coming from a different society he was unable to anticipate that in such a civilized democratic country as Sweden and also in other countries of Western Europe it is not acceptable to speak about the nationality of one's partner in communication and even less to make any unkind remarks about his nationality. If we, say, are in the company of other people and someone comes there and says something unkind, say, about the external appearance of somebody present, all of us are embarrassed regardless of whether he was right or not. Made could not anticipate that in the consciousness of the European intelligentsia this mechanism operates also when someone begins to insult representatives of some other ethnic group—this is simply barbarous and violates modern manners.

In the democratic countries of Europe after such a declaration the political career of Mr. Tiyt Made would have been ended forever and not a single decent party would have nominated him as a candidate. The voters that have rejected him not because they did not agree with his ideas but because they would simply be aware that their senator was not able to behave himself properly in society. The reaction would have been approximately what it would have been if he had not been able to eat with a knife and fork. Made's justifications that all of the Estonian people think as he does or as Dostoyevskiy in "Pushkin" wrote that has nothing to do with it. The only ones who can criticize a people are those who belong to this people—this has long been recognized among all civilized people. And we and Made really are producing an uncivilized impression on the civilized world, especially when we demonstrate our lack of a sense of the impropriety of what is going on which forced us to curtail his advertising.

The same kind of campaign was started to make a hero out of a Pylva chap who refused to serve in the army. It is clear that we must fight against bad laws and introduce an alternative military service, and as soon as possible, but we must not make heroes out of people who violate the law. The society and its representatives—the journalists—must have a moral sense of danger which eliminates such things for otherwise our moral boundaries will disappear and our respect for the law will disappear and as a result there will be moral collapse. I am not even speaking about the political aspect of the matter, but are we prepared for the consequences if suddenly hundreds of young people decide to see their photographs in the newspapers and on television just as easily?

One can give many examples of strange changes in our moral consciousness. To put it lightly, now in our mass media it is especially fashionable to poke fun at communism and communists both within the country and in a foreign political context. It is obvious that here is a strain on our nerves since history and also the present day of the Communist Party provides plenty of occasions for rejoicing at other's misfortunes. Laughter should also be

to one's advantage, but when encountering problems entering the party and leaving it each day, I probably take these jokes more seriously than I should. And I do not understand it at all when the mass media which are led by communists joke this way.

An intraparty discussion of the program of the Communist Party of Estonia [KPE] is now beginning. So during the course of it let us decide on the issue of whether we need the party or not. If not, let us disband with a calm conscience. But an intelligent writer without party affiliation, Yaan Kaplinskiy, on 29 August published in the newspaper EDAZI an article entitled "Civil War and Us" in which he takes quite the opposite viewpoint. I would advise representatives of the Russian-speaking mass media who have translated a number of other of Kaplinskiy's articles to be sure to publish this one. It would be interesting to see whether this article makes the jokers stop and think.

The attitude toward our own history is becoming more and more unethical. Saying that Estonian culture is now the ruins of Estonian culture of the bourgeois period or rejoicing in the departure of the Red Army from Tallinn in 1941, we are restoring a historical memory. (Examples are taken from the party press of subsequent times.) Again going through history with cans of black and white paint, we are simply making fools of yet another generation of Estonians.

It seems to me that in terms of the level of ethics and political culture of social orators we lag far behind Western Europe. What should we do? Obviously, we should be fairly aware of the situation of social development in which we find ourselves and build our political system correspondingly.

A party leader who would demand in a parliament of Western Europe the prohibition of strikes by law would seriously risk his political career. In our country such an appeal finds support. Of course one could assert that we are not a democratic society and a developing democracy must protect itself. I agree with this but let us be aware that this means that we are not a democratic society and we cannot simultaneously demand prohibition of strikes by law and elections to parliament according to party lists. These are arias from different operas, demands of a society with different levels of democracy. When people want to submit them simultaneously I am reminded of Kant's categorical imperative: Do not act toward others in a way that you do not wish for them to act toward you. This eternal requirement of absolute ethics is excluded from our present political life whereas before we have in operation a principle that says the goal justifies the means—"What is correct is what is useful to me and the law should state this." Nobody seems to want to understand that it is precisely this principle that led the Bolsheviks onto the bloody path and exterminated their initial noble belief in a state of justice and freedom.

I can see the danger that whatever forces may come to power in Estonia except for the KPE, which, incidentally, is now actually the most tolerant social movement

in Estonia, we will end up faced with a new dictatorship, a new representation for a people who have already suffered so much.

But it is clear that one does not move from totalitarianism to democracy in a single night, with a single leap. In the interim there should be a regime subject to democratic control which recognizes democratic values but is fairly strict, which will overcome the economic crisis. Whether we like it or not the Soviet Union is now moving in this direction. Our most important task is to provide for the functioning of the mechanism of democratic control under this regime and above all the mechanisms of intraparty democracy.

I should like to touch upon another sensitive subject in the relations between politics and ethics, risking being condemned by the audience. In the social division of labor there are sometimes unpleasant tasks which, however, must be carried out in order for the society to function normally. The performance of such tasks is sometimes tragic and unethical but in a number of cases it is inevitable. The work is done but society declares the ones who do it to be heroes. Among these tasks is the suppression of strikes—but we have begun to make a glorious feat out of this. It was indeed necessary to provide for normal functioning of economic life and transportation and honor and glory should go to the transportation committee for being able to do this. But I have never found an analysis of reflection of a tragic situation into which simple working people were led because of the fact that the politicians were unable to agree among themselves. If one worker has to come and do the work for another who is striking, and these relations arise on national soil, this ethical abyss with its far-reaching consequences into which we have thrust the workers becomes terribly deep and will take vengeance on us for a long time to come.

In this situation we can accuse only the political leadership of the republic and the leaders of all the social movements of whom in the current situation we have the right to demand that they lead in such a way that there are no strikes in Estonia. This would not mean concessions to the strikers on the strike committee since then the other side—the Estonian workers—could begin to strike and then obviously the strike breakers would come from other republics. This is indeed the path to the abyss and the CPSU Central Committee is right about this. There is not nor can there be such a concept as "confession" in the political lexicon. Politics is the search for ways of moving forward, the search for the path which everyone recognizes that he has gained something and nobody has violated his basic principles. The actual result will not satisfy anyone. In the republic it is not clear that we have become accustomed to this way of thinking yet and everyone is satisfying his rights in the old way. Naturally, conducting this policy is a very complicated process and requires above all unity in the republic leadership. We must not hope that the OSTK and STK or deputies of the Supreme Soviet will reach an agreement among themselves until an agreement is reached in the Bureau of the KPE Central Committee. When at the last session of the Supreme Soviet

after Comrade Vyalyas's appeal not to vote according to the national indicator the Buro of the Central Committee still voted precisely on the basis of these principles they voted practically unanimously and deliberately for the continuation of the strikes and also the situation in which we have ended up today and for all the subsequent economic and political harm.

On behalf of the communists of my rayon I first of all hope for a unified platform in questions of the political life of the republic on the part of the Buro of the KPE Central Committee. Otherwise there can be no unified direction or unified activity of the local organizations. If it is impossible to achieve unity the Buro must apply for leave and allow Comrade Vyalyas to form a new leadership for Comrade Vyalyas can bear no moral responsibility for the unity of the current Buro since he did not select it. Do we not find here also the roots of the current political situation and would such a step not be a real support for the leadership of the republic in more than just words?

I should like to conclude somewhat more optimistically. It seems that now that the extreme viewpoints have proved fairly clearly that they are not constructed and are dangerous a certain sobering up has begun. Attempts to impose one's will on the opposite sides may perhaps continue for a short period of time but nothing will come of this. It seems that a period of constructive political activity is coming when the KPE will be able to strengthen its leading role and considerably increase its authority. To do this it is necessary to begin very active political activity for defining and developing possible further variants of development. I was glad to hear in the report that such a course has been taken. Regardless of how people feel about the declaration of the CPSU Central Committee on the moral and legal plane, it must be recognized that it was clearly stated there that we are balancing on the edge of a knife. The people understand that only professionals can balance on that edge. It seems to me that precisely here lies a large chance for the Communist Party of Estonia and at the same time here lies its mission to the people of Estonia.

#### **Ryuytel on Minority Views**

*18001666B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 3 Sep 89 p 2*

[Speech by A. Ryuytel, chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, at the 15th Estonian CP Central Committee Plenum held 1 September 1989]

[Text] The experience of a year and a half of restructuring in Estonia has shown that the majority of residents of the republic support the course of the CPSU toward radical transformation of economic, social, and political relations. This can be done only by strengthening the democratization of the Soviet society and socialist self-management of the people. It is clear that implementation of the course toward renewal in Estonia requires getting rid of our sore spots and depends on how well we succeed in realizing the IME, raising the standard of living of all residents of the republic, and developing democracy.

Subsequently the position of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, which supports the restoration of the Leninist principle of self-determination of nations in its true sense and which should be supported by the corresponding democratic rights is extremely important.

Recently a relatively tense political situation has developed in Estonia, which impedes the implementation of what is planned. This is caused by the difference in the level of information and understanding by the movement and its associations and Estonian residents of the socioeconomic, sociopolitical and demographic processes in the history of Estonia.

All residents of our republic are longing for a safe life. This can be provided only to the republic's sovereignty, a full right to independent decision making, and accounting for the common interests of all residents regardless of their nationalities. There is only one path to this—the path of the goal-directed parliamentary democracy.

We are supported in our unwavering movement forward along this path by the resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the platform of the CPSU concerning the national policy. The democratic discussion of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet confirms the support from the deputies as representatives of the voters of the course toward restructuring.

The Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, also in keeping with the will of the majority of the people, adopted a number of fundamental laws during last year. These are acts concerning the sovereignty of the republic and republic economic accountability, the law on language, and the law on elections to the local soviets of people's deputies.

The critical problems of the present day ensue from the complex and contradictory nature of the political situation both in Estonia and throughout the Soviet Union, which was formed out of the various interests and approaches that have existed for decades up to the present day. Any provisions of the constitutions of the USSR and the republic and a number of unionwide legislative acts do not contribute to rapid development of restructuring either.

We are faced with a complicated and lengthy job of developing new basic laws of the USSR and union republics and updating all legislation. One of the steps toward this was the adoption by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 27 July of this year of a decree which approves the concept of IME and which establishes that legislative acts regulating economic relations are effective in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania only to the extent that they do not impede the changeover of these union republics to economic accountability. This is a qualitatively new approach to our aspirations and our will to unwaveringly implement a policy for restructuring.

But this process is contradictory which is also shown by the circumstance that the legislative acts adopted on 16 November of last year by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet and the recent law on elections to local soviets of

people's deputies were obsessed in various ways. The Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 16 August of this year registers the lack of correspondence of our Law on Elections to the USSR Constitution. The second point of the ukase suggests that the USSR Supreme Soviet returned to these issues at the next session where the deputies of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet will bring the final decision in line with the will of the voters.

At the last session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet a group of deputies submitted a proposal to account for the opinions and interests of the minority when developing and adopting legislative acts. In order to develop these proposals the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet formed a group of experts which include deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. In the near future the group will submit its proposal to the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

The basic content of the proposals is that in the stage of development of legislative acts various opinions and viewpoints should be taken into account more than they are now. Here we can take an example from the work practice of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. But it is clear that various opinions, regardless of how we may try to reconcile them, will still remain in our society for a long time.

In our work we have always tried to learn the attitudes and positions of various movements and associations and we have met and exchanged opinions with their leaders. Dialogue with representatives of the so-called republic strike committee is continuing. In our work we have also relied on recently conducted sociological research.

For further implementation and legal support for restructuring, in the near future we must adopt a number of laws: a law on citizenship, a law on referendums, a law on peoples living in the Estonian SSR, a law on the fundamentals of local self-management and economics, and a law on elections to the Supreme Soviet.

Each day the presidium of the Estonian SSR receives from the population, labor collectives, movements and associations contradictory opinions and evaluations of the declaration of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Situation in the Republics of the Soviet Baltic Area" but all of them show concern for the safety of the residents of Estonia. This safety should be ensured by our daily work and our composure in the name of the future of Estonia.

#### Titma on Alliance With Moscow

18001666C Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in  
Russian 5 Sep 89 p 3

[Speech by M. Titma, secretary of the Estonian CP Central Committee, at the 15th Estonian CP Central Committee Plenum held 1 September 1989]

[Text] First of all I should like to emphasize that today's plenum was directly brought about by the Declaration of the CPSU Central Committee. For the plenum for the first time since the 14th Plenum is proceeding in an atmosphere in which one feels the possibility of

achieving a compromise. We are leaving expressions and epithets to the side and on the whole have created an atmosphere for further development on the basis of which it is possible to create an effective future. Now I should like to go into greater detail about the question of our allies. The issue is that we cannot go on without allies. The basic problem now consists in searching for allies. This should be taken into account especially when reading the Declaration of the CPSU Central Committee. When selecting allies we must see the goals for which we are striving. Almost all of the people of the country have a negative attitude toward the past. Here the number of allies is very great. But when we approach the positive goals very large differences arise since the goals of various social groups and political leaders are established from quite different perspectives of all the ways of achieving them. Here the real watershed begins. If we now look at the Declaration of the CPSU Central Committee from this standpoint, it has become the most important information for us. From it the Estonian people have come to understand well that in principle in the current stage of restructuring the question of seceding from the union is a provocation. This has probably become clear to everyone. Let us set aside the tone and everything else which clearly depends on the stagnant formulas of past times. We can even analyze the amplitude of the entire text which follows the texts of the 1960's. Let us take the basic issue of the Declaration and now pose the basic problems from the standpoint of an ally.

For many people the basic problem consists in whether or not M. S. Gorbachev knew about the Declaration. Which of the leaders actually stands behind the Declaration? Apparently since the Declaration was made on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee, in a certain sense complete unanimity was achieved concerning the main point. And in this main point, if one thinks about it soberly, the leadership of the Soviet Union could not have a different viewpoint now. Consequently, if we want to acquire allies in Moscow, and I have always held the viewpoint that restructuring in Estonia in any form can develop only under the condition that Moscow is our ally, completing the progressive leadership of the CPSU Central Committee, only then can we proceed forward. This is our first and most important ally. And we must act on the basis of this. For more than a thousand years the Estonians have lived side by side with the Russians and they will continue to do so. Consequently we must seek allies primarily among the progressive circles in the RSFSR. Other allies are too temporary, since geopolitically we are most interested in a democratic Russia. When speaking further about allies, one must discuss the main aspect for which our ideological service is to blame. I thought this especially when I was in the United States. We have now begun to elucidate Estonia's past very openly. There have been many published articles pertaining both to the period of the Estonian republic and to the 1940's. It was very unpleasant for me to read an article published in the magazine VIKERKAAR by M. Laar about the service of Estonians in the German army.

When I was abroad I had a deep sense of the ambiguity of this question and I can imagine what will take place in the hearts of non-Estonian people if such texts are disseminated. Abroad there arose the quite pointed question of whether the Estonians really are beginning to identify themselves with the fascists. But the text that elucidates the past from 1941 through 1944 asserts precisely that in places. I can understand the motivation: to show also those Estonians who frequently as a result of pressure during the time of Stalinism ended up on that side of the front. During the terrible war years many people ended up in difficult situations and fratricide was committed on both sides. But still one must recognize the significance the texts have. If they uncritically ennoble the fascist invasion this is fundamentally alien to mankind. The same problem arises in connection with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its interpretation. The whole world understands that the Soviet Union was the major force in the fight against fascist German and that it bore the fundamental burden of World War II. One should clearly distinguish the Stalinist political regime from the struggle of the Soviet people against fascism. Stalinist crimes should be distinguished from the struggle of the Russian people against the fascist aggressors.

One cannot place Hitler's German in the Soviet Union on the same side of the scales in the war. Let us think about the effect produced by such an approach in the question of allies. We can condemn Stalinism and all of its crimes but in world policy we must see the interconnection of events. It is very easy to create opponents. Although my name was not mentioned I have had quite a few unpleasant occasions in connection with the fact that in one part of my interview I used the expression "priority of the indigenous nation" which disturbed the non-Estonians. They are even speaking about a large theory. I personally do not know where this theory was developed. Let us call things something else without using the concept priority. Let us note that Estonia is the ancient home for Estonians and they should be the masters in their ancient home. Let us speak about the right to self-determination. Let us reject the word "priority" and there is no theory of priorities in existence.

Here I should like to return to the republic problems. If we want to move forward now we have only one path. Throughout the Soviet Union there is clearly a further popularization of restructuring and anti-restructuring forces. It will become even deeper and I join the preceding speakers who asserted that actually we are a testing ground. That is the way it really is. For in essence this same struggle is taking place throughout the country. In connection with this at the level of the union a certain stalemate situation is being created in the republic so that restructuring is not proceeding too rapidly here. In this respect I do not believe that non-Estonians do not understand that we can become pawns in a large game. They probably do understand. The more so since we Estonians must understand this. Consequently, the only possibility of moving further involves the uniting both communities of population so that through difficult but efficient compromise we can arrive at joint actions. Only

this will make it possible for us to move forward. This should obviously be question number one in our policy in the immediate future. In order for us to move forward together it seems to me that all forces of the party central committee should be directed toward achieving balance in a package of legislative initiatives in these four commissions. So that we will be able to give both groups a feeling of confidence and thus create preconditions for implementation of the IME and for the development of restructuring in the republic since the people in the republic do not want to live as they have been living in the situation that is now developed and we ourselves do not want it either. So I wish for strength for everyone!

### Toome Criticizes CPSU CC Statement

*18001666D Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 5 Sep 89 pp 3-4*

[Speech by I. Toome, chairman of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, at the 15th Estonian CP Central Committee Plenum held 1 September 1989]

[Text] I fully recognize my responsibility for the situation that has developed in the republic. In the economic and political sense since next year I will have an anniversary in my life—I will have worked for 25 years in Estonia in Komsomol, party, or soviet organs. All the political events of this time have developed before my eyes and in a certain sense with my participation. I wish to share with you my thoughts evoked when analyzing the critical events of recent times.

It is natural that the Declaration of the CPSU Central Committee served as the occasion for today's plenum. But even without the appearance of this document, today's exchange of opinions, in my view, would have been necessary. Restructuring will become a revolutionary process only when some of the old is actually rejected and we do not simply speak about the need to reject it.

The Estonian society is dynamic and the tactics, cooperation, interests and possible unions of various political forces change depending on reality. But success in the future will not be achieved without flexible and constant reinterpretation of tactics. And in order for us to be able always to rely on the collective reason of communists, and the will of the republic party organization as a whole, obviously, it is expedient to convene more frequently than we have up to this point so that we can discuss the questions of our tactics at the plenums. In modern Estonia there is not a single political force, including, naturally, the Communist Party of Estonia, that can achieve success without constant and deep analysis of the political situation.

The question of questions in today's political process is the attitude toward the role of the people of Estonia and the party in restructuring. At the unionwide level there are constant polemics whose essence consists in the following. Since the party began restructuring the party could lead it single-handedly. I even got the impression that certain leading politicians understood this meaning

that the party should be acquainted only with the Central Committee and its leadership. If they agree with the proposals from the floor, it is possible to continue restructuring and if they do not agree it is not. I think that this approach is erroneous. Actually the CPSU Central Committee and the progressive part of it began restructuring and are making a large contribution to its further development. But if the people in the republic today become the subject of political life and political power and if the local leaders do not begin to carry out the will of the people but wait for instructions from above, there will be no restructuring in its true meaning. Neither in the Soviet Union nor here in Estonia. If the leaders of all ranks do not interpret restructuring for themselves as a process that truly democratizes society whereby the people realize their own will, something here is profoundly wrong.

The next question that must be answered before we can determine the strategy and tactics of the Communist Party of Estonia is this: Who is in charge in the national republic, in our case in Estonia? I shall clarify this question: Is the master in Estonia all union leadership or the leadership elected by the people of Estonia relying on the interests and the will of the people? Here I have in mind all residents of Estonia.

Or another question that awaits an answer. Is the Estonians' right to self-determination today problematic or real?

Now for a couple of words about the report. The report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia [KPE] gave a detailed analysis of the issues I shall touch upon today. The conclusions and evaluations of the causes of today's tension and the proposed paths for searching for political compromise plus the suggestions for continuing restructuring, and stabilizing the political, social and economic life, in my opinion, are logical, they reflect reality adequately, and they deserve support.

I wish to emphasize another thought which again we must clarify for ourselves. The tension in the process of restructuring in the social life in Estonia cannot be avoided. Disagreements, various political views, various political interests, and contradictions between opponents and proponents of restructuring actually do exist. There is no point in burying our head in the sand. In certain cases these contradictions can be reduced and in others they may be deepened. Let us be dialecticians and recognize this. In my opinion we would have arrived at the political situation we have today, a genuine dialectical conflict, sooner or later, even without the adoption of the laws on language and elections to local soviets about which so much is being said today. Therefore in the future let us be fully aware: of course we are in a very tense and complicated but objectively normal condition of the society. And possibilities for reasonable political compromise exist in the present and in future tense moments, and the Communist Party of Estonia should take advantage of them more frequently. I think that we are far from exhausting such possibilities.

It would be dishonest if I did not give my personal assessment of the Declaration of the CPSU Central Committee. In any case for me many things became clearer as a result of this Declaration. I believe that each communist in this hall, whether he is a member or a candidate member of the Central Committee, in spirit gave an evaluation to this document. Some approved and others disapproved. I agree with the points of the report and the provisions of the report and I agree with the appeal of the Bureau of the KPE Central Committee. But I would like to add one thing. The Declaration of the CPSU Central Committee should be perceived as a serious political document. And every communist should evaluate it according to his own convictions. This is quite natural since in our party we have no areas that are closed off to criticism.

There undoubtedly is something in the Declaration of the CPSU Central Committee that causes us to think deeply. It is quite clear that we are doing our political work in the republic not simply jumping from one victory to another. There are plenty of shortcomings in our work. These were discussed in the report at the Plenum as well. As a communist I wish to say that the Declaration of the CPSU Central Committee contains, obviously because of tendentious and inadequate information, provisions which do not correspond to the situation in Estonia. This is the first thing. The Declaration also has points with which I cannot agree either under these circumstances or as a communist or as a government head. It is possible to warn a government and it is possible to warn a party, but, in my opinion, nobody has the right to raise a question about the viability of a nation. The most stupid thing in politics and for a politician is to condemn a nation in everything. In my opinion the situation in Estonia is not such that a striving for earmarked goals could end up in catastrophe for our people.

In my opinion, a number of ideas in the declaration do not correspond to the principles of restructuring. At the same time I wish to emphasize that one should not take an emotionally negative attitude toward the Declaration of the CPSU Central Committee but should relate to it as is indicated in the draft of our plenum decree. We must calmly analyze everything that is said there based on our situation. And another thing. I gave some thought to why recently there has been special criticism of the fundamentals of the modern policy in the Baltic area and in Estonia and why the central press, with perhaps a few exceptions, has begun so persistently and zealously to see everything happening here through dark glasses. But when I read these lines in the Declaration: "Soviet people in all corners of the country were surprised and bitter to see and read about such things which had never entered their minds about national traditions of the Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians and would seem to be profoundly insulting to the national character of these peoples who are known for their honesty, sober-mindedness, and respect for the civilized norms of human relations," then I asked myself the question: Who



ordered this transfer of inadequate information to the central press and television?

As they say, you reap what you sow. Misinformation also creates a distorted idea about the affairs of the Baltic peoples among all the Soviet people. Obviously this direction of mass information is necessary to someone in order to show that the restructuring process in the Baltic area is an anomaly with respect to the unionwide process of restructuring. I believe that the CPSU Central Committee will take measures to put an end to this subjective approach in evaluating the process of restructuring in Estonia and on the pages of PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and other publications they will find a place for weighed, analytical and dialectical materials which will reflect both the shortcomings and the successes of our restructuring processes.

The strikes, the Declaration of the CPSU Central Committee, the negative attitude toward our latest enterprises by some of the foreign press—all this requires serious self-analysis and a critical evaluation of what has been done. In fact if a large part of the residents of Estonia and also representatives of many other republics and foreigners observing us from the outside do not understand our steps, our ideas, and our decisions, we must check them mentally ourselves. There probably are some mistakes and some excessive haste. At the same time it would be wrong to rashly declare one decision or another to be erroneous. Life itself will show the correctness of one step or another. I am convinced that on the strategic plane we should be sure of the goals earmarked by the 11th Plenum. That on behalf of which we began restructuring: political and economic independence, openness and democracy, and an economically prosperous and humane Estonia. Proceeding from these goals it is necessary to plan our affairs for today and tomorrow.

As chairman of the Council of Ministers I have an expressly strong sense of the disproportion between economics and politics. The way to overcome this is known—the IME [Self-Managed Estonia]. Its implementation is not so simple since our time is limited and we must not hurry. This is the reality of today. Work on the IME is proceeding in more than 20 work groups. The growth plan [State Planning Committee] is already in the stage of completion of the first draft laws. On Monday they will be discussed in the government. There is active work at the union level as well. This is not easy. One can feel the opposition from departments in Moscow and the wait-and-see attitude in the republic. But things are moving.

We have not yet determined precisely the priorities up to 1 January 1990 and there is perhaps no logical goal for the adoption of the more and less important laws and their interconnectedness. Today it is especially important to enlist regions, enterprises and departments, to adapt their activity to the concept of the IME, and unite the interests of the enterprises and the republic with as little pain as possible. We shall also be honest about the fact that today we cannot give simple answers to all the

basic questions. The Council of Ministers, the Gosplan, and the IME Commission must first of all strengthen their coordinating role. And the party organizations shall also have a certain role here.

One can increasingly sense the connection between the IME and politics. For example, serious elections to local power organs cannot take place until laws are adopted concerning local self-management, taxes, budget, and business. The relationship of the non-Estonian population to the IME and other key issues of Estonia will probably change fairly significantly after the adoption of the law on citizenship. Here we must be clear and interpret the provisions unambiguously. We cannot allow statements like, "You are not recognized," "You are second-grade," and so forth to deepen the sense of mistrust among the non-Estonian population.

The realization of all this is undoubtedly made more difficult by inter-ethnic tension which has been exacerbated by the strike. Let us say directly that the strike was directed toward changing the course of the 11th Plenum of the KPE that was being followed by the management organs. The strike caused serious harm to the national economy as a union since enterprises looking for the Ministry of Defense were on strike.

The strike also disturbed the work of enterprises of the republic, especially transportation. The losses are appreciable but they were caused the enterprises themselves. This is the firm opinion of the government which is in keeping with the Law on the State Enterprise. But the government is always ready to conduct constructive negotiations with everyone and to proceed toward reasonable compromises. And we always start with the interests of the matter, the interests of the people, and the goals of the IME. All political forces, including extreme groupings, must understand that the achievement of economic independence and real changes in daily life is the only path to reducing tension.

A couple of words about the organizational question of today's plenum. I am a person who at one of the conferences at which Buro members met with first secretaries said that apparently we must make it possible for the first secretary, Comrade V. Vyalyas, to form a new Bureau. After the plenum on 16 July of last year, he inherited the old members of the Central Committee as well as the old composition of the Buro, although several changes in the composition of the Buro had taken place anyway. The Buro must be unified. The Buro must make decisions so that they can be carried out unanimously. I do not wish to impose this idea on you, it was expressed as a polemical one and the first secretary of the KPE Central Committee, V. Vyalyas, obviously wanted to express his own opinion before we began to take up organizational issues.

I do not think that any of the current members of the Central Committee Bureau will argue with the fact that this step is expedient.

And, in conclusion. Anything that is authentic in this life is generated with difficulty and a great deal of pain. And



we all want an genuinely new Estonia and a people who are genuinely struggling for restructuring. We want a new, democratic life and society. In Estonia, where all people, regardless of their nationality, will feel confident and have faith in their leadership and the power structure. People want clarity and a sense of being protected and they are expecting us to contribute to achieving this. I do not think that we have the right to frustrate these hopes.

### **Armenian CP Leaders Explore Loss of Party Authority, Leadership Role**

90US0054 Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian  
10 Sep 89 p 2

[Roundtable discussion among A. Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Massisskiy Rayon Committee of the Armenian CP; M. Garagash, CPSU member; L. Gustin, first secretary of the Leninskiy Rayon Party Committee of the Armenian CP; G. Kazaryan, secretary of the party buro of the Sovkoz imeni Lenin, Echmiadzinskiy Rayon; V. Mnatsakanyan, deputy head of the Armenian CP Central Committee's Department of Party Organizational and Cadre Work; V. Ter- Arutyunyan, secretary of the party committee of the Armenian Aviokompleks Production Association; and V. Petrosyan, first secretary of the Spandaryanskiy Rayon Party Committee, moderated by *KOMMUNIST* editor B. Mkrtchyan: "Why Is the Vanguard Lagging Behind?"]

[Text] The alarming trend that manifested itself two years ago, namely the fact that a number of party organizations have been lagging behind the dominant attitudes and dynamic processes that are unfolding in society, is no longer a secret from anyone today. The CPSU Central Committee's resolution on holding reports and elections states outright that society is essentially undergoing a critical period in restructuring. The party's activity is taking place in the context of a deterioration of the situation in the socioeconomic sphere and in people's attitudes. The party has found itself under fire of criticism precisely because of the fact that many committees and organizations have been lagging behind the restructuring processes. A real threat has arisen of a weakening of the CPSU's leading role.

The reasons for the lag on the part of Soviet society's political vanguard and measures to overcome the existing situation were the subject of a recent *KOMMUNIST* round-table discussion involving the following participants: A. Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Massisskiy Rayon Committee of the Armenian Communist Party; M. Garagash, CPSU member since 1920; L. Gustin, first secretary of the Leninskiy Rayon Party Committee of the Armenian Communist Party; G. Kazaryan, secretary of the party buro of the Sovkoz imeni Lenin, Echmiadzinskiy Rayon; V. Mnatsakanyan, deputy head of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee's Department of Party Organizational and Cadre Work; V. Ter- Arutyunyan, secretary of the party committee of the Armenian Aviokompleks Production Association; and V. Petrosyan, first secretary of the

Spandaryanskiy Rayon Party Committee. The discussion was moderated by *KOMMUNIST* editor B. Mkrtchyan.

**Moderator:** Let's not be repetitious. It has often been stated from the loftiest rostrums that all is not well in the work of various units of our party at the present, very critical stage in restructuring. There are a good many problems here. And we need to analyze them and assess what is going on from a principled standpoint and in a party fashion, and to disclose the reasons that a number of party committees and organizations are lagging behind the restructuring processes and marking time. Let us recall V. I. Lenin, who said that in politics, as in all public life, not to move forward means to be thrown backward.

**L. Gustin:** If one makes a quick analysis, one can say that immediately after April 1985 it was easy for the party apparatus to work. The people viewed it as the initiator of restructuring, whose ideas were consonant with people's attitudes. But after a while, sharp and harsh criticism started to be leveled at party officials. Maybe such an attitude in society toward the work of party agencies and party personnel was partly engendered by the exposure of past mistakes and distortions, unrestricted criticism in the press, attacks on party executives, and the equating of them with bureaucrats.

**M. Garagash:** The barrier that exists between the apparatus and the people is a reality. Back under Stalin the party apparatus became an obstacle in the leader's communication with the masses. On the basis of personal experience, I can say with certainty that today a Communist cannot even get to see the city party committee without impediment. A stern guard wearing a militia uniform sits there and will not allow anyone to enter the building without a pass. This seems strange and incomprehensible to me. Who in the 1920s could have thought that it would be necessary to show a pass in order to enter the building of any committee, up to and including the Central Committee? Usually a person who wanted to see a secretary wasted only a few minutes. All it took was to climb the stairs to the building where the republic Knowledge Society is now located in order to meet with Ashot Ionisyan, who we considered a terrifying bureaucrat at that time.

**V. Petrosyan:** And in my opinion, it has now simply become fashionable to berate the apparatus. Yet the pay of a so-called party functionary is not high, and there are no benefits, although he sometimes has to work until 11:00 pm.

**V. Mnatsakanyan:** So we often work for naught, if we sit until late at night! It's understandable that if people on the raykoms dump every problem on their own shoulders, they will have to sit in their offices round-the-clock. I, for example, worked for many years as secretary of the Kanaz Party Committee. And to take one instance, the raykom demanded that before a candidate could be accepted for membership in the CPSU, his candidacy had to be discussed in the raykom, without fail. Either

the raykom did not trust one of the largest party organizations in the rayon, or it was afraid to let go of one mechanism for influencing primary party organizations.

**G. Kazaryan:** Obviously, there is a certain amount of truth in that. However, in my view, the party's lag behind the rapid processes that are unfolding in society is due to the adherence of personnel to obsolete methods and style of work, and their adherence to the party's former functions as a whole. For a long time, the party, to all intents and purposes, elevated itself over the entire administrative-command system, monitored all processes of state, economic and ideological life, and issued incontrovertible directives and commands to state and economic-management agencies and public organizations.

Now, guided by the decisions of the 19th Party Conference, the party buro has no right to impose its will on economic managers and cannot issue instructions to public organizations. And frankly speaking, we do not know how to exercise political guidance. Moreover, how can I avoid concerning myself, for example, with questions of vegetable growing and marketing output, if I am held accountable for that even now, if in the final analysis the evaluation of my work as the secretary of a party buro depends to a significant degree on the results of the sovkhoz's economic performance?

**B. Mkrtchyan:** The old stereotype led us to depersonalize all the other organizations besides the party apparatus and deprive them of initiative. I recall one case. I arrive in the rayon and drop by to see the first secretary. He has surrounded himself with information and is awaiting a phone call from "upstairs" asking him to report on the progress of the planting. Right there in his office sit both the chairman of the rayon agroindustrial association and the director of the statistical administration, but for some reason it is the raykom secretary himself who is supposed to report. The ispolkom officials gladly accept such a state of affairs. And then they engage in demagoguery, claiming that they've been deprived of their rights and prevented from working, and that the first secretary takes everything upon himself. To all intents and purposes, we have turned our state into a state of first persons—everyone else just runs errands.

**A. Arutyunyan:** The reason that sort of situation often develops is not because party functionaries do not want to operate according to the methods of political leadership. After all, how is our work structured? What's demanded of us is what we concern ourselves with. A rural raykom secretary is held particularly accountable for the fulfillment of elements of the Food Program. And if there is a breakdown in some sector or another, a detailed resolution is adopted and everything is placed under the secretary's personal responsibility. And so he has to be constantly hustling. Moreover, the conditions are created for another campaign, rather than consistent and purposeful work. At the same time, when several officials are concerned with one and the same matter, the accountability of each one of them is lowered. Granted, we have managed to rectify this situation somewhat.

Thanks to the regular holding of Open Letter Day and the single reception of citizens by officials of different services and ranks, the number of visitors to the raykom has decreased. People have gained confidence that the matter that concern them will be resolved in the ispolkom. And it is no wonder that the number of people appealing directly to the rayon soviet ispolkom has grown fivefold.

**L. Gustin:** I cannot help dwelling on yet another reason for the decline in our prestige. Just think how many decisions we make! And they are seemingly carefully weighed decisions and the only correct ones. It would be hard to find any issue on which a ready decision could not be found today. As a result, things stand still and go nowhere. Afterwards an analysis is made and it is found out that someone neglected or failed to do something. And objective reasons are always found. People are already tired of such an outcome. They get the impression that the party is looking for excuses, convinced that the decision was correct, but that the people responsible for carrying it out simply ruined it.

Let me cite, for example, the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers' decree "On Measures for the Further Development of the City Economy of Yerevan in the years 1986-1990." An important and serious document. And what has changed in the past few years in the capital? Many problems, to the contrary, have gotten more complicated. 20,000 people in our rayon are still living in emergency housing. I doubt that they will manage to be settled by the year 2000. And who is to blame for this? Why don't we name the specific people responsible for taking action, so that people will know who to hold accountable? A paradoxical situation develops. I know what the enterprises located within our rayon are supposed to do to carry out that decree. But who should do what for our rayon, I do not exactly know. Yet I am the one who usually has to answer to the residents of emergency housing.

In everything that affects people's interests, clarity and glasnost are essential. And in general, the people should be candidly told what it can be done today and what can be done tomorrow or the day after, and should not be fed empty promises.

**V. Petrosyan:** I agree with Leonid Ivanovich. The reason for the lack of trust in party organizations is in many respects due to the frequent divergence between words and deeds. Take the example of Kond as just one example. For decades executives of various ranks promised to resolve the question of its reconstruction. All the candidates for deputy from that district included promises to that effect in their election platforms, and party executives gave assurances. Yet when S. G. Arutyunyan visited that rayon, one of the long-standing residents made the following remark to him: "Since Agasya Khandzhyan, you're the first Central Committee secretary who has visited Kond, even though the Central Committee dachas are right on the other side." It's all true. We're good at passing out promises.

**V. Ter-Arutyunyan:** Not only the implementation or nonimplementation of decisions, but the decisions themselves frequently undermine the party's prestige. If you recall, it was not only the government but the Central Committee that adopted the now-discredited decree on measures to overcome drunkenness and alcoholism. And what did it provide? In our rayon there were formerly 25 stores that sold alcoholic beverages, and after the decree three remained. Lines and commotion arose. People were forced to horde alcoholic beverages. A new public organization was created; those were superfluous personnel. Recently I was phoned from the sobriety society and asked to transfer money for maintenance of its staff. And why should we, who have gone over to cost accounting, feed some sort of incomprehensible functionaries?

**B. Mkrtchyan:** Nonetheless, the chief reason for the lag is seen in the fact that correct decisions taken at the top level are slow to reach the specific people responsible for carrying them out. Yet today it is impossible to wait for a decree to be passed "at the top" on every issue. It is necessary for all levels to show initiative themselves and take practical steps.

**V. Petrosyan:** The plenum of the Spandaryanskiy Raykom, for example, did not wait until the mechanism for improving the welfare of low-income families was put into operation, but allocated 12,000 rubles from the raykom's funds for providing aid to party veterans receiving less than 70 rubles a month.

**V. Mnatsakanyan:** At the initiative of the Kanaz Party Committee, the labor collective's council granted women a three-year paid leave for child care. Moreover, taking the working people's wishes into account, this summer the children of Armenians living in other republics were invited to departmental pioneer camps. I want to stress that informal organizations provided great help in organizing this undertaking.

**A. Arutyunyan:** Incidentally, concerning the informal organizations. I can say that today they are giving invaluable help to us, too. They not only participate in the vegetable harvest themselves but organize field brigades of ninth- and tenth-grade students. Staff members of the party raykom, the Komsomol and the ispolkom also have gone out to the fields. We are managing to harvest about seven tons of vegetables daily. I believe that if the informal organizations' slogans are intelligent we should cooperate with them. But if the slogans are controversial, we need to enter into dialogue—if necessary, polemics—with them.

For example, informal organizations performed explanatory work during those difficult days when the situation in the could have gone out of control at any moment. They attempted to persuade people that violence was not a method of fighting for a fair solution of the problem of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Then, thanks to our joint efforts, we managed to avoid internationality clashes.

**V. Ter-Arutyunyan:** I agree that a differentiated approach to the informal organizations is needed. The main thing is not even the slogans themselves but the goals that they set. In our association there is an informal organizations whose goal is to increase the output of trailers for earthquake victims. Can we possibly fail to take advantage of such a powerful creative potential merely because it does not fit into existing sociopolitical structures?

Of course, we must deliver a firm rebuff to forces whose goal is to discredit the party's policy of restructuring and undermine the socialist foundations. But in doing so we should act through political methods, that is, by force of persuasion, in an open struggle of positions and views.

**B. Mkrtchyan:** In order to know how to conduct polemics, one must know how to captivate the masses, refute one's opponents' arguments, and expound and defend one's own viewpoint. Unfortunately, in the extreme situations that have often been arising lately, the sluggishness, feebleness and inertness of many communists and—what is especially alarming—party ideological workers have been manifesting themselves.

I think that particular exactingness must be shown in selecting staff members of ideological departments. They should have a good command of languages, good theoretical training, experience in practical work, and finally, speaking ability. I have repeatedly had occasion to raise this matter at plenums of the republic Communist Party Central Committee. However, no serious changes are evident yet in the formation of the ideological corps. For some reason it is still believed that the raykom secretary for ideology should necessarily be a woman. Aren't a number of serious blunders and disappointing omissions in ideological work the result of such an oversimplified approach?

**G. Kazaryan:** The lack of competent and militant ideologists is practically our greatest problem today. We consoled ourselves for a long time with the hope that ideologists could be trained and brought up in the political education system. However, as practice shows, the ability to influence people's hearts and minds comes exclusively with the experience of participating in political life. Not only ideological workers but all of us need to constantly work on ourselves and draw lessons from the experience of the political struggle of the past few years. We also have something to learn from the informal organizations—for example, their ability to influence people and change their forms and methods of work in accordance with circumstances. Many of them show initiative and can get people to follow them. I am glad that a dialogue with the informal organizations now seems to be getting started. But we missed a great deal by not taking a step to meet them in good time.

**M. Garagash:** Unquestionably, delaying here has eliminated the possibility of cooperating with the informal organizations in many areas. However, that's only the part of the problem that is manifesting itself most vividly today. We are not taking full advantage of the experience of CPSU veterans, either. I know that many republics

have councils of party veterans. Yet we do not yet have such a public agency. There are councils of war and labor veterans. And with the help of the Central Committee of the Armenian Leninist Communist Youth League we have also organized a council of veterans of the Revolution and Leninist Komsomol.

If my memory does not fail me, the Central Committee of the republic Communist Party has only once brought together the most senior members of the CPSU. Why haven't these meetings become traditional? After all, thanks to their rich experience in life, party veterans can render a significant service. I cite this example in order to show the attitude of party committees at all levels to such a reserve as party veterans.

I shall not conceal the fact that we have nowadays turned into a mass that is seemingly stewing in its own juices in these organizations under the housing operations office. We have become divorced from real life and cannot find a worthy application of our efforts. A sizeable detachment of communists finds itself in such a situation.

**B. Mkrtchyan:** We have forgotten Lenin's words to the effect that all the party's affairs are conducted, directly or through representatives, by all members of the party, on the basis of equal rights and without any exception. A whole set of reasons is interfering with the realization of that principle. And one of the most important is that intraparty democracy—that main source of communists' political activeness—has frozen on a prerestructuring level. Yet in a democratic society the ruling party itself should be the expression of a higher and more consistent form of democracy, and should set an example of democratic development for the whole society. This requires that it resolutely rid itself of formations born of the personality cult and stagnation period. And not least of all—that it revise its attitude toward the advancement and assignment of party personnel, including "apparatchiks."

**A. Arutyunyan:** The development of intraparty democracy requires the direct participation of all communists in the development and implementation of political decisions, and in monitoring that implementation. With respect to our work, that means the participation of rank-and-file party members in the preparation of questions for the buro, and their inclusion in the membership of various commissions.

Buro meetings themselves, if the matters under discussion affect the interests of the broad masses of working people, must be conducted at enterprises. Unfortunately, this form of work is clearly employed insufficiently. Even the very phrase "visiting buro" still sounds rather unfamiliar. Moreover, as in the old days, draft decisions are prepared by the apparatus.

**V. Ter-Arutyunyan:** Let's agree what in this case we mean by the word "apparatus." If we are talking about instructors, by and large they cannot be considered people who are involved in the development of political decisions. Today they are merely implementors who are lacking in all rights of political creativity. I do not know a single

case in which an instructor at his own initiative submitted any sort of issue for consideration by the raykom buro.

**L. Gustin:** And who do we take on the apparatus and promote to elective bodies? As a rule, people who we know will not create problems. In other words—implementors. Moreover, an executive often chooses his assistants according to the principle "worse than me." When we need personnel capable of doing political work in the masses, advancing bold ideas and explaining them to people, operating openly, preventing the growth of negative processes, energetically contributing to everything that is new and progressive, and effectively promoting the solution of problems connected with people's life.

Today we wait in vain for heated debates in buro meetings and raykom plenums. Let us look at who is sitting in the hall. As a rule, it is the executives of enterprises, secretaries of party organizations, and workers. And the middle level, from which progressive ideas and proposals have most frequently come lately, remains outside. We must fill this gap, attract energetic and knowledgeable people, and seek them in collectives even among those who have never engaged in party work.

**B. Mkrtchyan:** This is one of the fundamental measures for bringing the party out of a state of seige and giving it dynamism.

Today we are discussing only certain aspects of the problem associated with our party's lag behind the restructuring processes. However, disclosing the causes means taking only a half-step in understanding the party's functions and role in society at the present stage and determining its coordinates in the political system of a socialism that is in the process of being renewed. There are no ready-made formulas here.

At the 18 June conference in the CPSU Central Committee, M. S. Gorbachev stressed the need for every party organization, proceeding on the basis of general tasks, to have its own program of actions. Precisely its own program, one that answers to the concrete conditions in which it works. The discussion of such programs, ones which are capable of raising the shaky authority of individual party organizations and of the party as a whole, is already a topic for another serious discussion.

#### **Kirghiz Recommendation on Draft Laws, Soviet Federalism**

*18300837 Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 3 Sep 89 p 3*

[Unattributed report: "Along the Path of Strengthening the Soviet Federation"]

[Text] The upcoming, unified political day will be conducted for the purpose of explaining the recently published drafts of the CPSU platform on nationality policy under present-day conditions, the Kirghiz SSR Laws on changes and additions to the Kirghiz SSR Constitution

(Fundamental Law), on elections of people's deputies, and on elections of deputies to local soviets, as well as the Kirghiz SSR Law on the state language.

The task of the political speaker will be to bring to the awareness of his listeners the basic provisions of the above-mentioned documents, to organize a motivated discussion of them, and to answer people's questions.

In explaining the basic provisions of the draft CPSU platform on nationality policy under present-day conditions, it should be noted that, among the problems being widely discussed nowadays, interethnic relations have advanced to the foreground. This has been caused by the fact that the "sore points" have been revealed with particular sharpness. An attempt is sometimes made to link interethnic tension with perestroika. But, in point of fact, perestroika has merely revealed the acuteness of the nationality problems, which have accumulated over several decades.

As the experience of practical life has shown, our nationality problems here were not solved so "finally and irreversibly." We preferred lulling ourselves with the results achieved and asserting the idea that there was no problem concerning nationality relations in the mass consciousness, rather than studying them and tackling them. The departure from the Leninist principles of nationality policy, the violations of legality during the period of the Cult of Personality, the ideology and psychology of stagnation—all these factors imparted an explosive nature to the nationality problems in several regions of our country.

Nowadays our society, having embarked upon a course of radical reforms, is critically rethinking its own past. The 27th CPSU Congress and 19th All-Union Party Conference decisively adopted a course aimed at restoring health to nationality relations, to liberating them from everything that contradicts our morality and ideology, as well as the humane principles of socialism. The work done by the country's First Congress of People's Deputies and the new USSR Supreme Soviet have convincingly shown the following: no matter how complicated the interethnic problems are—optimal solutions of them are possible. The establishment of commissions under the Soviet of Nationalities on the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, on the problems of the Meskhetian Turks, Crimean Tatars, the "well-being" of the Baltic republics making the transition to cost-accounting independence, and other actions of the Supreme Soviet in this sphere comprise the first few practical steps on the path of renovating interethnic relations.

In this connection, the draft CPSU platform moves us forward considerably; it sets forth a number of provisions which will serve as a good point of departure in the search for optimal solutions to the most acute and most urgent problems.

In analyzing the contents of the draft platform itself, we must place particular emphasis on its realistic and, at the same time, innovative nature, its striving to solve the

complex problems of nationality relations within our country. The CPSU adheres to the Leninist principle of gradual democratism and internationalism as the only possible path nowadays to solving the nationality problem.

The document has justified the necessity and provided the contents of radical transformations in the Soviet Federation; it provides for the restoration of the Leninist principle of national self-determination in its genuine and practical sense, as seen in the following foreshortened formula developed by the party: Without a strong Union there are no strong republics, and without strong republics there is no strong Union. Those persons who drew up the platform have made a serious contribution to solving the important and quite difficult problem of delimiting the competencies and reciprocal obligations of the Union and the republics; they have also provided grounds for the role to be played by the principles of economic management and economic independence, the status and activities of the public organizations which play an important role in the USSR's political system.

The originality of this document is also to be seen in its innovative approach to solving the problems of the RSFSR's legal status and that of its national-state structure. Taking public opinion into account, we recommend that an examination be made of the problems relating to the creation within the structure of the CPSU Central Committee Bureau (Secretariat) of a Central Committee for the RSFSR, and within the Russian Federation—of additional organs under republic-level administration, including economic, administrative, ideological, cultural, and scientific ones.

An important section of this document is devoted to the role and legal status of national autonomy. Here maximum heed is accorded to the materials from the wide-ranging and sharp discussion which has evolved in recent months in the press and other mass media, as well as at scientific conferences and symposiums. The following goal is set: to fully restore the legitimate rights of those peoples who live in autonomous state formations. The draft platform emphasizes that the autonomous republics must have the possibility of solving all the problems of administrative division throughout their territory, along with the problems of economic development, protecting the natural environment, the development of culture, and language. For the first time provision has been made for the possibility for the autonomous oblasts of the RSFSR, taking into account the desires of their populations, to make the transition to direct subordination to the Russian Federation's organs of state power and administration. Considerable attention is accorded to an analysis of satisfying the national interests of those peoples which lack their own, national-territorial formations. Thus, for example, the possibility is provided for forming All-Union soviets of citizens.

In determining policy in the cultural field, the CPSU is proceeding from an acknowledgement of the originality

of the national cultures, their unique value, and the importance of creating the conditions for cultural interaction among peoples.

Running like a red thread through this document is the idea of the need for a complete and consistent implementation of the constitutional principle of equal rights for citizens, regardless of their race or nationality so that Soviet citizens of any nationality may feel at home in any point of the country.

The draft platform furnishes a sharp and well-argued criticism of various manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism, as well as extremism; it stresses adherence to the tried-and-true, internationalist values of Soviet society, the importance of new approaches to the formation of an internationalist, patriotic awareness among working people.

It is undoubtedly true that a wide-ranging discussion of this document by the entire Soviet people will be an important phase in preparing for the upcoming Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee dealing with interethnic relations.

In discussing the Kirghiz SSR Draft Laws on changes and additions to the Kirghiz SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law), on the elections of Kirghiz SSR people's deputies to the local soviets, particular emphasis must be placed on the fact that these documents contribute much that is new to the republic's electoral system.

Thus, for example, in preceding elections of USSR people's deputies a great deal of unfavorable criticism was evoked by the conduct of pre-election meetings by the district-level electoral commissions, where candidates for the office of people's deputy were determined and registered. The Kirghiz SSR Draft Law on changes and additions to the Kirghiz SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law) in Article 84 proposes the following: "Elections of people's deputies shall be held by single-seat or multi-seat election districts on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage with secret balloting."

During the course of the elections the voters, according to the Draft Law, shall have the task of designating 350 people's Kirghiz SSR deputies, elected directly by these voters.

The Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet shall be elected by secret balloting from among the Kirghiz SSR people's deputies by the Kirghiz SSR Congress of People's Deputies, which shall comprise, by analogy with the entire country's new legislation, the highest organ of power.

This republic's Supreme Soviet will include 65 Kirghiz SSR people's deputies. Moreover, it is proposed that one-fifth of the Supreme Soviet be renewed every year. This is also something new.

The Congress of People's Deputies shall be empowered to take under its consideration any matter pertaining to the Kirghiz SSR. It shall be convoked for its first session not later than two months after the elections.

Regular sessions of the Congress of Kirghiz SSR People's Deputies shall be held once a year, whereas extraordinary sessions shall be convoked upon the initiative of the republic's Supreme Soviet, upon the proposal of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, or by at least one-fifth of the Kirghiz SSR people's delegates.

The drafts of these new laws significantly expand the rights of the Kirghiz SSR people's deputies in their activities as deputies, the rights of voters, as well as those of oblasts, rayons, and local soviets of people's deputies.

We recommend that discussion of the Kirghiz SSR Draft Law on the state language begin with an explanation of the linguistic situation which has evolved within this republic. At this point we must say quite frankly and directly that the Kirghiz language has begun to lose its social importance; the sphere of its use is becoming narrower, and urban youths speak it poorly. But the loss of a language means the disappearance of the nation itself. And that is why the Law on the State Language is necessary.

It should be noted that adoption of the Law on the State Language will not contradict the Leninist principles of nationality policy. In his well-known article entitled "On the Problem of Nationalities, or about 'Autonomization'" V.I. Lenin wrote as follows: "...we must introduce very strict rules regarding the use of the national language in republics having other national languages which are included within our Union, and these rules must be checked out with particular care..." (V.I. Lenin, Complete Works, Vol 45, p 361). And it is here, in warning about possible abuses, that V.I. Lenin notes: "In order to combat these abuses, we need to be especially inventive, not to mention the sincere quality of those persons who will engage in such work. What is needed here is a detailed code, which can be successfully compiled only by nationals living in the given republic."

Proceeding from necessity, the republic itself shall have the right to define the status of a state language, its public functions and sphere of use. The CPSU platform on the party's nationality policy talks about this very specifically: "The question of the feasibility of a state language for a nationality which has been given the name of a union or autonomous republic shall be within the competence of the republics themselves."

During the course of the discussion it is important to emphasize that the state language will be introduced not as an assault on other languages but rather for the purpose of its own survival. It will be introduced in a planned manner, in stages, without affecting or infringing upon the interests of people of other nations or nationalities.

In no way is the Draft Law aimed at discriminating against any citizen of this republic with regard to his national origin. The draft centers its attention on man and his right to freely use his own native language.

The political speaker should reinforce these fundamental positions by analyzing the appropriate articles of the Draft Law.

Thus, Article 9 of the draft guarantees the free choice of language for those persons speaking at meetings, assemblies, conferences, sessions, or congresses. In accordance with Article 17, internal business and clerical work shall be conducted in the state language or in Russian, with a gradual transition being made to the state language. A citizen may use his native language in addressing a request to the organs of state power and administration (Article 15).

The Draft Law shall guarantee the conduct of all types of education in the Kirghiz and Russian languages (Article 21).

The equality and equal rights of citizens in the use of any language is being strengthened by Article 38. It states the following: "In the Kirghiz SSR it shall be forbidden to take a disrespectful or hostile attitude toward the state language or any other language; an intentional violation of citizens' rights in the choice of a language or the demeaning of citizens for linguistic motives shall be held responsible in the procedure established by the law."

It is undoubtedly true that, during the course of the discussion, the political speaker will have to answer a whole range of questions. By way of a recommendation, we cite below the answers to questions most frequently posed in labor collectives.

During the process of the discussion proposals are received to the effect that two languages—Kirghiz and Russian—should be proclaimed as the state languages. It is considered that this is a possible way to establish a genuine bilingualism in the republic.

But is there really a need for Russian to take part in this matter? Having received the status of the state language, Kirghiz would acquire a special position within the republic's framework, which would permit it to significantly expand its own functions and, to put it more briefly, to survive. But the Russian language does not need such support. It is the language of interethnic communication. According to the status of a state language would neither add anything nor take away from those functions which it already is performing. It is another matter when it comes to protecting the rights of Russians or any other people living in this republic. To our way of thinking, they are sufficiently protected in the appropriate articles of the Draft Law. Moreover, all proposals on this score received during the process of the discussion will be taken into consideration.

In this same connection, a detailed explanation is required for Chapter 2 of the draft law, where the rights and guarantees of each citizen to choose a language are spelled out.

Particular attention must be paid to the following points:

**first**, it does not follow at all from this chapter that as soon as the Law becomes operative, all people who speak

other languages shall immediately and everywhere—whether on a bus or in the bazaar, in a theater or on a street—absolutely must begin speaking the state language. Such a far-ranging conclusion is either the fruit of a profound misunderstanding or a conscious distortion of this draft law's essence. The main thing here is gradualism, a step-by-step introduction of the Law into practice;

**second**, the provision on the need to master the state language does not extend to everyone, but only to a certain category of officials who, by virtue of the specifics of their occupation, communicate with the native population on a day-to-day basis. Furthermore, what is intended here is not only those citizens who speak other languages but also the Kirghiz themselves, inasmuch as not all of them speak their own language fluently;

**third**, it is not required that even the category of officials mentioned above know the state language at the level of its native speakers. The draft law specially stipulates that, in the given case, it is sufficient to know the state language to the extent necessary to perform one's occupational duties;

**fourth**, such a requirement shall also be made on speakers of Kirghiz desirous of working in the listed spheres (especially in cities). In turn, they are obliged to know the Russian language and to take into consideration the role and place of Russian in the country's political and cultural life as a whole. Furthermore, knowledge of the Russian language for a Kirghiz, as well as for a person of any other nationality, is not only an economic and socio-cultural necessity, caused by the need for All-Union communication, but is also a moral duty for a citizen of our multi-national country.

Certain persons have doubts about the formulation of Article 21 of the draft law, where it is said that "The state language shall be the basic language of instruction and training within the Kirghiz SSR system of public education."

We must explain to people that such a formulation does not contradict other paragraphs of the given article. It contains nothing discriminatory with regard to people who speak other languages. In essence, what is meant here is that in each republic the native language of the nationality which the particular republic is named for occupies a special place and performs a special role, a special function. Does this objective fact need to be reflected in the Law? It seems that it is necessary. This is also achieved by singling out the state language among other languages, albeit these others also have fully equal rights. But the main thing is that this article guarantees citizens the free choice of the language of instruction. This means that the educational process at all its levels will be conducted in the state language, as well as in Russian, and in other languages of those nationality groups living in the republic.

Many inhabitants of this republic are puzzled and do not understand the meaning or use in many articles (17, 18, 19, and 26) of variants of the words "or" and "and." It



is understandable that people are disturbed as to whether or not there may be some loopholes here for extremes. The political speaker needs to explain that the necessity for using these variants (for example, "the state or Russian language") stems from real life. Thus, if in Article 17, instead of "internal clerical work shall be conducted in the state language or in Russian," the passage read "internal clerical work shall be conducted in the state language and in Russian," then all clerical work, including that in Russian-language collectives, would have to be conducted in Russian and Kirghiz in a parallel fashion. Nobody needs this. Clerical work should be conducted either in the state language or in Russian, depending upon the specific conditions involved.

It is undoubtedly true that the political speaker will have to answer a question about the procedure for financial support for the Law. In this connection, we recommend that maximum use be made of the interview by the KirTAG correspondent with S. Begaliyev, the chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Gosplan, as published in the republic's press (SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, 25 August 1989).

But the main thing to explain to people is that those 500 million rubles which will be required to implement this draft law will be spent not only for developing the Kirghiz language. A considerable portion of this money will go toward the construction of children's pre-school institutions and schools using Russian, Uzbek, German, and Dungan. That is, it will be used for the needs of the entire republic. Quite a bit of funds from this total will be earmarked for the study of Russian by the indigenous population, etc.

It is important to convince people that the expenditures on the draft law must not be linked with our present-day economic situation, with the shortages of sugar, soap, and laundry powder. Here we must look more deeply. If there is peace and harmony in our republican home, then good circumstances will come in time. A people, like an individual person, does not live by bread alone. As they say, without bread there is no person; without language there is no people. And this must be felt and understood by all of us. Otherwise, the word "internationalism" becomes an empty sound.

At the conclusion of the discussion we must remind our listeners once again that the law in question has been designed for the future. This republic's Council of Ministers has already finished working out the procedure and measures for implementing the Law on the state language. They will soon be published in the press. This will make fully clear the time periods for carrying out this or that article of the draft law. As we have already said, nobody intends to convert the entire population to the Kirghiz language on the very next day after this law is adopted. That is absurd! The truth of the matter is that the Kirghiz language is in trouble, and it needs help. It is precisely for this reason that the discussion of the Draft Law on the state language requires from each inhabitant of the republic a high level of political awareness, mutual

understanding, and mutual respect. Responsibility and once again responsibility. And the most important thing is to learn how to understand the members of another nationality, to know and respect their interests. It is precisely here that we have the meaning of genuine internationalism. It is precisely about this that the Declaration of the CPSU Central Committee speaks concerning the republics of the Soviet Baltic. Nowadays all of us bear an extraordinary responsibility for the fate of our multi-national Fatherland, for the destiny of Soviet people.... The time has come when each of us must take a principled position and act in such a way that his honor and conscience will be clean before his people now and for future generations.

Such is our common duty today.

#### **Kazakh First Secretary Nazarbayev on Republic Sovereignty**

*18300836 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 14 Sep 89 p 1*

[Speech by N.A. Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Kazakh CP Central Committee, at the 16th Plenum of the Kazakh CP Central Committee held 14 September 1989]

[Text] Comrades!

Without wanting to take a triumphant or ceremonious tone, I am profoundly convinced that the draft being discussed here today, providing for the transition of the republic to the principles of self-government and self-financing constitutes a major event in our public life. It is fundamentally important both for further deepening the radical economic reform as well as for restructuring the political system.

In essence, we are taking the first step along the path to solving one of the central problems of a socialist society which is being renewed—creating the conditions for a greater degree of independence of regions, for implementing such forms of cooperation within which each republic would be motivated to improve the end results of its own economic activity as the foundation of its own prosperity and to multiply the wealth and might of the Soviet state.

This is a step toward genuine republic-level sovereignty within the framework of our federation, toward full economic independence, under which the very concept of "federation" will find a truly Leninist meaning, and our multi-national, socialist community will become genuinely free and have equal rights.

Last week marked the close of Ukrainian Literature and Art Days in Kazakhstan, during the course of which we experienced the joy of sharing the poetic words, original melodies, and dance rhythms of this fraternal people. But is this the only thing to be remembered from our meetings with our Ukrainian comrades, who visited many of our republic's oblasts? In the final analysis, Kazakhs do not get their share of television and radio programs with the aid of which the songs and dances of



the USSR's peoples come to every family and every home. However, it was necessary to see with what genuine friendliness, with what heartfelt warmth our countrymen greeted the people from the Ukraine in Chimkent, Dzhezkazgan, Shevchenko, as well as many other cities and populated centers!

In my opinion, the particular openness and good wishes of Kazakhstan's people is caused specifically by the desire to emphasize the unwavering quality of our friendship, to show that no kinds of interethnic conflicts can destroy the foundation of our strengthening brotherhood.

If we examine the roots of this problem, if we strive to achieve not the outside show but a genuine community of nations and ethnic groups within our socialist, federated power, then it is impossible not to see that it is precisely the new principles of economic development which really do constitute that main tie-rod around which the contemporary Soviet federation must evolve.

The transition of our republic to self-government and self-financing is not a tribute to the latest fashion but rather an extremely important link in the widescale transformation of our entire public life, a major political act, directed also at solving the acute problems of interethnic relations.

There is no need to conceal the fact that implementation of what is planned is encountering quite a few difficulties. Too many problems of a socio-political, historical, and economic nature have piled up. If we assess the present-day inter-relations between the union ministries and the republic-level ones, then they cannot be called anything but anachronistic. It is getting to the point where the central authorities are approving even the recipes for preparing the national types of bread and bakery items! Not to mention the fact that the country's Gosplan planned everything for us and everybody, often without taking the republic's views into account.

Sectorial planning now continues to "control the ball." Just as before, it fails to take into account the specifics of the regions involved, nor does it concern itself with solving the problems of their comprehensive development. You do not have to go far to find examples of this. As a result of the approaches which have predominated for more than one decade, Kazakhstan, though possessing unique mineral and raw-material resources, has been turned into a republic requiring subsidization, one incapable of solving a great many social problems by its own means. Approximately 44 percent of its consumer goods are imported, while the volume of per capita paid services amounts to approximately 40 percent of the normative level.

A narrowly departmental or, to put it more precisely, a predatory approach to assimilating natural resources has led to irreversible losses of valuable components of raw materials, and to putting considerable amounts of usable lands under storage dumps of waste products, construction yards, etc. The intensive assimilation of regions without the necessary measures to preserve the natural

environment has led, in a number of places, to the irreversible destruction of the ecosystem and to increasing the zones of ecological disaster. The water of many rivers and bodies of water has been polluted.

The extraordinary centralization of administration, along with the dictates of the union ministries and departments, have also caused serious deformations in the structure of the national economy and the predominant development of the extractive industry, together with a substantial lag in the manufacturing and processing sectors. And with regard to the science-intensive and highly profitable sectors—machine building, light and food industries, their proportionate share in this republic is the lowest in the country (46 percent, as contrasted to 61 percent for the USSR as a whole).

The per capita production of items of light industrial items is less than the USSR average by a factor of 2, than Belorussian by a factor of 3.4, than Lithuanian and Latvia by a factor of 4, and Estonia by a factor of 5. By the way, it should be said that the system of greatest prosperity was considered completely justified at one time.

Within the structure of products being exported from the republic, 70 percent is accounted for by raw materials, 12 percent consists of semi-finished goods, while the volume of finished products being imported, in monetary terms, is approximately double that of exports. There is also a significant lag behind the other republics in the output of cultural-everyday and household products.

Then too, there are great disproportions in the development of the sectors within the agro-industrial complex. Every year as much as 10 million tons of grain are shipped out of this republic, along with 60 percent of tannery raw materials, about two-thirds of washed wool, etc. At the same time, almost 3 billion rubles worth of consumer goods could be made from this raw material.

The following questions are often posed: Why do we need economic independence at all? What will it give us? For the sake of what is all this being ventured?

The purpose is utterly clear—to increase the effectiveness of public production. Independence is in the interest not only and not so much of the individual republics, including ours, as much as for the country as a whole. The draft platform of the CPSU, entitled "The Party's Nationality Policy Under Present-Say Conditions" emphasizes the following: "The principal idea constituting the foundation of a Soviet federation is expressed by the commonly accepted formula: without a strong Union, there are no strong republics; without strong republics there is no strong Union."

Economic independence will allow us to effectively utilize our production and scientific-technical potentials, to move forward in evening out the level of our republic's social development, to create the optimal structure of the national economy, and to move away from its raw-material tendency. But the main thing is that it will raise

the responsibility of each worker, each enterprise, rayon and oblast for the results of their work. Because their prosperity will depend solely on such results.

As you know, it was initially intended to make the transition to operating under the new conditions at the beginning of the 13th Five-Year Plan. However, social processes, especially after the First Congress of People's Deputies, began to develop so dynamically that life itself demanded an acceleration of this process. Nowadays there is no longer any doubt that we must approve the new principles of economic management as early as next year in order to enter upon the new five-year plan, already having some definite experience.

But, of course, the transition of the republic to the principles of self-government and self-financing will not signify the waving of some kind of "magic wand." However, it will open up broad possibilities for further democratizing the guidance of the national economy at all levels, for a more flexible combination of the overall national and regional interests, and for harmonizing interethnic relations. Economic sovereignty has nothing in common with a striving toward autarchy, an enclosed, isolated quality, but rather it assumes the utilization of economic and legal regulators on a Union-wide scale as well as in each, individual region.

The most important, fundamental principle of our concept is the fact that it considers the problems of Kazakhstan's economic independence within the framework of the entire country's integrate, economic complex.

A second fundamental factor is the further deepening of the economic independence of enterprises and the freeing of ministries and departments from the direct administration of economic matters. A further decisive step is also possible—extensive development, on a voluntary basis, of various types of associations, concerns, consortiums, etc. instead of the present-day production ministries. This also pertains to enterprises under Union jurisdiction.

Restructuring the leadership of the economy and the social sphere on the principles of self-government and self-financing depends, to a large extent, on solving the general problems of developing the economy, increasing its efficiency, restoring health to the financial system, achieving a commodity-monetary balance, and bringing about an upsurge of the agro-industrial complex. There is work for us here—a lot of work! Analysis of the state of affairs attests to the presence of serious problems that need to be solved without delay. Against the background of the positive shifts in production growth rates, noticeable movements in solving the Housing-91 Program, an increase in the production and purchases of livestock produce, there has been a severe worsening of the situation in the consumers' market, increased shortages of the most important items; interruptions have been observed in trading of articles which, until quite recently, were in sufficient supply.

During the last three years alone reserve supplies of goods in retail trade were short by 790 million rubles.

There is still a shortage of synthetic laundering agents and cheap toilet soap. There has been a retreat from the previously gained positions in providing foodstuffs to the population of Guryev, Dzhambul, and Semipalatinsk oblasts, as well as the city of Alma-Ata. The pressure of the monetary mass is becoming more intense on the consumers' market, which is "exhausted" even without this; the amount of "tainted" money is increasing.

We have not succeeded in setting up a strong shield against the flow of unearned funds, or in compensating for the growth of wages by an increase in the production of the necessary goods. Under these conditions how should we assess the fact that in July and August there was a slowdown in building capacities for producing consumer goods? The conversion to economic methods of administration and the second model of cost accounting, the introduction of leasing relations, and the development of internal economic accounting are all being carried out too slowly.

This is the kind of complicated situation within which we must solve the problem of converting the republic to self-government and self-financing. We must add to this that the local Soviets of People's Deputies and the main economic-planning administrations up to now have not had a precise program for making the transition to the new principles of territorial economic administration; they have not ensured the needed development involving matters of restoring financial health, of discovering internal reserves for increasing the effectiveness of the regional economy, and improving the administrative system at the oblast level. This work is not being conducted in cities and rayons. Everyone is waiting for instructions from above, for ready-made recommendations and calculations.

It's time to explain that nobody except you, comrades, will engage in this work. It is necessary to set to it without delay, to involve scientists and the broad public in it.

Likewise insignificant is the contribution of economic science to developing methodological and theoretical issues of regional cost accounting. The presently existing studies are fragmentary in their nature; they contain too few constructive, practical suggestions, nor do they fully take into consideration the republic's socioeconomic characteristics.

The draft of the concept under consideration must, unless it is rejected by the members of the Central Committee, be published in the press. The Council of Ministers, taking into account the comments and suggestions expressed, as well as the results of a broad-based discussion, must complete work on it and submit it for consideration at a regularly scheduled session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet. It is also necessary to develop an explanation of the contents, goals, and principles of restructuring the territorial administration, to ensure their profound and multi-faceted discussion in labor collectives, creative unions, and organizations.

The completely worked-out document must be introduced at the USSR Supreme Soviet. Only after the adoption of an appropriate USSR law will our concept become operative.

The party committees must fully utilize the ongoing accountability and election campaign to make a multifaceted analysis of the state of affairs in the labor collectives, to provide an objective party-political evaluation of the implementation of the radical economic reform, to disclose the reasons retarding the restructuring of production relations, and to specify paths and methods for activating work on making the transition to the new principles of territorial cost accounting.

An important task is to upgrade the role to be played by the Soviets—their planning-and-economic organs—in administering the economy on their territory, and in re-orienting the economy to solve social problems.

We need to do a great deal of work on the legal provisions for converting the republic to the principles of self-government and self-financing. Within the shortest possible time period we must involve scientists and practitioners, as well as the broad public, including members of the progressive, “informal,” public organizations and movements, in working out a legal mechanism for regulating the mutual relations between the republic and the union organs for the purpose of precisely determining the competence and reciprocal obligations of the Union and the republic. The concept presented here must constitute the foundation of the political platform espoused by this republic’s Communist Party for the elections of Kazakh SSR people’s deputies and the local Soviets of People’s Deputies.

It would be correct to recommend that future candidates to the office of deputy in their own pre-election platforms take into consideration those broad possibilities for solving the economic and social problems which have begun to manifest themselves with the transition to the new conditions of territorial administration. I am confident that the new concept will become a fine aid for them in carrying out the tasks of evening out the levels of social development among the regions, of creating the proper conditions for work and everyday life in the collectives.

The new model of economic independence for the republic imposes an enormous responsibility and adds to the work, but, at the same time, it creates the conditions for achieving high end results. The latter must be skillfully used to the maximum.

Comrades!

The principal meaning of transforming economic relations consists of their humanization. The end result of the project before us is the good of man, and we shall achieve it if we are able to correct the mistakes allowed to occur in the past and to use socialism’s enormous potential in the name of a happy life for millions of people.

In proceeding to this great task, which is new in principle for us, it is important to realize that the success in beginning depends, to a decisive degree, on the moral attitude of the society, on the kinds of thoughts and hopes people take to transform the economic basis of our life. As never before, today we need complete unity and the full consolidation of spiritual and moral forces.

That is why one of the basic tasks for communists nowadays consists of seeing to it that all their efforts and all their consciousness are directed at eliminating any obstacles hindering people from living and working normally, feeling themselves to be a vital part of the multi-national family of the fraternal peoples.

Nowadays, during these tense, frankly speaking, alarming times, we must manifest particular vigilance so as not to allow a split which would divide people along ethnic lines.

In my opinion, our descendants will not forgive us if we fail to proceed to this great work, and if we bury it under the fragments of interethnic conflicts. By the way, something like this already happened in Biblical history....

It is no secret that even now certain persons are prepared to sacrifice perestroika to their own ambitions. We see all too clearly what profuse talk about “ethnic sterility” and “national priority” are leading, what long-lasting wounds in people’s souls are being inflicted by the advocates of dividing Soviet people by national “quarters.” It is difficult to imagine that they do not know what they are creating. More likely, it is the other way around. And, therefore, we must decisively oppose any base attempts to poison the pure spring of our friendship and defend with a unified front that which unites us and reject that which divides us.

We now know full well about the crimes of the Stalin period, about the distortions and deformations which were allowed, as well as the violations of the Leninist principles of interethnic, reciprocal relations. Perestroika, as begun by the party, has not only designated painful problems but has also indicated ways to correct them. And so why, then, instead of coordinated, targeted work along these lines, do sharp conflicts arise here and there, and are sometimes even accompanied by human victims? And where is a sense of balance and realism in evaluating the situation?

In this connection, I cannot help stating my own attitude toward the published Draft Law on Languages. All the more so in that it has been hotly discussed in this republic; the most diverse opinions and evaluations have appeared in the press. It is particularly gratifying that virtually all the multi-national population of Kazakhstan has regarded with understanding and support the idea of according the Kazakh language the status of the state language. This is yet one more piece of testimony to the profound participation by Soviet people who have grown up on the multi-national Kazakh land in the needs and concerns of their brother people. Many thanks for this.

comrades! The Kazakh people will never forget your tact and understanding, as manifested with regard to this matter.

With the same degree of responsibility the Draft Law speaks about the role and importance of the Russian language. Article 2 states the following: "As the language of communication, the Russian language, together with the state language, shall function freely on the territory of the Kazakh SSR."

At the same time we cannot help noting that, during the process of the discussion, various different points of view were manifested in certain articles of the Draft Law. In particular, there was justifiable criticism from the public, caused by the poorly thought-out formulation of Articles 17, 20, and 21, which, in our opinion, are too categorical in indicating the necessity for graduates of educational institutions, as well as certain categories of staff members and supervisors to know the Kazakh language. After all, V.I. Lenin particularly emphasized that in language matters there cannot be nor should there be any sort of compulsion! But here we clearly see a striving to solve an extremely complicated problem with one wave of the hand, without taking the specific reality into account. As you know, history does not forgive such haste.

For example, in Article 17, why not replace the words "Supervisors...must know the state language" by the words "Supervisors of departments shall ensure that citizens are received and spoken with in their native language"? The essence is not changed, but the compulsory shade of the formulation disappears.

The same thing is true with regard to the graduates of educational institutions. Is it really just or fair that the grade for the Kazakh language in the certificate or diploma should be given to those who begin to study it today in the tenth grade or in the fifth year of an institute? Of course not. It would be a different matter if this rule were to be applied to the present-day first-graders or to students in their first year. They would have sufficient time to study this language.

In short, the commissions engaged in preparing this draft must do some more persistent work and make the necessary corrections in accordance with public opinion. In my opinion, the deputies to this republic's Supreme Soviet will likewise approach the evaluation of this Law with a sense of responsibility and will not allow the adoption of an unfinished, doubtful document. The principal criterion here must be the lack of even the slightest hint of compulsion in language study, and, moreover, any sort of discrimination against people by reason of language. The Kazakh CP Central Committee will stand unwaveringly on this point.

We need to state directly and unambiguously that nobody will succeed in introducing a split or even the slightest note of alienation in the family of peoples which inhabit Kazakhstan. We shall not allow any impairment or discrediting of perestroika by the amateurs or advocates of left-wing deviations nor by frankly avowed conservatives, nor altogether by those who attack it from

anti-socialist points of view. We fully share the positions set forth in the well-known Declaration of the CPSU Central Committee regarding the Baltic republics, as well as with M.S. Gorbachev's speech on Central Television. Unanimously with the participants in today's plenum, we have adopted an appropriate decree which demonstrates once again the determination of Kazakhstan's communists to support with all possible measures the evaluations and conclusions of the CPSU Central Committee.

Permit me in your name, comrades, to once again assure our party's Central Committee and its Politburo that the Kazakh republic's party organization will apply all its efforts to solve the complex problems of radically renewing socialism in our country, and to restore health to interethnic relations. We are confident that these global tasks can be carried out only under the party's leadership, only on a foundation of the republics' economic and political sovereignty within the body of the USSR.

#### **Information Report on 16th Session of Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet**

90US0135 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 22 Sep 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Information Report on Sessions of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] The extraordinary 14th Session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet 11th Convocation started its work on 21 September in Alma-Ata.

The following took part in the work of the session: N.A. Nazarbayev, Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee first secretary, Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee Bureau members V.G. Anufriyev, Ye.M. Asanbayev, Ye.F. Bashmakov, V.I. Dvurechenskiy, U.D. Dzhaniyev, U. Karamanov, V.A. Kuzmenko, V.M. Miroshnik, M.R. Sagdiyev, and K.Kh. Tyulebekov, Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee candidate member E.Kh. Gukasov, official of the USSR Supreme Soviet A.V. Ivanchenko, and a group of USSR people's deputies.

Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet USSR people's deputy K.U. Medeubekov opened the session.

Chairman of the mandate commission G.N. Korotenko presented the report of the mandate commission.

A resolution was adopted on the report of the mandate commission recognizing the powers of the deputies elected for particular electoral okrugs to replace retiring deputies.

The agenda for the session was set:

1. The secretary of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.
2. Measures to further implement the political reform in the republic.
3. Law of the Kazakh SSR on changes and amendments to the Kazakh SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law).

4. Law of the Kazakh SSR on languages in the Kazakh SSR.

5. Law of the Kazakh SSR on elections of Kazakh SSR deputies.

6. Law of the Kazakh SSR on elections of deputies to local soviets of people's deputies in the Kazakh SSR.

7. Setting elections for people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR.

8. Setting elections for deputies to the local soviets of people's deputies in the Kazakh SSR.

9. Forming a Central Election Commission for the elections and the recall of Kazakh SSR deputies.

10. Confirming ukases of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Deputy M.R. Sagdiyev spoke on the question of candidates for the post of secretary of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. A resolution naming K.Z. Zhusupov as secretary of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was adopted unanimously.

The Supreme Soviet moved on to consideration of the second item on the agenda. Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium deputy M.R. Sagdiyev was given the floor to speak on "Measures To Further Implement the Political Reform in the Republic."

The following deputies took part in the discussion of the report: Z.K. Nurkadilov, chairman of the Alma-Ata city executive committee [gorispolkom]; G.Zh. Nugmanova, deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Aktauskiy rural soviet executive committee [ispolkom], Karaganda Oblast; M. Shakkanov, USSR people's deputy and chief editor of the journal ZHALYN; S.A. Tereshchenko, chairman of the Chimkent Oblast Executive Committee [oblispolkom];

B.M. Tursumbayev, chairman of the North Kazakhstan oblispolkom; S.A. Kuznetsov, first secretary of the She-monaikhinskiy party rayon committee [raykom], East Kazakhstan Oblast; K.S. Smailov, chief editor of the journal MADENIYET ZHANE TURMYS; L.L. Shrayner, senior equipment setter at the "Kustanayas-best" Combine enriching factory; G.B. Yelemisov, Kazakh SSR procurator; D.F. Snegin, writer; U.M. Sultangazin, USSR people's deputy and president of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences.

At the evening session the discussion continued on the report on the second issue. The following spoke: V.G. Kramayev, chairman of the Kokchetav oblispolkom; S.M. Danabekova, sugar beet grower at the sovkhoz imeni Ilich, Taldy-Kurgan Oblast; V.L. Levitin, general director of the Mangyshlak Power Combine; A. Ibzhinov, second secretary of the Karaganda party obkom; V.G. Savchenko, first secretary of the Leninskiy party gorkom, Kzyl-Orda Oblast; K.G. Murzaliyev, member of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, writer; M.I. Isinaliyev, Kazakh SSR minister of foreign affairs; A.V. Dokuchayeva, senior scientific associate at the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the Ionosphere; D.D. Dospelov, Kazakh SSR minister of justice; M.M. Nevolina, chemical laboratory worker at the Dzhezkazgan Geological Survey Expedition. Corresponding member of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, chief of the department of state theory and history at the Kazakh State University S.S. Sartayev, and section chief in the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Linguistics A.N. Garkavets also took part in the discussion of the report.

First secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, people's deputy N.A. Nazarbayev addressed the session.

The extraordinary 14th session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet continues its work.

**Ukrainian SupSov Commissions on Principles Behind Draft Law on Languages**

18001634 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
5 Sep 89 p 3

[Report of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commissions on Draft Bills, on Questions of Patriotic and Internationalist Education and Interethnic Relations, and on Education and Culture: "Toward a Ukrainian SSR Draft Law 'On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR'"]

[Text] Taking into consideration the cares of the wide sections of the population that use the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commissions on Questions of Patriotic and Internationalist Education and Interethnic Relations and on Education and Culture submitted, by joint decision on 9 November 1988, a petition to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium concerning the introduction of amendments to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution in the interest of granting state status to the Ukrainian language in order to provide for the harmonious development of national and Russian bilingualism and the free development of the languages of all the national groups residing on the territory of the republic. After it reviewed the commissions' petition, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium charged the Commission on Draft Bills, jointly with the Commissions on Questions of Patriotic and Internationalist Education and Interethnic Relations and on Education and Culture, to prepare motions for the introduction of the appropriate amendments to the Ukrainian SSR and to develop a draft "Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR."

The need for legislative regulation of the status of languages in the republic is the result of past deviations from Leninist principles of policy toward the republics, resulting in an unwarranted constriction of the social functions and sphere of use of Ukrainian as well as of the languages of the other national groups residing on the territory of the republic.

In the body of those issues which must in the course of perestroika today find their constitutional resolution and legal realization is to be found the issue of the state status of the Ukrainian language in the republic, that is, its approval on grounds provided by Leninist policy toward the republics, the norms of which were grossly violated during the era of Stalinist abuse and stagnation.

The draft law on languages in the Ukrainian SSR was developed on the basis of the Leninist conception of the functioning of languages in a federal, united, multinational state with the participation of deputies of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, scientific associates of the Academy of Sciences, scholars of the republic's VUZ's, workers of party and soviet organs, organs of education, culture, and justice, public organizations, and representatives of the various national groups of the republic's population.

Serving as the foundation of the work on the draft law were: the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference; the draft program of

the CPSU "The Party's Policy Toward the Republics Under Contemporary Conditions"; the resolution of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee "On Measures for the Realization in the Republic of the Guidelines of the 27th Party Congress and of the January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum in the Domain of Relations Among Nationalities and the Intensification of Internationalist and Patriotic Education of the Population"; and the resolution of the 1st Congress of People's Deputies "On the Basic Directions of Domestic and Foreign Policy of the USSR."

As the draft law was prepared, a careful study was made of legislative acts on languages which were developed or adopted in other union republics, as well as of the numerous suggestions contained in the letters of citizens and various public organizations sent to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, party organs, and to the editorial boards of newspapers and journals.

At the same time scientific publications on linguistic issues were utilized, and the experience of other countries in the resolution of similar problems was taken into consideration.

Article 2 of the draft law provides for the appointment of state status to the Ukrainian language. This signifies that Ukrainian must become the official language of work and of the correspondence and documentation of the republic's state, party, and public organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, as well as the language of their mutual communications. The Ukrainian SSR, represented by its organs of power and administration at all levels, must guarantee the development and exercise of Ukrainian in every respect and in all spheres of public life—political, economic, social, spiritual, cultural, etc. By doing this, it will then be guarantor of the fully developed and robust exercise of the language of the republic's indigenous population (the ethnic group) with the goal of creating the appropriate conditions for the very existence and future of the Ukrainian people as a nation, and of preserving the historic achievements of its distinctive culture and traditions, which are an irreplaceable and unique part of the spiritual possessions of mankind.

While providing for the appointment of state status to Ukrainian, the draft law also vigorously guarantees to the republic's citizens the right of free use on the republic's territory of any other national language, including the free choice of working language in any organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations (article 3 of the draft).

Consequently, recognition of state status for Ukrainian is simply a means of self-defense and self-preservation of the national uniqueness of the Ukrainian people, who by no means threaten the linguistic and national-cultural rights of citizens of other nationalities residing on the republic's territory. This proceeds from paragraph 5, page 2 of the draft law, which directs: "The Ukrainian SSR will manifest state concern for the free development and use of all the national languages spoken by the

republic's population." At the same time, the provisions of articles 3 and 4 of the draft law proscribe the violation of the linguistic rights of any citizen and the linguistic status of any language. The aforementioned provisions and all other provisions of the draft law, acknowledging the vitality and social value of all national languages, are intended to guarantee the personal and ethnic worth of every person, to promote the development in every respect of the spiritual and creative forces of both the Ukrainian people and the citizens of other national groups, and to be the legal basis of mutual spiritual understanding, cultural enrichment, and a strengthening of the friendship of the peoples.

An important feature of the draft Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR is the acknowledgement of Russian as the language of interethnic communication of the peoples of the USSR.

Among the problems taken into consideration in the draft law, the issue of a language of instruction merits special attention. In accordance with article 22 of the draft, each child has the inalienable right to education and instruction in a national language. This right will be guaranteed through the creation of a network of preschool institutions and elementary schools with instruction and training in Ukrainian and in other national languages. The provision of article 22 enjoins the republic's organs of public education to create a network of preschool institutions and elementary schools with the appropriate linguistic regimen, taking into account the ethnic-demographic structure of the population in the respective region or city and, at the same time, to guarantee the child's parents the freedom to choose an educational institution with the language of instruction they desire.

In accordance with article 24 of the draft law the study of the state language and of Russian is obligatory in all the general education schools of the Ukrainian SSR.

Consequently, the legislator distinguishes between a **language of instruction and the study of a language**. While the principle of free choice is operative regarding the language of instruction, that is, regarding a school teaching in a specific language, the study of Ukrainian and Russian are nonetheless obligatory in a school with any language of instruction. This approach is conditioned by the need not only to guarantee to the republic's citizens the principle of free choice of a language of instruction, but also to exclude any possibility of discrimination against one or another language and to affirm their legal and actual equality. However formal equality is not the main point, of course. In practice it signifies that not only will the students of Ukrainian-language schools master the field of Russian language and culture, but the students of Russian-language schools will also come to know the world of the Ukrainian language and culture. Solidly familiarizing citizens with both their own and other peoples' cultural heritage is the only firm guarantee of their mutual respect, fraternal friendship, and internationalist unity. The necessity of studying Russian in all the general education schools of the Ukrainian SSR is determined by

**its status as the language of interethnic communication of the peoples of the USSR—knowledge of Russian greatly widens the individual's sphere of possibilities both within and outside the borders of the USSR. The necessity of studying Ukrainian in all the general education schools of the Ukrainian SSR is determined by its status as a state language—knowledge of Ukrainian is an important factor in social relations and in the Ukrainian SSR citizen's practical enjoyment of his constitutional rights in the most diverse spheres.**

Article 25 of the draft law stipulates that instruction and training in **the republic's professional and technical schools, specialized secondary education institutions, and VUZ's must be conducted in Ukrainian**. Groups may be established at these educational institutions to be instructed in Russian or another national language for citizens from other union republics or foreign citizens, as well as in the event of a requirement to train cadres for population groups of the republic that do not speak Ukrainian. Accordingly, all people entering specialized secondary education institutions and VUZ's must take an entrance examination on the state language. University entrants from other union republics and those attending educational institutions to undergo preparation as national cadres will constitute an exception. They will take the examination in Russian or in another national language.

With a view to maximum regard for the interests of all the national groups of the republic's population and to guarantee the expedient execution of the provisions of the draft law on languages, a gradual implementation of its terms is envisaged. The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet's draft resolution "On the Procedure of Implementing the Ukrainian SSR Law 'On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR'" stipulates that its rules will be introduced in the course of fixed transition periods. Thus, only those rules which specifically provide for the appointment of state status to the Ukrainian language as well as those guaranteeing the defense of the linguistic rights of citizens of all nationalities will go into effect immediately after the implementation of the law. Those rules concerning the universal transition of the republic's office work to the state language will go into effect over the course of five years. A period of 10 years has been established for the introduction of the rules which will regulate questions of language in the realm of education. The time is needed to train the necessary cadres and to allow students of the secondary schools to prepare themselves for the entrance examinations and for productive work in the VUZ's.

The task of organizing the implementation of the Ukrainian SSR Law on Languages is entrusted to Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers and the local soviets. The Council of Ministers must develop and adopt by 1 July 1990 a "State Program for the Development of the Ukrainian Language and Other National Languages in the Ukrainian SSR," which will appoint concrete measures directed at the cadre, material, and organizational maintenance of the implementation of all the provisions of the law.



## Yerevan Opera Square Protest Participants Explain Goals

18300792A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian  
12 Aug 89 p 1

[Article by S. Makaryan and T. Oganessian: "Two Views of the Problem"]

[Text] August, the height of the vacation season, turned out to be a hot one this year. Probably not a day has gone by that the electronic thermometer on the Opera Theater building has displayed less than 35 degrees. The sun's rays really burn, and the asphalt looks like it will melt any minute. The only relief is to be found in the shade of public gardens and parks. But even there it's not very crowded. The only place you will find people all day every day is on Theater Square. After many months of enforced "idleness" the square has again become the epicenter of events, a kind of pulsometer of our days. Several tens of thousands of people gather in the evening on the square... And again all eyes are on the microphone. Almost every evening there begins with a rally.

Like last year, Theater Square today has become a kind of Armenian Hyde Park, a crossroads of opinion. Leaflets, excerpts from newspaper articles, posters, and declarations are plastered on almost all the trees, walls, and monument pedestals. Nor are Yerevanians astonished anymore to see the small tent that has been erected on the square, decorated with the national tri-color flag. This is no accident: for the eighth day now a "round-the-clock vigil" has been mounted by several young army conscripts who have declared a sit-down protest and advanced a number of demands. This newspaper's correspondents went to the square, chatted with the participants in the sit-down protest, and looked over their demands. Herewith we turn the floor over to the protesting conscripts and to a representative of the republic's military commissariat. Without any corrections or changes we offer our readers their opinions, diametrically opposed opinions on one and the same issue.

**Artur Sarukhnyan, 18 years old, conscript:** We participants in the sit-down protest (20 in all) have advanced the following demands: Give the young men of Armenia the opportunity to complete their military service within the territory of the republic; create conditions to allow our countrymen, servicemen called into the army from Leninakan, Spitak, and other cities in the disaster zone who are now serving in various regions of the country, the opportunity to return to Armenia and continue their service in the disaster zone, on their home grounds.

Considering that our republic is in a very difficult situation since December's devastating earthquake, do we have the right to act otherwise? After all, it is Leninakan, Spitak, and other population centers that suffered from the natural disaster and now need manpower most of all. There is no doubt that by being drafted into the army and serving within the territory of our native republic we will not only be rebuilding the cities destroyed by the earthquake but also, naturally, learning the military arts.

**Suren Sirunyan, conscript:** This is already the eighth day of our protest. During that time we have met with representatives of the republic military commissariat and the republic Komsomol Central Committee. We have tried to explain our demands to them but what good has it done? So far we have not been given a single intelligent answer. They simply don't recognize us. And since the officials have been dragging their feet and done nothing, we have decided to take the initiative into our own hands. In a few days, a detachment numbering 25 men of the Armenian National Army [?!] in which we serve, will head out for Kirovakan to take part in restoration work.

It must be said that we are not alone in our struggle. We are being supported by numerous participants in rallies on Theater Square as well as Armenian conscripts both from our republic and from all over the country. This is attested by letters that have come to us. The adults are helping and supporting us a great deal. Food is being supplied to us by the Gtutyun Volunteer Society and by the collectives of a number of the city's enterprises. We are determined to stand until the end, until all our demands are met.

**Razmik Vasilyan, as one of the organizers of the sit-down protest introduced himself:** I am certain that the national army that will be made up of our boys will be able much better to defend the republic's interests and do much more good in the disaster zone. Please try to understand us: our action is one that has been forced upon us, an extreme step that we have decided to take.

There's something else I want to say. Unfortunately, representatives of the military commissariat so far have done nothing but "manipulate" the parents of the protesters. Not only that, they have resorted to threats. But we are steadfast, because we have just one goal—to help our country at this difficult time. It is a noble goal.

**And here is what Colonel E. S. Gevorkyan, head of the political department of the republic military commissariat, thinks about this :** in early August it became known to us that some initiative group in the Aboyan School building was signing up persons who desired to join the national army. A march was scheduled for 4 August. On that day I personally went to the public garden near the Sayat-Nova monument, where 30 to 35 young people were assembled. They hoisted placards and soon moved out in a column through the streets of the city. Gradually the number of participants in the march increased to 200. They were carrying slogans like "Draft Armenians Into the Armenian Army," "Let's Revive the National Army." At 2000 hours a rally was held on Theater Square. Curiously, the speakers did not introduce themselves except by their first names. Someone named Zaven proclaimed the birth of the national army. Other kinds of slogans were also heard. One Seyranyan spoke on behalf of the conscripts and told of army horrors, cases in which the rights of soldiers of Armenian nationality had been allegedly infringed upon. He even named a specific case in which parents had received notification that their son had died in the army. I assure



you in all honesty that if any cases like that had taken place, the republic's military commissariat would be the first to know. It's true that some alarm signals have come in to us. We are taking all the necessary measures in regard to them. That same day several young people declared a sit-down protest. On 5 August, officials of the Armenian Komsomol Central Committee, along with representatives of the republic military commissariat, went to confer with them. We offered to organize a meeting in the Opera Theater building, but it was refused. The discussion took place right out in the square, in the presence of several dozen curious onlookers. For some reason, however, it was adult representatives of the informal organizations who talked to us, not the conscripts. The subject of creating a national army came up. We stated our position on the matter. I repeat once more: It is absurd nonsense. Our little republic is simply not in a position to maintain a separate army (not even 10 Armenian budgets would be enough). We would need officer cadres and, therefore, higher military schools. We would need shooting ranges and military units for all branches of the service. But where would we build them? We adduced a number of other arguments, but it seemed to us they were not accepted.

Much is also being said about the revival of national divisions. This issue was also raised at the Congress. It is something that should be dealt with not by the military commissariats but by deputies and soviet organs of authority.

There are persistent rumors going about that this issue has already been decided in Georgia and the Baltic republics, that their young men are to complete their service within the territory of their republics. This does not coincide with the truth.

Our own military commissariat intends to broach the issue, but from a somewhat different angle. The only young men who will serve within the republic (a certain percentage of the conscripts) are those who win that right via competitive selection. Most of them will be assigned to work in the disaster zone.

#### **ArSSR: Karabakh Movement Activist on 'Miatsum' Association Goals**

*18300792b Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian  
3 Aug 89 p 4*

[Interview with Igor Muradyan by A. Gazazyan and G. Rubinyan: "We Are the 'Miatsum' Association"]

[Text] And so, the Armenian national movement has been recognized. A thorny path lasting a year and a half has been traveled; there have been mistakes, confusion, but there have also been victories that instill confidence in the justice of the problems facing us. One would think that those who have taken the leadership of the people have assumed an intolerable burden. But it is largely thanks to them that the people have come to feel they are a real force and have become resolute in the struggle for

the right to resolve their problems on their own, however complex they may appear at first.

One of those who stood the beginnings of the Karabakh Movement was Igor Muradyan, a candidate of economic sciences and senior scientific associate in the Scientific-Research Institute of Economics and Planning, Armenian SSR Gosplan. His fate in the arena of the people's struggle took an unexpected turn: enormous popularity and then—suddenly—he disappeared completely! Many people have asked in bewilderment: What happened to Igor Muradyan, what turn did his fate take, what is he doing now? These and other questions have been asked by numerous readers of KOMSOMOLETS. We have to admit we were also seriously interested. We met with Igor Muradyan in his office and asked him to answer a number of questions.

[Muradyan] Is it really worth it to dig up the past? It seems to me that the disgraceful details make up nothing but a kind of curious sensation of the kind pursued by every newspaperman, one which holds for me the unenviable role of a leader who is unrecognized or has been toppled. I think it would be more constructive to discuss the present stage of the national struggle to resolve the Karabakh problem, the course of further action proposed by our organization—more precisely, the Miatsum Association [sotovarishchesto].

[KOMSOOLETS] But as we know, those who do not learn from the past are bound to lose....

[Muradyan] If you insist, let me say briefly: Most of the people, it seems to me, have developed a kind of complex in which economic measures and political solutions to the problem are placed in opposition. The lack of flexible thinking on the part of many people had its effect. It developed, for this reason, that everyone demanded instant, fundamental measures and rejected natural intermediate ones. The task then was to work out, adopt, and promote lines of genuine struggle that could be carried out without appealing to higher authorities [instantsii]. If you call for the self-determination of Artsakh, it entails appropriate methods. It seems absurd to me to try to achieve self-determination by begging and wheedling. In April of last year, when the Karabakh Committee came to be a "so-called" thing, the question of the necessity of working out ways to continue the struggle arose. Things were very tense in NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], and I made a few harsh statements.... It was an outburst, and there were those who called it a provocation fomented by Demirchyan; I myself was called an agent of the KGB in a hastily fabricated leaflet. There were those who needed to isolate me from the struggle. And that's what happened: I was removed from the Committee.

In June, nevertheless, I did try to present my program. It was the same program we have adhered to so far. At that time, to be sure, it had not been worked out conceptually; I would say we were "groping," using trial and error. And because I spoke out against strikes, I was declared a provocateur....

Let me emphasize that I was always against the kind of strikes we are observing now in Karabakh. They are tantamount to self-destruction... A significant role in what happened was also played by the fact that from the very beginning I insisted on the priority importance of the Karabakh problem over all others, whereas a completely different opinion prevailed on that score. Events themselves showed that replacing issues of strategic importance with a mess of nonfundamental issues of the moment (though I do not dispute their importance!) weakened the movement, made it possible to crush it and shunt it aside.

[KOMSOMOLETS] Igor, what is Miatsum and what is its program? Would you please tell us in detail how you envision a solution to the Karabakh problem?

[Muradyan] In 1985 a group of Karabakh natives, with the support of the most active young people in Yerevan and Stepanakert, raised the issue—for the umpteenth time—of joining Artsakh to the Armenian SSR. The journey that they undertook was a tough one. Leaders were replaced, methods of struggle were replaced, but the nucleus of the group remained the same. We sent an enormous quantity of materials to all kinds of levels of authority; we sent a delegation to Moscow; we collected signatures. Our goal was to show that NKAO could no longer remain part of Azerbaijan....

[KOMSOMOLETS] But at the time you received no response....

[Muradyan] Yes we did. They were extremely negative. By the middle of year before last a referendum had been held in NKAO; more than 110,000 signatures had been collected—essentially almost the entire adult population of the oblast! A plan of peaceful “insurrection” was worked out. This became necessary because we could see that no one was about to take the matter seriously. By February of 1988 the flags of the Armenian SSR were waving over many village and rayon soviets of people's deputies; people had practically come out from under the jurisdiction of the Azerbaijan authorities. The people declared Karabakh to be de facto an inseparable part of Armenia.... Events shifted to Yerevan. What happened next is common knowledge.

Well, Miatsum consists of the nucleus and the like-thinkers who have joined it, and it was created to realize the sovereign rights of the Armenian people in Artsakh. The basic ultimate goal of the Armenian political struggle is to achieve self-determination for the Armenian people in the oblast, to defend and affirm the people's historical and national rights. The political course of action to achieve self-determination constitutes the struggle of the broad masses of our people, along with all the peoples of the country, for the democratic development of federalism, to transform the USSR into a federation of sovereign peoples. Reuniting Artsakh with the Armenian SSR remains a high-priority task until we attain a complete and definitive solution to this problem.

As events have shown, we armed ourselves basically with two methods of struggle: parliamentary and economic

(strikes). That is, we attempted to appeal to the authorities, who did not want to resolve the issue. But there were numerous commentators who said this constituted pressure on the authorities. The practice of begging or demanding that someone resolve this or that problem of the Armenian people had to be abandoned as being fundamentally flawed, and replaced with the practice of parliamentary affirmation of some particular right of the people, along with activities to confirm this right de facto. On 18 July of last year we were witness to the “spectacle” in which they tried to shut down our issue once and for all by using genuinely parliamentary methods. Is this convincing or not? This formulation of the issue makes parliamentary forms of struggle indispensable, but not as a method of “wheeling” rights—rather, as a method of constitutional ratification. Is a legal basis necessary for this? Evidently, within the framework of the Constitution which is now in force, such a thing is simply impossible. But in addition to juridical categories there are higher ones—the survival of the people, the people's right to reunion. And it seems to me that if we undertake a number of bold steps right now, they will lead to the accomplishment of our goal.

At present both the NKAO and Armenia are experiencing a national disaster. And it may be that now is the time to take the step of creating an All-Armenian Committee of National Salvation. Incidentally, this is not my idea; it belongs to that portion of our intelligentsia that thinks constructively. What kind of Committee would it be? Its structure would be as follows: A joint session of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet and the NKAO Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies would proclaim a Declaration of the Reuniting of the Armenian People. Juridically this document would not be very binding, but it would be of great moral and political significance. After that, the republic's Council of Ministers would be directed by the Armenian Supreme Soviet to draw up and adopt a special decree by which Armenian production, cultural, and social structures would incorporate the production associations, social organizations, and cultural institutions of similar profile in Artsakh. There is, after all, a single Armenian socialist nation, and it entails a unified economy and unified cultural and spiritual life. All of this should lead to the systematic transformation of Artsakh into a de facto part of Armenia. Merely a declaration of union, you must agree, is insufficient.

[KOMSOMOLETS] Don't you think this program is rather utopian? How feasible is it?

[Muradyan] All of this is, of course, an ideal. We also see the use of parliamentary methods and dialogues with governmental authorities as ways to resolve the following issues: The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet's passage of a law governing citizenship in the Armenian SSR and the granting of this right to the inhabitants to NKAO; the election of deputies from Artsakh to the republic's Supreme Soviet; the NKAO Oblast Soviet's decision to incorporate Shaumyanskiy and Getashenskiy

rayons into NKAO as demanded by the 25,000 inhabitants of Armenian nationality there; the oblast soviet's decision to restore the Armenian districts of the city of Shusha. As for the latter question, the restoration of Shusha is essential lest anyone get the illusion that Shusha is irretrievably lost. If we don't do this, then we will thereby be consenting to the claim that it is possible to seize other people's territory by means of genocide and justify the annexation by the absence of a native population....

If we cannot carry out all of our program, we must at least fight to realize certain components of it. This is also one way to deal with the problem. Let me put it succinctly: The essence of the program is to establish the sovereignty of the Armenian people in NKAO. Inasmuch as we have armed ourselves with the slogan of self-determination, it is unclear just what we are in fact doing about it. Yes, a session of the oblast soviet did decide to secede from the Azerbaijan SSR (12 June 1988). The decision was most consistent with the principal of sovereignty. Unfortunately, this legal act was not backed up by actions and measures pursuant to the goal of making Artsakh a de facto part of Armenia.

What we have to do now is confront our legal institutions with an accomplished fact, so that on the basis of existing realities they can make the appropriate correctives in the Constitution. Because we do not have totally constitutional means in the true sense of the word. B. Dadamyan, a people's deputy to the USSR, was right when he said that the people cannot be reunited on their ancient land just on the basis of lofty ideas.... We must point our people, our deputies toward accomplishment of the fact and strive to implement the program, even in truncated form.

[KOMSOMOLETS] In other words, Miatsum proposes a course of accelerated integration of Armenia and NKAO, as a course of merging rather than merely strengthening ties. But this course was not accepted by the broad segments of the national movement, which preferred other tactics and strategies of struggle. We must agree, however, that much has been achieved....

[Muradyan] Armenia's national flag has been reinstated; we have celebrated the state's Independence Day for the first time; and the genocide of the Armenians in 1915 has been recognized. These are substantial landmarks on the way to the restoration of national self-awareness. I think, however, that this is just one side of the coin. There is another side, which poses the danger of getting carried away with many problems at once. If that happens, our main goal—Artsakh—gets pushed to the background. At the November session of the republic's Supreme Soviet there were speeches about language, the ecology, and all kinds of other things, but what about Karabakh? Yes, the questions that are riding the crest of the national consciousness need to be dealt with, but not at the expense of the main task! We must not yield our position.

We succeeded in closing down the AES [atomic power plant], the Nairit Scientific-Production Association, so

now why shouldn't we think about the demographic situation in NKAO?! After all, thousands of refugees from Azerbaijan, tired of the exhausting struggle, have abandoned Artsakh and scattered through the country. We need to deal with the issue of enabling hundreds of thousands of Karabakh Armenians who are scattered throughout the country and the world to return to their native land; the necessary conditions must be established for this. I am certain that this would resolve many problems all of the people are worried about.

In conclusion I should like to make a brief statement. Our Miatsum will immediately announce its self-liquidation as soon as any actual group of people or organization appears which will undertake to implement even just a few of our proposals. Incidentally, the Stepanakert Miatsum supports them completely, but unfortunately the problem is that our program does not enjoy widespread support in Yerevan....

[KOMSOMOLETS] Thank you for the interview.

We do not want to comment on this interview—for the simple reason that only by means of an open, sincere dialogue will it be possible to evaluate the constructiveness, effectiveness, and feasibility of the program proposed by Igor Muradyan and the Miatsum organization he heads concerning further actions in regard to the Karabakh problem. We need to listen to everyone who has something to say, to find the grain of reason in every proposal, to remove what is superficial, contrived, and harmful. Surely this is the prime task of the Armenian national movement today, of every one of us. KOMSOMOLETS is ready to offer its pages—let the dialogue begin!

### Armenian Handling of Refugees From Azerbaijan Detailed

18300794 Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian  
8 Aug 89 p 3

[Article by M. Balayan: "Refugees"]

[Text] *Refugees... How many times in history has the hard fate of the wanderer fallen to the lot of the Armenian people, when in the name of saving their children's lives and the honor and dignity of their women and mothers, to protect them from numerous enemy invasions, they left the land of their fathers.*

*History, it seemed, had begun to correct the mistake made previously: somehow the Armenian people managed to preserve part of their land, and began straightening out among other peoples... Yet, once more there are refugees...*

We will not go into the origins of the tragedy that has started. This is the topic of another discussion. There is another aspect, another no less important side of reality: the fate of the refugees, of our fellow countrymen, who headed for their homeland when they lost all guarantees of safe life in our neighboring republic.

May thousands of my countrymen forgive me for addressing them with this word, refugees. There is something humiliating about it for a civilized world, something insulting to man's dignity. However, alas, it most accurately reflects their current status, or more aptly, absence of status, and consequently of all legislatively reinforced rights. Although, it seems, even after obtaining Armenian citizenship, they still have to wear this label for a while, until all the problems related to them remain unsolved. There are many problems.

The date of 21 June 1989, when the ArSSR Supreme Soviet session began its work, also marked another event: 15 of our countrymen among the refugees started a hunger strike. The extreme step that this group (which included an elderly woman) was forced to take was a consequence of actual indifference toward their concerns and needs over the course of several months on the part of republic authorities and really, to be honest, of many of us. "No one can talk about their problems better than the refugees themselves." This fair comment by deputy Khachik Stamboltsyan most fully reflects the state of affairs that had taken shape at the time, when almost everyone except the refugees themselves had the right to bring up (or silence) their most painful problems. To the credit of the republic Supreme Soviet deputies, they insisted, at last, that representatives of many informal organizations, including the refugees' initiative group, be invited to the session, where they were able to speak of their aspirations and concerns from a high rostrum.

So, over a year had passed since the republic began receiving refugees. What came of these long months?

The initial shock after the carnage in Sumgait... and the first flow of refugees. Assistance was offered to people who had endured the terrible tragedy: this natural outpouring of sympathy stirred up the whole republic. Rooms in boarding houses or vacation homes and material assistance funds were allocated quickly. Enterprises, the church and various organizations made a sizable contribution. As many apartments as possible were provided... Several people from Sumgait are still living in boarding houses in Agveran right now.

Of course, offering moral support and providing a material minimum, albeit for several thousand people, did not present great difficulties for our republic. The situation was aggravated later, after the infamous events of last November, when the flow of refugees grew sharply and more than 200,000 people were concentrated in the bounds of a relatively small territory. The Armenian government took a number of specific steps. Yet later, a republic Council of Ministers resolution came out, one of the points of which proposed returning refugees of Armenian and Azerbaijani nationality to their places of permanent residence...

In that heated situation, when insults and wounds were still fresh, on the pleasure of resolutions from the center and the then inappropriate, lofty phrase of brotherhood, was it necessary to so near-sightedly traumatize the consciousness and feelings of our fellow Armenians, who

had entrusted their fate to their people, ruining their destiny? Although, who are we to judge?

The problem is multifaceted and complex. It is hard to write about and even more difficult to solve. The catastrophic earthquake in December intensified the situation even more, completely canceling out previous plans and resources... The tens of thousands who died, the devastated industrial complex and agricultural projects... It cannot be denied that the critical situation in the republic was extremely strained. The fate of 500,000 people, left without shelter (may they forgive me this forced comparison), was closely interlaced with the fate of the refugees. It was necessary to take urgent practical steps. They were taken, but afterwards the refugees were absolutely forgotten. The only place left that they could turn to with questions was the Council of Ministers reception room, where it was not always possible to expect an answer, or the official headquarters operating under the "Armgirozem" Scientific Research Institute or, as it is still called, the "group for receiving, registering and accommodating refugees," which, however, has no real power at all. The group's functions include only the registration of arrivals and receipt of applications according to a fixed pattern. Yet, as the leader of this group, Tigran Altunyan, told me in our talk, accommodation is not done systematically. He simply calls the rayon centers and reveals the availability of work and rooms, in order to recommend this rayon to refugees. Unfortunately, he complains, people often refuse, or else they dislike a place, or they were not accepted in the rayon.

"I have no right whatsoever to order rayon leaders to accept refugees," T. Altunyan wearily shrugs his shoulders. "There are cases in which one loses heart. Imagine, an old single man, an invalid, arrives. He has no relatives in Armenia. Where should I send him? The rayons do not want him, because, having provided him with a home, they will not receive able-bodied hands. Or a doctor of mathematical sciences arrives, a professor with teaching experience. What can he do in a village?"

"In general, I see no interest in solving this problem. For the fourth day already, I have not sent a report to the Council of Ministers and nobody has become worried yet."

Whereas at first such an attitude perplexed the refugees, they later resorted to active protest. Meetings began, repeated addresses were sent to the Armenian CP Central Committee and the republic Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet, from whom they heard promises that everything would be all right. Alas, the refugees did not wait these long months for tangible changes. In order to unite their efforts, to attract attention, and to struggle (!) for their rights, in opposition to the kind of vacuum in which they unwillingly found themselves, the refugees are creating their own headquarters.

Seventy years ago, in a newly revived Armenia, there were more than 600,000 Armenian refugees who died of hunger and disease. Devastated by war, the republic was

in no state to feed everyone. Nonetheless, a there was a Committee on Refugee Affairs and a mass of charitable organizations which strived, if even somewhat, to help suffering people, be it with food, clothing, shelter or money. How does one explain the present situation, where tens of thousands of refugees, receiving neither wages nor aid, can barely make ends meet?

During meetings between voters and deputy G. Staroboytova, I happened to witness how one woman tried to get through the dense crowd of people to her. She did not succeed and nearly cried in despair. As it later became clear, Gyulzar Stepanyan, mother of three small children, had tried earlier to find temporary work and now she had been dismissed.

"What will I do now? How will I feed my children? I have neither savings, nor help..."

All the same, she was lucky. Some nice people at the republic Gosagroprom met her and found a job. True, it is temporary once again, and there are no guarantees whatsoever that the story will not repeat itself.

Another refugee from Baku, Arega Sarkisyan, also the mother of three children, ended up in a similar situation. She is living with relatives in a small apartment with an ill mother-in-law.

"I cannot stay with them forever... If I could find a job, I would leave the apartment, although you yourself know what the prices are like. However, I know how to sew, which is always some sort of support. Meanwhile, I have to spend much of the time outside."

Those refugees who were forced to settle in empty, dangerous buildings or basements also find themselves in an indefinite situation. They live thus in the expectation that some wonderful day either the building will collapse, or they will move. Whereas the danger was shrugged off long ago, so as not to sleep on the streets with one's family, cases of moving the refugees happen only periodically.

There is so much sympathy all around Armenia, so much charity for our children who suffered from the elements. But what about here, in Armenia itself? Of what are the refugees guilty? Is the cynical saying that "the fat do not understand the hungry" really becoming a terrible reality in a country where kindness, knowledge and hospitality were valued in a person above all?

How many of them are there, driven to despair, with whom we have not talked, about whom we know nothing? Is it really possible to somehow solve painful problems while closing our eyes to the true state of affairs? Or will we hope (to our shame) that the refugees will disperse to other republics and all the problems will disappear by themselves?!

The refugees are not demanding that apartments be found quickly for all of them. They want jobs in order to feed their families and themselves. They need guarantees that there will be roofs over their heads in the future. There is talk that, people say, they want to take our

places, which humiliates our people and, alas, reflects a certain segment's level of national self-awareness. We have one sky, one land! We must build our future home together!

In talks with many refugees with whom I happened to speak at the headquarters, on the street, or among a circle of acquaintances, I heard different opinions and suggestions, but one thing remained chief—hope. I also heard complaints that they are not receiving work not only in the Ararat Valley, but also in the cities of the northern rayons of the republic that suffered from the earthquake. Trying to investigate the reasons, I turned for help to I.Ya. Semenov, chairman of the ArSSR Goskomtrud. This is what came to light.

"They are not denying the refugees work, but contracts on the basis of which they would receive apartments in the future. The motivation is that there are not enough for their own. Yet, Goskomtrud is not in a position to influence the decisions of the Leninakan or Kirovakan City Executive Committees," says I.Ya. Semenov. "The well-known republic Council of Ministers resolution No 70 of 10 February 1989, concerning the Ararat Valley, restricts our activity (in particular, it states: "It is also permitted to employ and register a residence permit for citizens, who have migrated to the republic, except in the cities of Yerevan, Abovyan, Charentsavan, Razdan, Ashtarak, Echmiadzin, Oktemberyan, Artashat, and Ararat, as well as Abovyanskiy, Ashtarakskiy, Nairiyskiy, Masisskiy, Echmiadzinskiy, Araratskiy, Artashatskiy and Oktemberyskiy rayons"). If not for it, we would be able to provide work for almost everyone. We even need manpower here in Yerevan, for instance, at the plant for technical rubber goods."

The Goskomtrud chairman let me look through a whole heap of newspapers where announcements of job openings and bulletins were published in the Armenian and, specially for the refugees, in the Russian languages. Announcements are even being made on radio and television. A set of work brigades was organized to work in the stricken rayons. For those who have no job specialty or want to be reclassified, Goskomtrud is offering free training at the Armenian SSR Gosstroy Educational Combine or at appropriate trade schools. In short, workers are needed all over the republic.

At the headquarters itself, where the refugees' initiative group is located, a number of job openings are pasted on a board: plants, factories and cooperatives. However, unfortunately, the announcements remain meaningless paper, since the concept of a residence permit exists, and the refugees' rights have not been legislatively reinforced for the time being. It turns out that half of Armenia is closed to refugees. Yerevan, Abovyan, Echmiadzin, Artashat, Ashtarak, Ararat, etc., are forbidden; in the disaster zone they do not want to take up any more responsibilities whatsoever and the rayon centers are overpopulated, so only remote villages remain. More than 300 homes are vacant in Azizbekovskiy Rayon alone! Yet what could an opera singer do there, or many other city dwellers with an exclusively urban profession?

The absence of a unified system has already complicated the situation, since the spontaneous settlement of refugees initially led to the fact that rural residents ended up in rayon centers, leaving no choices for subsequent influxes of citizens.

True, there are exceptions in which city dwellers have found jobs in the countryside and are working at kolkhozes. There are cases where the leaders of some enterprises have, at their own risk, hired refugees for permanent work in "closed" cities, but without definite guarantees. Yet, these isolated cases are no answer to the problem!

One way or another, by the will of fate, Armenia is enduring a crucial moment now, when, in fact, the republic is being re-made: almost 40 percent of the territory is being built over again. Yet, if we set the refugees' problems aside and do not handle them together with the republic's economic and social development program, in all likelihood, we will be forced to reconsider certain points in the resolutions again tomorrow.

Returning to the work of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet session, which decided to create the Supreme Soviet Commission on Refugee Affairs, it can be said that a start has already been made. The commission has submitted a whole package of proposals on handling the refugees' social establishment for the examination of the Armenian CP Central Committee. The mass information media will report on these, with regard to their implementation. An official Administration for Refugee Affairs was also created under the Council of Ministers. Its decisions will have legal force and, consequently, must mandatorily be executed. The start of the Administration's operation has been delayed, as S.R. Megrabyan, department chief of the republic Council of Ministers agroindustrial sector and member of the Supreme Soviet commission, told me, for the simple reason that the candidates for work in this institution have not yet been selected. Finding ten energetic and competent people in our entire republic has turned out to be unbelievably difficult. The refugees were more practical, having offered their own list. As Liliya Kaliyan, an activist for the refugees' initiative group, informed me, their plan was approved and refugees will fill eight of the fifteen seats in the Administration. Meanwhile, time goes by and the individual confirmation of the candidates still lies ahead. This is delaying the Administration's work until an as yet indefinite time.

Most likely, many would agree that there are many difficulties in solving this problem, of both an objective (the consequences of the destructive earthquake), as well as a subjective nature—the absence of legislative acts, without which it is impossible to solve the most urgent problems, such as the ill-preparedness of local authorities and organizations for receiving newly-arrived citizens, the need for the assessment and processing of all information about the refugees, and a number of others...

A conference of the ArSSR and AzSSR Interrepublic Commission, held on 27 June 1989 in Idzhevskiy Rayon, which proposed specific measures, could be considered the first step in work to ease the refugees' situation. An official report on problems related to receiving one-time aid, pensions, and handing over work-books and other documents was recently published in all the mass information media. An oral agreement was also reached at the same conference—to avoid incidents and other negative phenomena, the refugees can appeal to the leadership of their former places of work in written form. A successful compromise? In my opinion, yes.

Meanwhile, there is no official organization within the republic. All work is being done unsystematically, from case to case, one could say, without looking at broken destinies and dwindling hope.

**From the Editors:** While this article was being prepared for press, the republic Council of Ministers passed resolution No 359 of 17 July 1989, in which point 5, concerning certain measures to guarantee the rights of citizens to housing and everyday living arrangements for citizens who have been forced to abandon places of permanent residence beyond the republic's borders, reads: "In partial change to the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers resolution No 70 of 10 February 1989, employment and temporary residence permits are allowed for citizens, forced to abandon places of permanent residence, in Abovianskiy, Araratskiy, Artashatskiy, Ashtarakskiy, Masisskiy, Nairiyskiy, Oktembrianskiy, and Echmiadzinskiy rayons and in the cities of Abovyan, Ararat, Artashat, Ashtarak, Oktembryan, Razdan, Charentsavan, and Echmiadzin, with the consent of the employer or owner of the building, if the amount of living space per resident is not less than 7 square meters as a result of settlement..."

### Georgian People's Front Stages Demonstration

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[Editorial Report] Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian on October 31 carries on page 3 a 200-word unattributed report titled "Demonstration on Rustaveli Avenue." The report states that on October 29 the People's Front of Georgia held a mass demonstration in Tbilisi to support their demand for an immediate convocation of the GSSR Supreme Soviet to deal with the republic's many acute problems. People's Front member Zurab Kiknadze told a GRUZINFORM correspondent that the organization had taken this step "because of the decision to delay the next Supreme Soviet session for an indefinite period of time." Irakli Batiashvili, chairman of the Society of Ilya the Righteous, listed the demonstrators' demands: "We want an objective investigation, to be carried out with the participation of appropriate international organizations, of the ethnic crisis in the republic and of the tragic events of 9 April. We want a clarification of the issue of Georgia's annexation and immediate solutions for the problems experienced by Georgian young men during their military service."

**Uzbek CP Buro Assesses Blame in Fergana Events***18300786a Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
30 Jul 89 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "In the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro"]

[Text] As has been reported, a regular meeting of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro was held on 20 July. It discussed the question of the tragic events in Fergana Oblast and the responsibility of party, soviet, and law enforcement organs.

The resolution that was passed reflected agreement with the conclusions and proposals set forth on the subject in the Report of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Commission that was created by decision of the 14th Central Committee Plenum (the report is being published).

It acknowledges that the tragic events in Fergana Oblast resulted primarily from serious mistakes and oversights on the part of the obkom buro, the oblispolkom, and soviet and law enforcement organs in the district. They failed to see the danger in the increasingly tense social-political situation; not only did they underestimate, they sometimes even abetted anti-perestroika, nationalistic and corrupt elements striving to foment interethnic strife and to exploit the religious sentiments of the population to heat up and destabilize the situation. They failed to stop attempts by certain persons of Turkish nationality to aggravate interethnic relations and the mood in the settlements.

The resolution emphasizes that what happened in Fergana Oblast is largely due to the extremely unsatisfactory state of party, political, cadre, and ideological work. For many years, cadres there were selected on the basis of kinship, narrowly local concerns, and cronyism, which engendered corruption and anything-goes. Officials who compromised themselves and fell down on the job were not always assessed strictly enough by the party. The obkom, gorkoms, raykoms, local ispolkoms, and, especially, the law enforcement organs acted confused during the emergencies and failed to utilize all available resources to put a decisive stop to the disorders. The trade union and Komsomol organizations proved helpless. MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] units failed to cope with their assigned task of protecting the safety of people and economic installations. Nor did the Fergana Obkom Buro that was held on 21 June of this year properly assess its mistakes and oversights in a sufficiently self-critical and principled manner and map out effective measures to normalize the social-political situation in the oblast. The decisions taken by the buro in regard to communist officials have been assessed as too liberal.

The resolution stipulates the responsibility of the officials of party, soviet, and law enforcement organs for the tragic events that took place in Fergana Oblast. It notes that because of the low quality of his party leadership, his lack of proper exactingness in regard to cadres, failure to see the unhealthy moral and political climate

developing in the oblast, and his indecisiveness in regard to taking measures to stabilize the situation in the oblast, Obkom First Secretary Sh. M. Yuldashev deserves strict party punishment and dismissal from his post, but in consideration of the fact that he has not served in the post very long and has acknowledged his mistakes, he has been given a severe reprimand which is noted in his CPSU record card.

The resolution recommends that a session of the Fergana Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies consider whether Fergana Oblispolkom Chairman Kh. Madzhitov be kept in his post in view of his failure to exercise the necessary leadership, his inconsistency in accomplishing the tasks of the oblast's social and economic development and in meeting the needs and demands of the people, and his passivity during the period of the mass disorders. His party responsibility is to be examined after his convalescence.

For his shortcomings in the supervision of party, soviet, and Komsomol organizations and law enforcement organs and for failure to make timely decisions on fundamental issues relating to putting a stop to the mass disorders, Obkom Second Secretary A. V. Kozyr is given a severe reprimand, to be entered on his CPSU record card. The Uzbek CP Central Committee Department of Organizational Party and Cadre Work has been directed to make its recommendation on A. V. Kozyr's further work.

For serious shortcomings and oversights in the organization of ideological and political-upbringing work as well as failure to take the necessary steps to mobilize the ideological aktiv and party members in the struggle against various antisocial manifestations in the oblast, Obkom Secretary T. A. Egamberdiyeva has been dismissed from her post. It is noted that she has been given a severe reprimand by decision of the Fergana Obkom Buro, to be entered in her CPSU record card.

Obkom Secretary A. R. Mamatkazin has been given a severe reprimand, to be entered on his CPSU record card, and Obkom Secretary B. A. Ashrafkhonov has been given a severe reprimand.

It is noted that because of the bungling of the militia organs, further retention of S. Yu. Burkhanov in his post as chief of the oblispolkom's Administration of Internal Affairs cannot be considered. His party responsibility will be examined after his convalescence.

The Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro notes that N. G. Leskov, chief of the KGB [state security committee] Administration for Fergana Oblast, has been given a severe reprimand, to be entered on his CPSU record card, and he has submitted a report of dismissal from his post. Uzbek SSR Minister of Internal Affairs U. S. Rakhimov has submitted a request to be released from his post.

Party member and Republic Procurator D. A. Usatov has been directed to focus on the inadequate supervision over the work of the procuracy organs and shortcomings



in the exercise of procuracy supervision over the strengthening of socialist legality, crime prevention, and coordination of anti-crime efforts. Uzbek SSR KGB Chairman A. S. Morgasov is directed to focus on the necessity of strengthening supervision over subordinate units, and on shortcomings in the implementation of preventive efforts locally. D. A. Usatov has been directed to carry out an integrated inspection of the activities of the Fergana Oblast Procuracy. The findings of the inspection are to be reviewed at a meeting of the expanded collegium of the republic procuracy and, if necessary, the Fergana Oblast Procuracy is to be reinforced with competent cadres.

Communist officials of the Uzbek SSR MVD, the Uzbek SSR KGB, the Uzbek SSR Procuracy, the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Justice and the Uzbek SSR Supreme Court are directed to take immediate steps to clean up the moral and psychological situation, restore public order in the republic, prevent and forestall mass disorders, and improve the efforts of the law enforcement organs in emergency situations.

The Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro has directed Central Committee departments, obkoms, gorkoms, raykoms, and primary party organizations to concentrate their efforts on accomplishing the immediate tasks of improving interethnic relations; they are to view it as a vital part of party-political work, the accomplishment of which will to a large extent determine people's calm and wellbeing, and the fate of the multinational state as a whole.

The resolution states that all party-political and upbringing work must be carried out in light of M. S. Gorbachev's speech on Central Television on 1 July 1989. This effort must enlist the best forces of the party organizations, the whole party aktiv, and the creative intelligentsia; it must pursue open dialogue with people and actively oppose provocateurs and extremists and the ideologically harmful statements of certain representatives of the arts and creative intelligentsia, actions that are damaging to the internationalist principles governing relations among all the nations and nationalities inhabiting the republic. It is essential to make a careful study of every instance of dissatisfaction or conflict based on ethnic relations and deal with any problems in a calm and constructive atmosphere.

Party committees are directed to decisively rebuff any attempts to denigrate party officials, any attacks on the party and the social system; they are instructed to see to it that every party organization has a precise program of action, conducts political work among the masses, acts openly, and copes successfully with the problems relating to people's lives. Personal responsibility for this is assigned to the first secretaries of party committees.

The resolution states that the Tashkent, Syr-Darya, Samarkand, and Andizhan obkoms failed to carry out the necessary explanatory work among the population, failed to defuse the tension in interethnic relations, and allowed a certain portion of representatives of the

Turkish Meskhetians to go outside the republic. In this connection, it is essential to create conditions favorable to the return of the Turkish Meskhetians who left the republic after the events in Fergana. It is essential to do everything necessary to ensure that people of any nationality in the republic may live and work in tranquillity. It is essential to focus the efforts of the party and soviet organizations and law enforcement organs, of every labor collective, on this task.

The Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, Gosplan, Gosagroprom, Gosstroy, and other republic ministries and departments are directed to draw up and implement a complex of measures to get rid of stagnation phenomena in the economy of the oblasts of the Fergana Valley, carry out priority social tasks, especially those of the Housing Program and the Food Program, increase employment, improve the people's standard of living, and clean up the ecology. Problems of accelerated development of the national economy must be resolved in organic harmony with improvement of the people's cultural and spiritual-intellectual life.

In regard to problems requiring decisions by all-union organs, proposals are to be submitted to the USSR Council of Ministers.

The Uzbek Trade Unions Council and the Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee are directed to take practical steps to stabilize the situation, eliminate the causes and consequences of the interethnic clashes, and improve their work overall.

Using specific examples, the mass media are directed to broadly propagandize the friendship of the Soviet peoples and demonstrate how important internationalist unity is to the fate of perestroika. Publications and television and radio broadcasts are to strive for competence, objectivity, and balance in assessing the events that took place; the media must wage uncompromising struggle against any and all manifestations of nationalist arrogance and egotism, of chauvinistic mentality. There cannot be any hastiness in assessments and commentary on particular events that would engender doubts and false rumors among the public.

#### **Commission Offers Conclusions on Cause of Fergana Crisis**

*18300786b Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
30 Jul 89 pp 1-2*

[Report of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Commission: "On the Tragic Events in Fergana Oblast and the Responsibility of Party, Soviet, and Law Enforcement Organs"]

[Text] On 23 June 1989, the 4th Uzbek CP Central Committee Plenum created a Central Committee commission assigned to collaborate with the relevant local organizations on a thorough study of the causes and circumstances relating to the tragic events in Fergana Oblast, assess them from the political standpoint, and

make suggestions concerning the responsibility of party, soviet, and law enforcement organs.

In the course of the commission's work, numerous meetings were held with workers, representatives of the party and soviet aktiv and social organizations, party, war, and labor veterans, and officials of law enforcement organs. The commission studied documents, coded messages, letters, and other materials relating to the events. The commission focused efforts mainly on determining the complex of objective and subjective causes that promoted the conflict in Fergana Oblast.

The commission considers that any attempt to oversimplify the problem or represent it in a one-sided manner, to attribute the start of the tragedy to a mere conflict over consumer matters [bytovaya pochva], would constitute an attempt to avoid analyzing the true causes of the extreme tension in the moral-political situation and the danger of the conflict's spreading to other regions. In the situation as it stands, such a position would be irresponsible and politically harmful.

The commission also considers that the attempt by certain party and soviet officials of the oblast to represent the affair such that the resulting disorders came as a complete surprise do not stand up. Competent organs and working people repeatedly informed the party committees of negative manifestations based on interethnic problems.

The tension in interethnic relations was being fomented long before the events of May and June. There were cases of dissemination of anti-Soviet and nationalistic leaflets calling on the local population to drive the non-native peoples out of the oblast. The events that developed, their scale and ferocity, could have been prevented if party, soviet, and law enforcement organs had made a timely and principled assessment of the situation and undertaken the necessary prophylactic and preventive measures.

The commission has taken note of the dimensions and scope of the mass disorders. A total of 103 persons died in the tragic events, including 52 Turkish Meskhetians and 36 Uzbeks. Injuries and maiming were suffered by 1011 persons. Wounds were suffered by 137 men of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] internal troops and by 110 militia officers, one of whom died. Some 757 homes were burned and looted, also 27 state installations and 275 vehicles. Assaults were made on important economic installations; the criminals attempted to seize MVD department buildings in order to steal firearms; they took party and soviet officials hostage and attempted to release people from jail by force. There was a real threat of the spread of extremist actions to other oblasts of the republic.

The atrocities were presaged by mob gatherings at which participants made demands concerning social-economic and ecological matters as well as the removal of the Turkish Meskhetians out of the oblast. Illegal actions were committed against oblast, city, and rayon party and law enforcement organs.

It was in this difficult emergency situation that a curfew was imposed in the oblast on 4 June 1989 by a ukase of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and, at the republic's request, units of the USSR MVD internal troops were sent down.

Considerable help was rendered by USSR Council of Ministers Chairman N. I. Ryzhkov and CPSU Central Committee Secretary V. M. Chebrikov, who came to the republic. Specific measures were undertaken to help the Turkish Meskhetians; the appropriate all-union organs were directed to hold additional discussions of matters relating to the development of the republic's productive forces and to the accomplishment of social-economic tasks. To avoid any more casualties and prevent the spread of infectious diseases in the temporary holding camp, and also at the request of the Turkish Meskhetians, 16,282 persons from Fergana Oblast were resettled, with the help of the Soviet government, to Smolensk, Orel, Kursk, Belgorod, and Voronezh oblasts in the RSFSR.

Having analyzed the causes and circumstances of the tragic events in Fergana Oblast, the commission considers that they resulted from serious oversights and mistakes on the part of the obkom buro, the oblaspolkom, and party, soviet, and law enforcement organs which failed to perceive the danger of the aggravated tension in the social-political situation and not only underestimated but sometimes even abetted anti-perestroyka elements.

The commission concluded that during the emergency situation, local party, soviet, (and in particular law enforcement organs) manifested confusion and failed to make use of all available resources to forestall the disorders, acts of arson, murders, acts of vandalism involving the use of inflammable liquids, firearms, and other weapons. Militia organs failed to exercise the rights conferred upon them and were unable to secure the safety of the public or state installations. All of this resulted in a sharp deterioration of the situation; the disorders soon took on a political orientation and an increasingly nationalistic character. The various corrupt and criminal elements attempted to exploit the situation, primarily in pursuit of their own narrowly selfish and dirty goals, striving to foment interethnic strife and exploit the people's religious feelings to ignite fanaticism and, in the long run, destabilize the situation not only in the oblast but all over the republic. We submit that in the course of the events, the cleverly organized and prepared nature of the actions became increasingly manifest. It is absolutely essential, therefore, that the appropriate organs make a careful study of this aspect of the events.

The Fergana Obkom and local party committees went about their work essentially without a grasp of the social-political situation, were detached from the actual concerns and needs of the people; they have yet to renounce their armchair style of bureaucratic paper-shuffling; they have not learned how to do business under conditions of perestroyka; they have failed to manifest fighting spirit. They have failed to grasp the

seriousness of the dissatisfaction of a certain portion of the population, especially young people, with their social-economic situation, the high level of unemployment, their feeling of exile [perenaselennost], and the spread of corruption and bribery.

An intolerably oversimplified approach was taken by the Fergana Obkom in assessing the increasingly frequent cases of confrontation in the city of Kuvasay between some Turkish Meskhetians and members of the native population, while the local law enforcement organs failed to apply the force of the law against persons starting fights and brawls, thereby abetting strife and rumors about the omnipotence of the chieftains of criminal gangs. The deteriorating work of the law enforcement organs was also reflected in the fact that the chief of the city MVD department was replaced three times in a short period of time, and the post remained vacant for almost a year prior to the mass disorders. The city procurator's post also remained vacant for more than six months.

The situation was considerably worsened by the attempts of certain of the Turkish Meskhetians to aggravate the situation in order to solve the problem of repatriating them as soon as possible to the southern districts of the Georgian SSR.

The circumstances of the disorders and mass fighting that took place between the opposing groups in Kuvasay, involving the use of firearms and other weapons and leading to the death of one man and the wounding of dozens, was not examined at a meeting of the obkom buro until eight days later. But the extraordinary event was not examined from a principled political standpoint, and essentially the danger of the spread of the conflict on interethnic grounds was ignored by the buro.

Another serious mistake by the buro was the fact that despite the difficult situation, the mass information and propaganda media failed to supply up-to-date information about the events. The oblast newspapers were very late in publishing reports about the events. The broad party-economic aktiv, soviet deputies, trade union and Komsomol officials, party, war, and labor veterans, and the public at large failed to get involved in explanatory work. The organizers of the disorders made skillful use of this circumstances, deliberately distorted the events in Kuvasay, fomented interethnic strife, and lured immature elements among youth, including youngsters in school, into their ranks by using blackmail, deceit, and threats.

Even at its meeting on 21 June of this year, the obkom buro was unable to assess its own mistakes and oversights in a self-critical and principled manner, to map out effective measures to further normalize the social-political situation in the oblast; they confined themselves to the formalistic meting out of penalties.

The commission considers that the events of Fergana became possible because of serious violations in work with cadres. Over the course of a number of years, many official positions were filled on the basis of kinship,

cronyism, and personal loyalty. Officials who compromised themselves and fell down on the job were not always subjected to strict party assessment. Unprincipled cadre policies gave rise to cronyism and a spirit of anything-goes, leading to the moral degeneration of such "appointees."

Thus, M. Ulikov, the former director of the Kuva Furniture Combine, was boss there for 20 years. Out of 26 persons accepted into the ranks of the CPSU at the combine between 1976 and 1984, one out of every seven was a relative of the director; frequently, moreover, they used falsified and forged documents. Despite committing gross financial violations, M. Ulikov escaped party punishment several times, and it was not until 1988 that he was removed from his post and expelled from the CPSU. In the last three years, 107 nomenklatura personnel were dismissed for negative reasons. They included gorkom and raykom secretaries, city and rayon ispolkom chairmen, one out of every seven kolkhoz chairmen and one out of every four sovkhoz directors, and six enterprise and organization executives. Many of them were expelled from the CPSU and criminal proceedings were instituted against them, but even these measures resulted in practically no change for the better.

In the formation of party committees and the acceptance of persons into the ranks of the CPSU, obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms did not always take account of the multi-ethnic makeup of the oblast's population. Out of 15 party committees, it was only the Akhunbabayevskiy and Ferganskiy raykoms that included a total of four Turkish Meskhetians. In the past eight years, the Kokand Gorkom did not accept a single Turkish Meskhetian into the party, and during the same period only a few Turkish Meskhetians were accepted by the Kuvasay and Margilan gorkoms and the Tashlakskiy Raykom.

Similar oversights were made in the promotion of cadres to official posts and the formation of the corps of deputies. Recent years have witnessed a decline in the number of party, soviet, and economic leadership personnel from among the Koreans, Crimean Tatars, Armenians, and representatives of other nationalities. The proportion of Turkish Meskhetians among leadership cadres is only half their representation in the ethnic structure of the population; among deputies to soviets of all levels the figure is only one third. Only one Turkish Meskhetian was elected to the latest convocation of the oblast soviet, and there are no representatives of this nationality on the Fergana and Kokand city soviets.

The obkom, gorkoms, and raykoms have yet to restructure their ideological work in light of the requirements of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference. Officials of party, soviet, and economic organs of the oblast have distanced themselves from personal participation in upbringing work, have not studied the political situation in the collectives and in people's place of residence, and are not responding to the working people's critical remarks and suggestions. The

upbringing of the masses suffers from the lack of purposefulness or a precise ideological position on the part of the party committees, also a complacent attitude toward ideologically harmful statements by certain representatives of the arts and the creative intelligentsia.

Work on the internationalist upbringing of the population is conducted in a formalistic manner, using outmoded stereotypes. The emphasis is still on ostentatious, outwardly effective measures at the expense of careful and specific work with various groups and segments of the population, individual work with people.

The work of the obkom and other party committees lacks any analysis of existing difficulties and conflicts in the interethnic sphere, where the causes thereof are not being studied and no measures are being worked out to resolve them. Practically nothing has been done to meet the cultural needs of the smaller nationalities. Officials have ignored the fact that even the slightest neglect of this concern evokes an undesirable reaction and creates tension in interethnic relations.

An unhealthy religious situation has developed in the oblast. Cause for serious alarm is the fact that more and more people are falling under the influence of religion, especially young people in school. Not enough work is being done among women; their place and role in production and in the home are being neglected. Shocking cases of women's self-immolation still occur.

No specific work is being done to implement vital party documents. For instance, decisions taken by the obkom on the basis of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Decree "On the State of Interethnic Relations and Strengthening Internationalist Upbringing" and "On Measures To Strengthen the Prevention of Antisocial Manifestations in the Republic" were not even sent out to the gorkoms and raykoms.

The practice of replacing upbringing work with administrative-command methods, and the inability to consult and confer with people, to hold open dialogue with them, is attested by the following fact. In 1988, the obkom and the oblispolkom mistakenly designated the community of Lyangar as the rayon center of the combined Akhunbabayevskiy and Yazyavanskiy rayons—yet there were no other buildings in the town except the raykom building. The workers of Yazyavanskiy Rayon asked former obkom first secretary Kh. Umarov to meet with them and discuss the matter objectively. But he didn't even come to the meeting. The workers' legitimate demands were rated by the obkom buro as extremist. More than 300 communists, party, war, and labor veterans, and representatives of the rayon's intelligentsia expressed their hurt and outrage about this to members of the commission.

The central, republic, and even oblast press published serious comments about gross violations in cadre selection and placement, violations of socialist illegality, neglect of ideological and political upbringing work, and

the suppression of criticism and other negative phenomena. However, the obkom buro and secretariat failed to react to these publications.

The commission notes that even now, ideological work continues to be hackneyed and over-organized, ignoring the realities of life. Concerns of the ideological and internationalist tempering of the people, inculcation of creative attitudes toward labor, and rejection of any manifestations of indiscipline, mismanagement, and irresponsibility have yet to become the focus of each party organization. The methods and quality of the work of public education organs are not up to the standards of perestroika; formalism has yet to be eradicated in the organization of communist upbringing of school and college students. A significant portion of them are losing interest in knowledge and are manifesting political naivety and a dependent mentality. Educators are not showing enough creative initiative and responsibility in perfecting teaching-upbringing work and organizing leisure time. In all this work, they are not getting enough help from cultural and sports organs.

The oblast's party committees have slackened their political supervision of the activities of the law enforcement organs, are not being demanding enough toward communists working in the militia, the procuracy, and courts, and have not paid enough attention to strengthening their cadres. The quality of their professional training is low. In a two-and-one-half-year period, disciplinary action has been instituted against 350 MVD officers, and 100 officers have been dismissed for negative causes, including 23 members of the CPSU. Criminal proceedings have been instituted against 11 persons.

This year, crime in the oblast has risen by 28 percent; serious bodily injury and thefts of citizens' personal property have doubled. Crimes committed while intoxicated have increased by 86 percent.

Not enough is being done in the oblast to fight persons who use narcotics or are engaged in cultivating and distributing them. At present there are over 600 persons on the books who use narcotics; this is twice as many as in 1980. Last year, cultivated narcotics crops were found and destroyed in Akhunbabayevskiy, Ferganskiy, Frunzenskiy, Uzbekistanskiy, and Leningradskiy rayons.

Law enforcement organs have failed to master effective methods of preventing lawbreaking and do not know how to work in emergency situations. The law enforcement organs failed to detect and stop criminals from making various kinds of weapons and inflammable liquids, which were used extensively during the mass disorders. The ferocity and brutality of the extremists, and the MVD officers' lack of dedication and their fear of taking responsibility, generated fear and lack of confidence among the people, while the criminal elements got the feeling they could get away with anything.

Major General S. Yu. Burkhanov, chief of the oblast ispolkom's MVD administration, essentially bungled the work of the militia, for which he should bear personal responsibility. The KGB administration in Fergana

Oblast (N. G. Leskov, chief) confined itself merely to reporting information and failed to show the necessary persistence in taking essential measures. Nor have the procuracy organs made their influence felt on the state of law and order. Oblast Procurator A. A. Atadzhanov and the city and rayon procurators have failed to study the causes of crime and are not doing enough to stop thievery, hooliganism, parasitism, drunkenness, and narcotics use; overall, they have failed to exercise the necessary procuracy oversight.

The ispolkom of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, and the city and rayon ispolkoms, are not restructuring their work fast enough in their capacity as organs of state authority and self-government. No fundamental solutions are being sought to problems relating to the implementation of economic reform, reduction of reliance on cotton growing [khlopkovost], rational utilization of labor resources, land use, the ecology, and the restoration of order in the sphere of services; this has led to increasing social tension, and it was exploited by the anti-perestroika forces to provoke the disorders.

Serious distortions and oversights in economic and social development have been committed in Fergana Oblast. In this very densely populated region, the structure of the economic complex has been shaped without taking account of demographic characteristics. The oblast is overrun with enterprises of the chemical and petrochemical industry, which has an extremely negative impact on the ecology and does practically nothing in regard to solving the employment problem.

Over the past several five-year periods, the production of industrial goods there has developed more slowly than in the republic as a whole. The average annual rate of increase fell from 7.1 percent in 1971-1975 to 4.6 percent in 1981-1985 and to 3.5 percent during the current five-year plan. In the past three years, 3.7 percent fewer non-food commodities and 2.2 percent less output in light industry have been produced than was stipulated in the integrated program of goods and services.

The oblast's agriculture has become even more troubled. There as nowhere else, the cotton monoculture holds sway; cotton's share on irrigated lands runs as high as 64 percent versus 59 percent in all of Uzbekistan. Problems of supplying the inhabitants with food products are being handled very poorly, especially meat and milk. Gross agricultural output in the social sector has not risen but declined—from 736 million rubles in 1985 to 698 million in 1988, and yields per irrigated hectare have declined from 2500 rubles to 2200—a 12.5-percent drop.

The social sphere is in terrible shape, and the problem of employment has worsened. Although the average income per capita in rural districts is 60 to 64 rubles, the oblispolkom has stymied the process of changing production relations in the countryside. Until recently, no lands were being allocated for the household plots of kolkhoz members and sovkhoz workers, for garden and orchard partnerships, and individual home construction. Because of an inadequate feed base, more than half of

rural households do not keep cows, and the number of sheep and goats has declined.

The situation is seriously complicated by the continuing rise in surplus manpower. The actual number of unemployed persons in the oblast's social sector comes to more than 70,000 persons, and according to the dynamics of growth of the population, by the end of the 13th Five-year Plan this figure may increase by almost 2.5 times.

Party and soviet organs' style in dealing with this problem shows a lack of specific work in the production collectives and people's place of residence. Yet today, in various spheres of social production, there are 10,000 unmanned workplaces, including 2700 in Fergana, more than 1000 in Margilan, more than 600 in Tashlakskiy Rayon, and so on. About 30,000 persons could be placed in jobs by increasing the shift-work coefficient and expanding, rebuilding, and commissioning enterprises under construction. Despite the difficult unemployment problem, however, officials of the oblispolkom seem unconcerned; their actions show a lack of initiative or any striving to deal with virgin ovens in a practical way. Moreover, the republic's Council of Ministers is not doing much to monitor these matters and is not being demanding enough in regard to the ministries, departments, and oblast organizations.

The oblast is failing to meet targets with respect to the construction of housing, schools, and polyclinics, and urban, community, and kishlak development. There has been no reduction in the number of families who are on the waiting list for improved housing. One third of the schools are in unfit buildings; half of them lack athletic facilities and auditoriums, standard cafeterias; 70 percent of them are operating on two or more shifts. Only 44 percent of the rural population is equipped with water pipelines. There are only three laundry facilities, there are not enough bathhouses, rental outlets, and shops for the repair of household appliances. The network of children's preschool institutions, physical culture and sports facilities, and health care facilities is not developing fast enough. The rate of infectious hepatitis, acute intestinal infections, and cardiovascular and oncological diseases is considerably higher than the republic average.

Last year the local ispolkoms received more than 70,000 complaints from citizens; 3600 complaints were addressed to the CPSU Central Committee. But these appeals are not being properly analyzed, and the work of the relevant organs and services is not being assessed as it should. The investigation of complaints is frequently tangled in red tape in the Margilan and Kuvasay city ispolkoms and Akhunbabayevskiy, Rishtanskiy, and Uzbekistanskiy rayon ispolkoms. The rural inhabitants of the oblast were seriously dissatisfied by an illegal decision of the Fergana Gorispolkom, which substantially restricted the hiring of young people from the rayons and the kishlaks. Because their complaints have been handled carelessly, the working people are frequently forced to appeal to all-union and republic organs.

Over a long period of time, the residents of Kokand and adjacent rayons were complaining to various organs about pollution of the atmosphere and water sources by the Novyy Kokand Chemical Plant. The failure of the Fergana Oblast Ispolkom and the republic Council of Ministers to take specific steps and show persistence in dealing with the problem created tension and got the people upset. The tense situation was skillfully exploited for their own purposes by certain extremist elements, and only the intervention of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and all-union minister N. M. Olshanskiy made it possible to decide the issue of closing the enterprise and giving it a new profile.

The commission is of the opinion that the activities of the oblast trade union council is still dominated by the formalistic-bureaucratic style of work. The trade union organizations are not taking active part in strengthening discipline and good organization in production and are not showing sufficient persistence in adhering to the principles of social justice. At numerous meetings with workers of the oblast, people have expressed indignation about injustices in the assignment of apartments, cars, medical and trade services, and the allocation and use of trips to sanatoriums and vacation homes. All of this creates moral and psychological tension in the collectives.

Party supervision over the oblast's Komsomol organizations has slackened. The organizations are not taking active part in getting young people involved in socially useful labor, or in patriotic and internationalist upbringing. Having nothing really interesting to do, some young people are drifting into the informal organizations and committing unlawful actions. A substantial number of those who took part in the disorders were young people of Komsomol age whom the criminals were able to enlist and exploit for their own purposes.

The commission considers that despite measures that have been taken to put a stop to antisocial actions, it would be premature to rate the situation in the oblast as completely stabilized.

At present, investigative organs have instituted 58 criminal cases involving murders, robberies, arson, and mass disorders. On two of them, the investigation has been completed, and the cases have been turned over to the courts; several cases are nearing completion. A total of 97 persons have been arrested; 127 persons have been apprehended on suspicion of committing specific crimes. Nevertheless, the dissemination of alarming rumors, gossip, and leaflets with gross nationalistic slogans has not ceased. For this reason, there is still a sense of fear, indecision, and suppression, especially among the non-native population, some of whom are striving to get out of the republic. Containers to ship household goods from Fergana, Kokand, and Margilan have been booked for months in advance.

The commission emphasizes that the main responsibility for such serious oversights and shortcomings in organizational and political work, which led to the tragic events, rests primarily on the obkom buro and its secretaries.

Obkom First Secretary Sh. M. Yuldashev (less than a year in his post) has been slow in getting to the bottom of things and has not been demanding enough on the secretaries and members of the obkom buro and the oblast's leadership cadres. He has yet to focus adequately on the crucial, high-priority aspects of the work of the oblast party organization in order to restructure the activities of the obkom toward political methods of administration.

During the days of the emergency, obkom First Secretary A. V. Kozyr acted confused and failed to exercise the necessary leadership to mobilize the oblast's aktiv and law enforcement organs to prevent and halt the disorders that developed. He bears responsibility for inadequate work with cadres and with trade union and Komsomol organizations.

Obkom Secretary T. A. Egamberdyeva has not yet unlearned her old, outmoded methods of work with people, focuses too much on the outward aspects of things, and is too carried away with various formalistic measures. She was not up to the task as events came to a head, the ideological apparatus was not mobilized to wage battle against the various negative manifestations, and it lost the initiative.

Obkom secretaries A. R. Mamatkazin and B. A. Ashrafkhanov have yet to restructure their work in the light of the new requirements; they have failed to be persistent in dealing with acute social-economic problems, are not achieving effectiveness in the work of the sectors under their supervision, and have failed to draw upon the elective party aktiv for support.

A substantial portion of responsibility for the situation in the oblast rests with Fergana Oblispolkom Chairman Kh. M. Madzhitov, who has failed to organize the work of the oblast ispolkom and city and rayon ispolkoms properly. Essentially, the oblast ispolkom does not have a program to bring the economy out of stagnation; it is dealing unsatisfactorily with problems of putting surplus manpower to work, improving the people's wellbeing, and resolving other urgent problems.

The commission considers that certain secretaries of gorkoms and raykoms, as well as chairmen of city and rayon ispolkoms, acted passive, confused, and unconcerned during the mass disorders. They failed to take the necessary steps to prevent and stop the extremist actions and to prevent the atrocity-committing gangs from going out into the cities and rayons of the oblast; they failed to get the public at large to join them in the fight.

During the initial stage of its activities, the governmental commission that was formed on 3 June was not able to work out tactics to localize the conflict. By 6-9 June, the disorders had spread to the Kokand district, where criminal actions became especially widespread and dangerous. Vital state facilities and installations were attacked there—the railroad station, the main water supply, the airport, automotive enterprises, and so on. Also cause for concern is the fact that to this day the governmental commission has failed to map out specific

measures to rebuild and repair the burned-out homes belonging to the Turkish Meskhetians, thus making it difficult to bring them back.

We submit that the as yet unsolved urgent social-economic problems of Fergana Oblast require further deep analysis and comprehensive examination by republic organs, the drafting of a specific program to deal with them, to discuss the above-mentioned problems at meetings of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers Presidium and collegiums of the republic's ministries and departments.

After numerous meetings with the party and soviet aktiv, veterans, and young people, the commission is convinced that the oblast party organization is healthy overall, activists and rank-and-file communists are deeply concerned about what happened, are very critical of the work of party and soviet leadership organs, demand prompt investigation by competent organs and the prosecution of participants in the murders, pogroms, robberies, acts of vandalism, and the prosecution of those who organized and inspired these acts. The people consider that they have all forfeited the right to belong to the Uzbek nation, a nation of internationalists and workers. Numerous instances of steadfast and valiant behavior on the part of rank-and-file workers and party and soviet activists during the emergency confirm this conclusion. The working people of the Fergana Valley have also expressed a number of serious complaints against republic organizations, including the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and the republic's Council of Ministers.

The commission deems it necessary to direct all party and soviet organs of the republic to take urgent organizational and political measures to prevent the development of new hotbeds of conflicts in other regions of the republic, to strive to consolidate social forces and secure a calm atmosphere for the normal life and fruitful labor of the working people of all nationalities. Nevertheless, the complexity and intensity of the tasks relating to the restoration of order and discipline, the necessity of accelerating the development of the economy and the social sphere, improving the quality of cultural and moral upbringing, creating healthier interethnic relations, and restructuring organizational, political, and ideological work, lead to the conclusion that it is essential to strengthen the buro and the secretariat of the obkom and the leadership of a number of city and rayon organizations, to bring fresh new forces into the most crucial sectors of national economic development.

#### **Uzbek Party Resolution on Results of Fergana Commission Inquiry**

*18300786c Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
2 Aug 89 p 1*

[Uzbek CP Central Committee Plenum Resolution: "On the Findings of the Work and the Conclusions of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Commission to Investigate the Circumstances Related to the Events in Fergana

Oblast and Measures To Stabilize the Situation and Improve the Effect of the Work of the Republic's Party Organs"]

[Text] 1. Take note of the report of Comrade M. I. Ibragimov, a member of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro and Chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, concerning the work of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Commission to investigate the circumstances relating to the tragic events in Fergana Oblast.

Agree with the conclusions of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro on 20 July 1989, which discussed the issue "On the Tragic Events in Fergana Oblast and the Responsibility of Party, Soviet, and Law Enforcement Organs." Consider that what happened resulted from serious shortcomings in the organizational and political work of local party and soviet organs. The obkom, gorkoms, raykoms, and local ispolkoms, and in particular the law enforcement organs, underestimated the danger of aggravation of the tense social-political situation and failed to properly rebuff anti-perestroyka, nationalistically inclined, and corrupt elements striving to foment interethnic strife and exploit religious feelings among the population to heat up and destabilize the situation. They failed to halt attempts by certain persons of Turkish nationality to aggravate interethnic relations and the mood in the settlements.

2. The Uzbek CP Central Committee Plenum expresses profound alarm and concern over the scale and ferocity of the disorders, accompanied by mass murders, homes destroyed and burned down, and attacks on state installations; the Plenum condemns the inaction, indecisiveness, and confusion of party, soviet, and law enforcement organs in regard to stopping the mass disorders.

The Plenum considers that the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro, Central Committee secretaries, the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the republic Council of Ministers failed to take timely steps to deal with the oblast's urgent cadre, social-economic, ideological, interethnic, and organizational problems, and were for a long time complacent about the fact that the situation in Fergana Oblast went uncriticized. Republic organs remained unconcerned about the fact that many officials of party, soviet, economic, and law enforcement organs proved totally unable to work in the new way; yet they continued to occupy high posts, which evoked the people's justified indignation and led to undermining of the party's authority.

3. On the basis of the Central Committee Commission's conclusions, the obkom, gorkoms, raykoms, and primary party organizations are to analyze the moral-political atmosphere in each oblast, city, rayon, and labor collective. They are to collaborate with soviet and law enforcement organs, social organizations, and party, war, and labor veterans to work out a complex of measures to rule out the possibility of a repetition of interethnic clashes. Create permanent working groups made up of members of



elective organs to deal in a timely fashion with any problems that arise, in a calm and constructive atmosphere.

4. Guided by the statements and conclusions in M. S. Gorbachev's report at the conference in the CPSU Central Committee, the obkom, gorkoms, raykoms, and primary party organizations are to radically change the style and methods of their organizational and political work, gearing it to living contacts with the masses and dealing with the everyday needs and requirements of the people. They are to study public opinion constantly and react promptly and in a principled manner to any instances of callous treatment of people, red tape and bureaucratism, or manifestations of social injustice.

Accord crucial importance to delineating the functions of party and soviet organs and reinstating the full authority of local Soviets of People's Deputies; enhance the role and responsibility of communists working in them with regard to implementing the party's economic, social, and national policies.

5. The Plenum requires that party committees and communist officials in soviet and economic organs and trade union and Komsomol organizations take every measure necessary to protect the rights and interests of the working people, strengthen discipline and good organization, and ensure social justice. All matters relating to the allocation of apartments, cars, and tickets to sanatoria and vacation homes must be decided only by the labor collectives and the community on an open and democratic basis. It is essential to make broader use of the rights and capabilities of workers' control to ensure overall improvement of the population's trade and consumer services.

6. The fundamental task of the party committees is to ensure rational placement of cadres through democratic mechanisms, so that the style and methods of their work can be founded on collective leadership, initiative, and independence, a high level of responsibility for one's assignment, and thorough knowledge of one's job. It is essential to shun the questionnaire-nomenklatura approach to cadre selection. Candidates must be nominated openly, with extensive discussion in the labor collectives and with due regard to public opinion. Vacancies should be filled only on the basis of alternatives and competition. The rule should be that officials are appointed to the apparatus of party and soviet organs and social organizations on the basis of recommendations by the primary party organizations and labor collectives, with obligatory confirmation of their character ratings [kharakteristiki] and the right to recall those who do not justify their trust.

Monitor cadres' activities more closely, evaluate their work in a principled manner and without condescension, and allow no slackening of efforts in the struggle against mismanagement and abuse of office.

7. The Plenum directs the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers:

to analyze the Program of Accelerating the Social-Economic Development of the Republic for 1991-1995 in order to make fuller use of labor, material, and

financial resources and comprehensively invigorate the intellectual and spiritual potential of society;

to take immediate steps to accelerate the republic's transition to regional khozraschet [cost accounting] and economic methods of administering the development of social production, make effective use of the republic's rights and enhance responsibility for resolving problems of economic and cultural development;

to continue working with all-union organs on raising purchase prices on raw cotton, wool, karakul, vegetables, fruit, and melon crops in order to improve the earnings of workers in agriculture, create material incentives to enhance the effectiveness of the agroindustrial complex, and improve the republic's financial situation;

to direct radical efforts toward increasing the employment level of the able-bodied population in the republic and eliminate unemployment, especially among youth. Pursuant to this goal, by 1 October 1989 to draw up a republic program for the years 1990-1991 designed to create new jobs, train and retrain cadres, with the aim not only of providing jobs but also keeping accurate records of persons needing jobs, and determining the specific amount of time between the offer of work and the obtaining of a worker's specialty;

to adopt a formulated system of measures to establish comprehensive monitoring over the implementation of plans of social-economic development in the oblast, ministries, and departments, especially as regards targets for the construction of housing and social-cultural facilities, and the production of consumer goods and foodstuffs. To pursue a firm policy in implementing programs of ecological clean-up, environmental protection, and the re-profiling of enterprises which have a negative impact on the ecology in the oblast and regions of the republic;

to institute strict monitoring of unimpeded allocation of lands to kolkhoz members, workers, and employees to develop household plots and build individual homes. To make broad use of glasnost and democratization for these purposes and get the public involved.

8. The republic's procuracy, MVD, Ministry of Justice, and Supreme Court are to ensure prompt and qualified investigation and judicial review of criminal cases in regard to the mass disorders in Fergana Oblast. Institute proceedings against all persons who took part in organizing and carrying out the disorders. Provide the republic's population with extensive information concerning the findings of the investigative body and the court.

The republic's law enforcement organs are to take immediate steps to clean up the moral-psychological situation, restore public order in the republic, prevent and forestall mass disorders, and step up efforts to fight thievery, bribery, abuses, and other types of larceny.

9. The Plenum considers it essential to step up the perestroyka of ideological and upbringing work in the labor and educational collectives and in people's place of

residence. Under present conditions, problems of political work among the masses must be the concern not only of ideological cadres but also all party, soviet, and economic officials. They must know how to persuade people, to lead, to engage in bold dialogue with the masses, to carefully probe the root causes of manifestations of dissatisfaction and conflict, and to deal efficiently and concretely with issues raised by the working people. In all party-political activities they must proceed on the basis that unless careful individual work with people is strengthened it will be impossible to deal with the complex social-economic problems facing the republic.

10. It is the vital task of party committees, soviet organs, and social organizations to draw up and implement a complex of measures to improve the health of interethnic relations. To resolutely oppose any manifestations of nationalism and promptly forestall any attempts to foment interethnic strife and provoke clashes, utilizing the force of the law and public opinion for these purposes. To create an atmosphere of intolerance toward anyone who strives to exploit interethnic friction for purposes of greed and narrow selfishness. To consider such behavior incompatible with membership in the CPSU.

To provide the necessary prerequisites for the social-economic and spiritual/intellectual progress and free development of representatives of all the nations and nationalities living in Uzbekistan. To make an immediate study of people's needs, decide questions of creating cultural centers and increase the number of schools, classes, and kindergartens providing instruction in the languages of the various national groups, and the publication of appropriate literature and newspapers.

11. The Plenum notes that in the context of perestroika the republic is carrying out measures to restore Leninist norms of dealing with religion and to renounce command-prohibition measures in this regard. It is essential to pursue the line of democratization in relations with believers and at the same time to decisively forestall any attempts to exploit religion, any passivity or lack of principle on the part of cadres and activists whose job is to organize opposition to religious extremism and fundamentalism.

Obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms are to make a thorough analysis of the religious situation and the state of atheistic propaganda in the localities, focusing special attention on stepping up individual work and shaping people's Marxist-Leninist worldview, and take prompt measures to eliminate any shortcomings or distortions. Communists whose actions are counter to the CPSU Charter are to be called strictly to account.

12. It is the vital task of party, soviet, and law enforcement organs to create all the necessary conditions to bring back the Turkish Meskhetians who left the republic after the events of Fergana and to recompense all those who suffered material losses.

It is essential to do everything possible to enable people of any nationality to live and work peacefully in Uzbekistan. The Soviet peoples all have a common fate and common path. The Plenum calls on all the republic's inhabitants to manifest the utmost responsibility to the present and the future, to do everything necessary, on the basis of friendship and cooperation, to solve accumulated problems in the republic's interethnic relations and social-economic development.

### **Uzbek Police, Justice Officials Detail Fergana Situation**

*18300793 Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA in Russian 16 Aug 89 p 1*

[Report by UzTAG correspondent V. Gladilov: "Reliable Protection for the Life and Dignity of Man"]

[Text] A press conference devoted to problems of the activity of the republic's law enforcement organs with respect to the protection of human rights was held in the Uzbek CP Central Committee. At it the procurator of the republic, D. A. Usatov, the Uzbek SSR minister of internal affairs, V. M. Kamalov, the Uzbek SSR minister of justice, B. G. Alimdzhonov, and the chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Court, M. M. Malikov, met with journalists of the central and republic publications, radio and television.

D. A. Usatov characterized the present growth of crime in the republic as "explosion-like". During this 6-month period alone, 17.2 percent more crimes were committed than during last year's. All law enforcement organs are especially concerned by the splash of serious crimes—premeditated murders connected with severe bodily injuries and rapes. Here crimes of a property character must also be included: robberies, assaults, and apartment-burglaries. In terms of all these types, the growth came to 35 percent. But this is on the average, and in some cities and regions it is significantly higher. Thus, for example, in Urgench the number of serious crimes increased more than 50 percent, in Samarkand Oblast—more than 62 percent, and in Fergana Oblast—more than 70 percent. Moreover, in Fergana Oblast, even without taking into account the recent tragic events, there was a significant increase—by 78 percent—of the number of murders. In some regions, robbery attacks increased by a factor of 1.5 to 2.

All of these figures, unfortunately, are already no news for all of us. They have been published both in the central and in the republic press, many are now familiar with them. We also know that in many republics and oblasts of the country the situation is even worse. And nevertheless—those are terrible statistics. For this reason, journalists were first of all interested in the reasons for such an awful crime wave. It is no secret, there are quite a few fabrications to the effect that, so they say, it is perestroika. . . which is responsible for this, that the development of democracy, in conditions where there is a lack of general culture to utilize it, leads to the intensification of negative trends. Is that so, what do the

representatives of the law enforcement organs think about this, are they conducting a constant analysis of the crimes being committed, what conclusions are they reaching, and what ways of getting out of the situation that has been created do they propose?

In the answers of the leaders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Procuracy and the Supreme Court, many reasons were cited. But there is rather speedy agreement on one thing: The growth in crimes is in one way or another connected with the unfavorable state of the economy in the republic, with the low standard of living, and with the bad social conditions.

Some of the journalists in response to this recalled the pre-war years, when people did not at all live better, but nevertheless there were fewer crimes committed. There was a shortage of bread, but, when they left their homes, people did not think about hanging heavy locks on their doors, "you fastened it with a stick so that the wind would not throw it open, and you calmly went about your business."

Then the chairman of the republic's Supreme Court, M. M. Malikov, returned to the question about the general culture of people, about the lack of strong mutual ties today, let us say between neighbors. The overwhelming majority of apartment burglaries, he cited as an example, are committed in our multi-storey buildings, and only a handful—in the old mahallahs. Isolated in the small shells of apartments on floors, people frequently do not even know the neighbors using the same staircase, and for this reason they are not in any hurry to help one another.

The chairman of the Supreme Court passionately tried to convince the journalists of the advantages of the high culture of people and of the necessity of strengthening interrelations. But, speaking frankly, his emotional speech cleared up little of anything—the journalists, and many of them later talked about this, did not want to hear a lyrical digression on present-day customs from the chairman of a law enforcement organ, but a professional, precise assessment of the state of affairs. No one even doubts that the moral atmosphere in society influences literally all spheres of life, and it is not necessary to convince us of that. But, indeed, everyone of us should work professionally on this.

But in the same legal procedure in our republic, according to the view of M. M. Malikov, there is very little order up to now. There are many overdue cases. The Surkhan-Darya Court, for example, since the beginning of the year has pronounced only 12 sentences. Perhaps there are only a few crimes there? No, it is simply that the courts are doing a poor job. But having acknowledged this, the chairman of the republic's Supreme Court could only say: Let us investigate this. Some time has passed from the time when M. M. Malikov stood at the head of the Supreme Court, but this can hardly serve as a justification today: It is necessary to investigate more quickly and more accurately, after all he is not a novice in this system.

D. A. Usatov, too, suggested his vision of the reasons for the growth of crime. Besides the unsatisfactory social, everyday, and economic conditions of the life of the whole society, he dwelt on the recent past, when the corrective labor colonies were overcrowded, when nearly half of the prisoners were not able to work since there were not enough places for them, when in essence no one had to be engaged in educational processes. People were set free, and all of their social relations proved to be broken, people do not want to accept them for work anywhere, and they cannot obtain an elementary bunk in the dormitory. And friends from the former groups—they will not offer assistance. It is only necessary "to go after the case." And the number of recidivist crimes is growing.

Today the role of voluntary people's patrols, comrades' courts, and other public formations, which previously extended great assistance to the law enforcement organs has been practically reduced to nought. And until we will understand that, without the participation of the broadest strata of the population, we will not be able to bring order, it is difficult to count on a reduction in the level of crime.

Problems of a somewhat different sort were expressed by the republic's recently appointed minister of internal affairs, V. M. Kamalov. In criminal investigation, the hottest direction of the work of the militia, the professional nucleus proved to be eroded. Carried away by the replacement of some operatives and investigators for others, they suddenly discovered here that the young people who have come to replace the old investigators lack both everyday and professional experience and skills. At present, of course, radical measures are being taken, but some time will pass before the mechanism of operation will be properly adjusted.

As before, the inhabitants of the republic are acutely concerned about the problems that arose in connection with the tragic events in Fergana. Responding to the questions of journalists, the Uzbek SSR minister of justice, B. G. Alimdzhonov, noted that 388 people there were subjected to administrative punishment—penalties, and arrests of up to 10 days. It is quite clear that these, as it is said, are by no means the main operating persons. But the investigation there is being conducted very intensively, the best and most experienced staff members of all the law enforcement organs are working there, and neither the organizers of the slaughter nor those who inspired it will escape punishment. Six criminal cases have already been completed—a number of people have been sentenced to various prison terms for keeping weapons. Important trials are now in preparation, and the journalists and the entire population will be informed about them in broadest manner.

But what about the rumors that continue to circulate around these events? The things they don't say: Beginning with the number of victims, which supposedly is understated by a factor of 2 to 4 in the official reports, and ending with the report that the troops and militia

arranged for the formal shooting of participants in a peaceful meeting in Fergana. Moreover, this is sort of described in leaflets that are being distributed? Is this so?

V. M. Kamalov informed the journalists that not long ago two distributors of such leaflets, with the signature of the movement "Birlik" were arrested in Fergana. The leaflets do indeed say that militia men and soldiers of the internal troops opened fire on people who sitting down peacefully. There is much to indicate that this is not true, and the minister showed the participants of the press conference photographs of selected weapons—besides knives, home-made and factory-made pistols, rifles, and even automatic weapons figure there. What then is one to understand by the definition of a "peaceful" and "unarmed" crowd? V. M. Kamalov asked reasonably. Also shown were photographs of members of the militia and soldiers, who had received the most varied kinds of wounds. So that it was not at all "defenseless" and peaceful inhabitants who committed outrages in Fergana Oblast.

The journalists also asked about rumors, spreading in waves through Tashkent, to the effect that the burial of the waste of harmful substances without installations is allegedly taking place in Tashkent Oblast, where industrial wastes from nearly the entire country are brought together. It turned out that the republic procurator, D. A. Usatov, personally was in those places and saw two such burials. One of them belongs to the Elektrokhimprom Association, the other—to some enterprises of the republic. Only two deliveries here of production wastes from other republics and oblasts were stated. According to preliminary observations, in spite of the fact that these burials really do need more careful installation and they have already begun to establish a strict procedure there, dangers of air and soil contamination do not exist. But, the procurator emphasized, the most careful ecological examination is necessary, and for this reason he is inclined to obtain its efficient conduct by the appropriate competent organs.

And a multitude of the most diverse questions was presented by the journalists to the administrators of the law enforcement organs—in regard to individual trials and sentences, in regard to some publications of OGONEK and to the activity of the trade and purchase cooperatives, and the workers' detachments being created to assist the militia. To all of these questions answers were given, which, if they did not always satisfy the representatives of the press, were sufficiently frank in the general opinion of the press conference participants. And nevertheless, among the majority of those present the impression was created that the organs for the protection of the law in our republic are not yet making sufficient efforts to coordinate their work and to make fuller utilization of the already accumulated potential. And the more rapidly they overcome the "growing pains", the more quickly order will be established in our cities and villages. But, let us remember, without our common and effective assistance, this process may be delayed for a long time.

### Officials Debunk Rumors About Fergana Situation

18300788a Tashkent KOMSOMOLET  
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 8 Aug 89 p 1

[Report by UzTAG correspondent A. Baranov: "And Once Again About Rumors"]

[Text] "The spreading of alarming rumors, gossip, and leaflets with crude nationalist attacks has not ceased. And because of that, the feeling of fear and uncertainty remains..." This was stated in the recently published report of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Commission, which contains an evaluation of the events of June in Fergana Oblast and the present tasks of the party, soviets and law enforcement organs. These words are enough to reveal the goals, pursued by the extremists who have concealed themselves but not put down their weapons, the organizers of the rumors. And they touch on not only Fergana valley, but all regions of the republic without exception.

Reports which were transmitted to us for publication by the press group of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs confirm this.

In Leninskiy rayon in Tashkent, near the Magistral cafe on Kuybyshev Road, a citizen named Turgunov was detained in July for nationalistic propaganda, threats and insults addressed to militia workers, and hooligan acts. Arresting him were employees of the UVD of the Tashgorispolkom, Junior Sergeants I. Islyamov and N. Makhka, and Senior Militiaman A. Samukhodzhayev, who were posted to Tashlaskiy rayon. Without difficulty they identified among the brawlers one of their "friends" who appeared among the instigators of the mass disorder. Why did he then remain unpunished? What winds carried him from the land of Fergana to the republic's capital? Possibly an investigation would answer these and other questions.

A little earlier, the Bostanlykskiy rayon court clarified the situation of the watchman from the Pakhtakor voluntary sport society, M. Kalybayev, who was living in the settlement of Tavaksay. He had called upon local inhabitants to come to an unsanctioned pro-nationalist meeting, threatening with arson the homes of those who refused to heed his calls. By the decision of the court, the instigator was confined for ten days.

That is for those who love "to muddy the waters" to think about. Incidentally, after the publication last month of our report "Whom Do These Rumors Suit?" where the independent activist spreaders of rumors were named in a conversation with the deputy chief of the republic MVD Political Administration, a whole deputation soon arrived at the editorial office from Akkur-ganskiy rayon, headed by the chief of the Alimkentskiy branch of the Signal Scientific-Production Association [NPO], V. Medvedev.

"In the article you named as a rumor-monger 'a certain Sabirov,' who is a worker at the Signal NPO plant." We officially state that this is not so. Only one Sabirov works

at our branch - Abdukakhkhar, a hunting rifleman, but he is not a "rumor-monger": at that time, he was in the hospital, and he is not that kind of person in general... Please retract this blemish on our collective.

Rechecking confirmed the grounds of the claim. We must insert a more precise definition: a worker at the Alimkentskiy branch of the industrial textile association, Sabirov Mamed, was arrested at the end of June and received an official warning for spreading provocative rumors.

And again to the question about rumors - a request from Militia Major V. Safiulov, an employee of the MVD press group of the Uzbek SSR,:

"A telephone inquiry was received at the press group: is it true that in Fergana oblast a shortage of cadres arose in the militia, militiamen resigning en masse, afraid to work?... We asked the chief of the Fergana UVD, Lt. Colonel of the militia R. Abdullayev, to clarify the situation. He answered that as of now he has not seen even one report about dismissal of workers. On the contrary, there has been a flood of applications from honorably discharged militia veterans requesting to be called up for service if conditions again require it. Is it impossible to bring this answer to general attention.

We think it is possible.

#### **Uzbek Journalists Protest Central Press Statements on Fergana Events**

18300788b Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 8 Aug 89 p 3

[UzTAG report: "Meeting in Tashkent"]

[Text] A sanctioned meeting in which journalists, representatives of other creative organizations in the republic took part, took place on 10 August at the club of the Uzbek SSR CP Central Committee Publishing House.

The participants at the meeting voiced a protest against the distortion of facts about the events at Fergana in some of the central mass media, in particular in the journal OGONEK.

#### **UzSSR: Belorussian 'Birlik' Member on Group's Structure, Goals**

90US0063A Tashkent KOMSOMOLET  
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 16 Sep 89 pp 4-5

[Interview with S. Orlov, member of "Birlik", by L. Razuvayeva: "There Must Be an Opportunity To Understand Each Other"]

[Text] *The interview which is presented below to the readers was prepared about 2 months ago, but... The editorial staff saw an opportunity to publish it only today after television broadcasts which, 3 days running, suddenly (?) gave one of the informal associations, "'Birlik'-", the opportunity to speak out.*

*After the broadcasts we again met with our hero—had our article gone out of date? It turned out that it had not, that*

*there had been no further changes. As a result we have decided to present it just as it was written at the very beginning—in the spirit of a "discovery."*

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At a briefing by the Uzbek SSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Justice, and the Procuracy of the Republic held in Tashkent soon after the Fergana tragedy, many if not all still remembered the sturdy young man from the audience who introduced himself: "I am Sergey Orlov, member of "Birlik". I would like to ask..."

A Russian in "Birlik"? Until then we had known that the independent organization was "working" almost solely among the Uzbek population. In a word, we met with Sergey and asked him to answer several questions.

[Orlov] I am Belorussian by nationality. I worked 16 years at "Sredazkabel". Now I am a teacher-organizer where I live in the Kuybyshevskiy Rayon. I am a member of the CPSU.

How did I become a member of "Birlik"? In general it was "'Birlik'", or rather its leaders, who found me. At first they invited me to a meeting and gave me an interpreter. Then I had several conversations with the leaders of the movement. Finally they suggested that I join "Birlik" and even become a member of its council. Why?

My opinion is (and it has been generally confirmed in private meetings) that the organization must not remain homogeneous in terms of its ethnic composition any longer. Otherwise, whether or not its members want, it can slide into the nationalist rut. The leadership of "'Birlik'", in any case, are greatly worried about this very problem. And it seems to me that they understand very well that if the organization is to consist of only one nationality, it simply will not survive under the circumstances of today's development.

[Razuvayeva] Excuse me, Sergey, but they asked you to join the council of "Birlik" right at the beginning?

[Orlov] No, of course not. At first the talk was only of ordinary membership. I said that I would consider the offer seriously. A little later, at the end of May, they invited me to a constituent congress of "Birlik" and at this time suggested that I join the council. They also said that "Birlik" sees itself as something of a people's front, which would comprise representatives of all the nationalities residing in Uzbekistan. At that same constituent congress I was officially elected to the council.

[Razuvayeva] Why do you think they chose you in particular?

[Orlov] As far as I could tell, I attracted their attention when I was expressing my views on the democratization of the country at conferences and meetings of informals long before the creation of "'Birlik'."

[Razuvayeva] Were you the sole representative of the Russian-speaking population at the congress?

[Orlov] No. They suggested that I invite any number of people to the constituent council, as many as I needed, and each would be given a translation. I brought just one comrade with me. You understand, at first I had to examine it closely myself. But I saw Russian-speaking journalists in the audience.

I must note that the interpreters did their work fairly accurately, correctly, and competently.

[Razuvayeva] I understand that when you joined "Birlik" you carefully studied both the program and the regulations of that amateur organization. But I also know that "Birlik" has issued several draft programs. How do you explain this abundance of programs? And which of them influenced your decision to join "Birlik"?

[Orlov] I know of three programs. It may be that there are more of them. I explain this by the fact that "Birlik" is still trying to find itself and that it does not have any political training or experience. The very first programs I read cannot even be called "programs." The one that was issued later was marred by an obvious concern only for the indigenous population with no regard for the interests of the other peoples.

I do not consider even the latest draft program ideal. Consider the problems, for instance, when the development of one language and one culture are put ahead of issues affecting the entire republic and all its nationalities such as, let us say, the one-crop cotton system, ecology, the social and economic crisis, etc. But I think that has to do more with the propaganda effort specifically among the Uzbek population. The leaders of "Birlik" should realize that first we must together solve those problems common to all of us, without regard for nationality, of nourishment, public health...

Moreover, in conversations with some of the members of "Birlik" I have heard concern that at present the council of "Birlik" is constrained, and that in any case it is already being led by the masses now. That is, the organization's general policy which is expressed in the program is determined, perhaps, less by the personal views of the leaders than by the sentiments of the bulk of the members of "Birlik." Unfortunately, we are seeing this.

[Razuvayeva] If I have understood you correctly, the leaders of "Birlik" still disagree on the program?

[Orlov] It may not be right to put the question that way, because there may be differences of opinion even between two people. It seems to me that the current difficulties are caused by the lack of a systematic organizational and structural function in "Birlik." And why is this? First of all, it is summer, the vacation period...

The appointed work at "Birlik" is being conducted only by individual sections, and for the time being there is no comprehensive effort. Even the council has not done any serious work since the constituent congress. In fact today's "Birlik" was created only quite recently. Up until

April one might say that it was a matter of uncoordinated groups. Even now not all the groups have joined the organization and maintain regular ties with the council.

[Razuvayeva] But just what is "Birlik"? In one of its programs the organization calls itself a movement defending nature and spiritual and material wealth; in another there is talk of a nationalist association; elsewhere they call themselves...

[Orlov] I understand the question. Today "Birlik" calls itself the People's Movement of Uzbekistan, which implies all the aspects of a democratic movement open to other nationalities. To the best of my knowledge there are currently discussions underway with Tajik, Kazakh, and Uighur activists. Something is happening, and the members of the association are at the very least trying to include representatives of the republic's other nationalities in the movement.

[Razuvayeva] And what is the nationalist makeup of "Birlik" today?

[Orlov] It is predominantly Uzbek. You can count the representatives of the other nationalities on your fingers. But the effort to include other nationalities has only just begun.

Yes, practically all of the work of "Birlik" is conducted in Uzbek. Their publication, as you know, is published only in Uzbek for the time being. But, as I have found out, that is not because of a desire to exclude speakers of other languages. It is because of a lack of funds and of qualified translators. But we have resolved the problem in a fashion for the time being: We are going to give a short Russian annotation for each article. We are also looking at the possibility of publishing either two identical issues under the aegis of "Birlik," in Uzbek and Russian, or a single issue with articles in the two languages thrown in together.

[Razuvayeva] What kind of structure does the organization have? Are its subunits functioning in all of the oblasts?

[Orlov] I would say that we have subunits, but that structurally we are still developing. We are still only forming the working groups and working commissions. There are commissions for working with young people and for discussing a bill on languages, etc. Our most prominent structural element is the chairman of the organization and his four vice chairmen, who handle organizational issues and contacts with the press and other organizations...

[Razuvayeva] What do you mean by "other organizations"? Informals?

[Orlov] Yes, informals, and the party, and the Komсомол, and soviet and religious organizations. The broadest range of contacts.

[Razuvayeva] What is your goal in particular?

[Orlov] The creation of a Russian-speaking section of "Birlik." There are parallel plans to create Kirghiz and Tajik sections, etc. It is hard to say what will come of them, but the desire to create them is present.

[Razuvayeva] Could you name anything specific that "Birlik" has accomplished other than the organization of meetings and demonstrations?

[Orlov] Right now I cannot name any specific deeds or instances because I have joined "Birlik" so recently. I know that its members work actively on a committee to save the Aral Sea.

Meetings and demonstrations are just part of the work aimed at developing the social and political activity of the masses. Just a part. Through its own channels "Birlik" influences prominent scholars, economists, sociologists, etc. concerning the creation of serious programs involving, first and foremost, regional economic accountability. It maintains close contacts with the academician Mukhamedzhanov, known for his opposition to cotton's dominance even in the seventies. A group will be created to develop legal standard acts. Ties have been established with amateur social and political organizations in Leningrad, Moscow, and the Baltic area for this purpose.

[Razuvayeva] Everyone knows about the strict discipline within the CPSU, whereby the minority submits to the judgment of the majority. How is discipline within "Birlik"?

[Orlov] We have accountability. But there is not that sort of rigorous discipline, at least so far as I have seen. Perhaps it will make its appearance sometime in the future, but I doubt it. Because each person must have the right to disagree or disagree with the majority opinion. At the last congress of people's deputies we noted that the minority may have had more sound ideas and sensible suggestions than the obedient majority.

[Razuvayeva] How does "Birlik" regard those "recommendations" (our readers are writing in about them) to the women of the local nationality to grow out their hair as quickly as possible and to wear only ethnic clothing, for instance? People have been receiving malicious letters of all sorts, even to extremist and nationalist...

[Orlov] I understand the question. My contacts on this theme with the members of the council allow me to spell out the position of "Birlik": We must not on any account tolerate such attacks. I would like to offer an example. Two women take part in the sessions of the council, and no one has ever suggested to them how they should dress and what kind of hair style they should wear. They are modern, independent women.

Concerning letters and threats, those who write them have no right to speak on behalf of "Birlik." They discredit the movement. There are no exceptions. Extremism is not the way to build a law-governed state and bring about those democratic, social and economic changes that contributed to the birth of "Birlik."

At this point I want to mention my own principal differences with some of the members of "Birlik" concerning the issue of the so-called migration. In contrast to them, I believe that a Soviet has the right to live in work anywhere in the Soviet Union.

[Razuvayeva] And do you disagree on any other issues in the program or their interpretation of the situation?..

[Orlov] Yes. I expect that I will have to defend my point of view in earnest on the issue of granting the Uzbek language state status. And I am sure that I will find some support. It is really a question of whether the council will listen to my arguments.

[Razuvayeva] And with such substantial differences, you still remain on the council of "Birlik"?

[Orlov] Yes, that does not keep me from being on the council. That is, the specific issues are not so important when the only alternative is to refuse to cooperate and abandon the effort. There must be an opportunity to discuss things and to understand each other.

[Razuvayeva] And do you, Sergey, have some kind of document showing that you are a member of "Birlik"?

[Orlov] Documents are not now distributed, but the issue is being reviewed. I am registered on a special list of the members of "Birlik" and on its council. We do have a little registration card which is a sort of form showing all our information: social background, nationality, etc.

[Razuvayeva] Thank you for your answers, Sergey.

### **Uzbek Party, Informal Group Officials Begin Dialog on Goals**

90US0118A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS  
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 4 Oct 89 p 2

[Roundtable discussion: "We Have Nothing to Hide!"]

[Text] An unusual meeting took place in the Tashkent party obkom—for the first time, representatives of three of the republic's informal organizations, and party workers from the oblast and the Uzbek capital sat down to a "roundtable" (to be precise, a negotiating table). The discussion went on for about 3 hours. Apparently, it cannot be said that it was a very constructive one. But on the other hand, this was a fact, the first meeting, the first step toward one another. And we are certain that this is its particular value and importance. In a word, there is hope for fruitful cooperation in the near future.

E. Fazylov (Tashkent party obkom secretary): I personally feel that the presence of informal movements in the country is a benefit; after all, they wake us up, they force all our thought to work. And we must know as much as possible about them, we must proceed toward open dialogs, and not hush up the existence of the organizations and their problems. What good is there in the fact that the Western "voices" speak confidently of our informals, predicting through them the future of our society, while we do not have even minimal information of our own.



It is another matter that having begun wonderfully, not all informals continue to implement their best ideas so wonderfully, and it is no coincidence that at a CPSU Central Committee plenum, M.S. Gorbachev warned us all of the possible consequences of overdoing democracy. So, in inviting you to this meeting, we determined this to be its approximate goal: The time has come to decide how we can be of use to one another, both formals and informals, in joint activity for the benefit of the republic. Today it is in a catastrophic situation...

**A. Pulatov (Birlik):** We are meeting in such a body for the first time. I propose that the goal of the discussion be determined accordingly—the informals' preliminary familiarization with each others' platforms. Then we each will discuss the results of the familiarization in our association, and possibly decide to meet again.

**V. Sradzhev (Uzbek Democratic Movement):** But why not define the meeting's tasks according to the most concrete and practical issues of the day? First of all, the removal of inter-ethnic tension, the inculcation of trust toward one another. Secondly, bringing order to the city, the republic. And thirdly, discussion of the range of problems in light of Uzbekistan's transition to economic accountability.

**M. Khadzhimukhamedov (Uzbek Democratic Movement):** And we would like to discuss the problems of achieving peace in our home through the prism of the draft Law on Language, and conversations about republic citizenship. We have concrete proposals on how to take away the population's alarm and tension.

**A. Pulatov:** I do not know what alarm you are talking about. I deal with the Russian-speaking and Uzbek-speaking population, and perceive absolutely no alarm. You are exaggerating. How do such rumors get started, that the Russian-speaking population is highly alarmed?

That is the first thing. The second thing. What you are proposing is already a concrete form of cooperation, a form of joint work. We will hardly manage to cope with even one of these points today. Perhaps that is possible at a second meeting.

**M. Khadzhimukhamedov:** Yet you will agree that each organization already has its own platform worked out. Is there a need to discuss them? Each organization (and the informals first and foremost) has the right and the complete independence to accept any platform which has been worked out with like-minded people, that is its own affair, right? Together, we must discuss the matters concerning the situation in the city and the republic as a whole.

You say that there is no alarm. I do not agree! Alarm, tension, and intolerance along with them are growing everywhere: both in the oblasts, and here in the capital. Naturally, we can depict for ourselves the surrounding situation in different ways, but this is not the main thing. Let us take the events of the recent Saturday and Sunday. Mass-scale hooliganism is not born just like that, no all by itself...

But we did not come here to pin labels on anyone, but to react together to the disturbances which have emerged so that they do not spread. You will recall Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's last speech; as the country's leader, he is disturbed by the population's anxieties, their accumulation in localities. And Birlik feels that there is no alarm?

**M. Grebenyuk (International Union of the Uzbek SSR Peoples):** Perhaps alarm is a mild word for the definition of the population's condition, especially recently. A month ago it was clearly said in the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Central Committee, at a soviet of the republic's creative unions: People are receiving notes urging them to clear out, threatening notes. It was then that we expressed the proposal to gather immediately and talk about our sore spots.

After all, how did this come about? Panic is being sown, rumors are distorting reality, time passes, and our press is silent. But it is silent, clearly, not of its own will. And here it is quite impermissible to be limited to an empty statement of reproach to the gorkom [city committee]. Rumors and panic are squelched only by the truth.

**A. Arutyunyan (International Union of Uzbek SSR Peoples):** Indeed, how many errors have been committed over the years of our history. No one is denying them. But why breed new ones instead of thinking about how to clothe, shoe, and feed the people, how to guarantee them security against all sorts of hooliganism? We have one state; we are all its citizens, even though we are of a hundred ethnic groups.

I, for instance, am an Armenian, and I want, imperatively, that my son speak Armenian. I realize that he must also know Russian, in order to find a common language with his neighbors. But they are telling me that he must also know Uzbek. I am not opposed; let him study. However, Uzbekistan is the seventh republic in which I have lived. Imagine that in each republic, I study the republic language, plus the languages of the autonomous republics, oblasts, and krays. I would waste my entire life just studying languages. And when can I work, create, do something for society?

I am firmly convinced that knowledge of languages other than one's native tongue is a person's culture, a matter of conscience, but not a legal responsibility. And now, since the publication of the draft Law on Languages, nobody wants to think deeply about these things. But we have to control somewhat the passions which have flared up all around.

**M. Kosykh (International Union of Uzbek SSR Peoples):** First and foremost, I would like to emphasize that we must converse with one another in the language of trust. After all, our main goal is the same for both the formals and the informals—to make our life better. Let us think about who we are, and for what we are concretely responsible as representatives of this or that population group. After all, this is very serious. What measures of influence can we have upon improving and curing the situation?

It seems to me that we must all actively support those statutes of the CPSU platform on inter-ethnic issues which concern impatience toward the creation and existence of nationalist organizations in our country. Ours is a multinational state striving toward a single goal—the building of genuine socialism. If we are honest people, we are not on the nationalists' path.

The republic's residents already know about Birlik from reports in the press and on television, but they do not know about us yet. Therefore I want to say the following about our organization. The positions and tasks are, for the most part, clear from our speeches. Organizationally, we still do not have a single leader. And it seems to us that there will not be one, in order that neither careerism, nor extremism, nor other mercantile caprices arise. Three or five co-chairmen will lead intersoyuz after the founders' congress.

**Kh. Abduraimov (Head of the Ideological Department, Tashkent party gorkom):** Since the conversation has gotten into the vein of reducing inter-ethnic tension, it seems to me that the representatives of the informals attending here, who have a certain influence over a part of the population, could, let us say, take responsibility (and they possibly already do so) here, in each others' presence, to halt the inflaming of passions, to not undertake any steps which could entail any excesses, and to conduct discussions in a civilized manner, not through fists and demonstrations of force!

**M. Khadzhimukhamedov:** Our organization, DDU [Uzbek Democratic Movement] has charged me with presenting at this meeting a joint declaration on rallies, on any cause for the people to congregate. We feel that all the republic's informal organizations must temporarily refuse to hold rallies. This is dictated by the situation: Today, they only increase tension, provoking unpredictable consequences.

We also propose to create an informals' coordinating council, into which information about this or that group's actions would flow. If, for example, a rally, or something else were planned somewhere all the same, we must all be made aware of it. This does not mean that it is necessary to ask permission for an action, but this will be conducive to a reduction in rumors and panic.

And finally, our last proposal, even request. A session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet will soon take place. Why shouldn't the informals' leaders be invited to it as unofficial listeners with a deliberative vote, as was done in Moldavia and Baku?

**E. Fazylov:** A very sensible proposal. As a deputy, I take it upon myself to introduce your request to the republic's Supreme Soviet.

**A. Pulatov:** For Birlik, the issue of cooperation with other informals is obvious. We are prepared to discuss variant forms of cooperation. However, we have a request of the organizers of our meeting today—not to publish anything about it. Why? I would prefer that Birlik's program

documents be published first. (As is known, the Birlik charter was recently published in the republic's youth newspapers—L.R.).

The thing is that far from all the Uzbek- and Russian-speaking population knows us. A great many things are attributed to us which we have never even mentioned. Everything will fall into place after the official publication of the Birlik program: I think that people with nationalistic tendencies will be disappointed in us; the tension problem will remove itself.

**A. Artyunyan:** But why just the Birlik documents—publication is proposed for the documents of only one of the informal organizations?

**M. Kosykh:** And afterward, reference materials for the republic, concerning the most vital issues, must be published regularly. Complete information would help people orient themselves more quickly; it would remove the emotional tension. For example, such official data exist for an issue which interests us. Today, 78.2 percent of the total number of schools in the republic have teaching in Uzbek. Some 75.8 percent of the pupils are taught in them. A total of 71.4 percent of those studying in professional and technical schools are being taught in Uzbek; they make up 67 percent of the students in national groups in the higher educational institutions of the UzSSR Ministry of Education.

The situation is analogous in the mass information media. Of 140 rayon newspapers, 122 are published in Uzbek. Of 19 city, 24 oblast, and 18 republic newspapers, 9, 10, and 8 are put out in Uzbek respectively. The average daily volume of Republic Television broadcasting in the Uzbek language is 69 percent, with radio broadcasting, 76.5 percent. This corresponds completely to the specific proportion of the native population in the composition of the peoples of Uzbekistan.

Incidentally, business correspondence is conducted in the Uzbek language in 57 of 142 party raykoms [rayon committee], in the majority of the rural locality primary party organizations, in 61 of the 157 rayispolkoms [rayon executive committee], and so on.

**A. Azam (Birlik):** But in these Uzbek schools, the Russian language is taught 6 hours per week, and the native language, 2 hours.

**M. Kosykh:** Excuse me, but that is another matter. Here neither the "immigrants," nor the Russian language should be blamed, but the excesses of the careerist leaders, and the mistakes of the prognosticators who publish the corresponding circulars.

**A. Azam:** I would like to say that we must be very careful in our evaluations. Birlik has no intention of accusing the Russian people, the Russian language, of anything.

Having decided to cooperate, we leaders of the informals must understand the responsibility we take upon ourselves; after all, ours will be the most difficult lot, since the entire weight of the situation is upon our shoulders.

**V. Sradzhev:** True. And we must answer for our every word. That is why I would insist that the course of our meeting, our conversation, be published in the press. We have nothing to hide; this is not a secret meeting. We seek common paths, and our goals are noble. Everyone should know about this.

#### **Afterword**

In preparing this material for the press, we consciously rejected any commentary on one or another point of view, and discussion of the informals' positions on a number of issues. Let the readers try to sort out for themselves the views uttered during the course of the conversation, to understand who's who. For us, the main thing is that the meeting took place.

True, as you gathered, opinions as far as publication is concerned were divided among the informals. To be honest, this was somewhat unexpected for us. Yet, having thought about the situation, having counted all the "fors" and "againsts," we decided that: **PEOPLE ABSOLUTELY MUST KNOW ABOUT THE MEETING.**

Even if this meeting had not gone as well-planned and smoothly as some of its organizers would have wanted. Even if some sort of mutual documents had not been worked out as a result of the conversation. It is just a great thing that those who gathered learned about one another, heard and supported sensible proposals, agreed to a new meeting...

The warming in the formally informal "upper echelons," the contact of official and unofficial ideologues, the mutual tolerance, the work on a mutual platform—is this not an example to us all. In such a cause, imitation is sacred. After all, peace and quiet in our republic home, and friendship among peoples really depend upon each of us.

#### **Military Readers Comment on Nationalities Issues**

*18010890a Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Sep 89 First Edition p 1*

[Letters to the editors: "Readers Comment on Interethnic Issues"]

[Text] The restructuring of interethnic relations has occurred in an extremely complex manner. The responses received by the editors to the draft CPSU Platform "On Party Nationality Policy Under Present-Day Conditions" have indicated that the Soviet people support radical changes in this area.

The realities of life have repudiated the former dogmas and notions concerning the "stability of the nationality question." What is waiting for us? How can we halt the development of negative trends? The draft platform outlines the foundation and main areas of party activities. The local bodies, the readers feel, should create a mechanism capable of productively resolving the questions of interethnic relations.

We are continuing to publish letters received by the editors.

#### **On a State Basis**

**Capt 3d Rank Yu. Grigoryev from Vladivostok:**

I was born in Yakutia and I am a Yakut by nationality, but I went to Russian school and have served many years now in the Pacific Fleet. The draft CPSU Platform is particularly memorable in those lines where they speak of the importance of strengthening concern for maintaining and developing the languages of the minority peoples.

In actuality, concern for this must be shown on the state level. The indigenous population in Yakutia numbers around 700,000 persons. And is each Yakut capable of reading and writing in his mother tongue? The picture is rather lamentable. The younger generation in the towns prefers communicating predominantly in Russian and does not know the mother tongue fluently. Is this not an indication of the start of the degeneration of a people which has its own vivid culture and way of life and possesses everything necessary to feel themselves full partners in the fraternal peoples?

In all questionnaires opposite the line "mother tongue" I personally fill in Russian. There is not much I can do as I was not taught my mother tongue in school. But the time has now come when I feel in my heart that I do have something to say to my compatriots about military service, about patriotism, friendship and so forth. But I can only do this in Russian.

Last year, the Yakut Book Publishing House published my first small book on the service of fellow Yakuts. Recently I also prepared for publishing a tale entitled "Maritime People." But I deeply regret that it will not be read by all my fellow Yakuts, many of whom have a poor knowledge of Russian (particularly in the interior). But how can the situation be rectified? I see one way out and that is we must have a new nationality policy which would help to maintain the language and culture of each people of our country.

#### **A Proposal...**

**Sr Lt Yu. Moroz (Northern Group of Forces):**

In a number of Union republics there are special boarding schools for preparing local young persons for admission to military schools. But the results of the activities of these schools are rather meager. For precisely this reason, in my view, there are so few officers in the Armed Forces who are natives from the Baltic, Central Asia, Transcaucasus and elsewhere.

In this context, I propose adding the following provision to the draft CPSU Platform: In each Union republic, it is essential to strengthen the military patriotic education and propagandize the glorious combat traditions of the Army and Navy.

#### **Another Proposal...**

**Maj V. Barannik from the Central Group of Forces:**

The draft CPSU Platform points out that any attempts to defame persons due to nationality should be viewed as

inadmissible for the Soviet state. In line with this, I consider it necessary in the near future to adopt a USSR law which would set responsibility for any discrimination due to nationality. Mere appeals alone, as life shows, are of no benefit.

### **Hazing and Ethnic Groups**

#### **Sr Lt A. Yaichenko, Black Sea Fleet:**

Recently there has been sharp talk about "hazing" ["dedovshchina"]. But for some reason we are still very condescending for a different stagnating and very harmful phenomenon of the forming of groups of regular servicemen along nationality lines.

The explosive development of interethnic relations in certain areas has had a negative impact on the moral atmosphere in the Army and Navy collectives. Even a recent inductee with the support of other personnel of the same nationality with strong fists may indulge in bullying against a fellow serviceman who does not have a "nationality" back-up. In a word, serious thought must be given to these questions. We for some reason simply overlook such things. I proposed my comments on the harmful consequences of "nationality groups" to the editors of the fleet newspaper, but they refused to publish them.

### **How Did Things Get So Far?**

#### **Capt 1st Rank (Ret) M. Vaysak:**

I am extremely concerned by the situation in the Baltic. Here there have been ever-growing attempts of individual forces to separate these republics from the Soviet Union. And a component part of this unseemly campaign has been the desecrating of the monuments of our military past and even—just think of it—the graves of those who have fallen in the battles of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars.

Two of my brothers did not return from the war. The younger, the 18-year-old Ivan perished in liberating Latvia of the Nazi invaders. His name has been inscribed on the slab of one of the graves in the cemetery in Sigulda. The Latvian land has become for our family just as sacred and our own as the Ukrainian. And the Baltic soldiers with whom I happened to serve were always close and kindred persons for me.

And then these blasphemous actions by modern vandals. How could things reach this point? And what will become of us if we are unable to protect the sacred memory of those who gave up their lives for the sake of the life of present generations?

### **Half Measures Will Not Do**

#### **S. Zimancov, academician of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences:**

In reacting sharply to the negative trends which are presently occurring in the interethnic relations, we should still assess them soberly and study their prime cause.

For this reason, I feel it desirable to make the following proposal for the draft CPSU Platform.

I feel that it is not sufficient to merely voice the notion which is correct in and of itself that under present-day conditions the solution to the nationality question can and should be found solely in the channel of the revolutionary renovation of our society. This reflects the general, so to speak, situational aspect. In my view, we should supplement the draft with an indicating of the need to carry out fundamental transformations and reforms in the very sphere of nationality policy.

The draft says nothing about cadre work by the party in the Union republics and national autonomous areas. In the lifetime of V.I. Lenin, great attention was paid to the questions of training nationality cadres in the republics and autonomous regions. This can be seen, in particular, in the materials and decisions of the 12th Party Congress. The latter dealing with appointments remains pertinent today. During the period of the cult of personality a lax, mass approach was established to the practice of sending to the republics responsible party, state and economic workers regardless of their knowledge of the history, culture, traditions and language of the indigenous peoples and, consequently, their ability to work in the masses and with the masses.

### **LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Readers at Variance on Language Issue**

18300808 Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* in Russian 13 Sep 89 p 3

[Letters to the editor received by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Languages of Soviet Peoples Department: "Polemics:" "Which Language To Speak?"]

[Text] "What language do you speak?" That was the theme of a roundtable discussion from which materials were published in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA on 29 March of this year. This was not so much a question addressed to the participants in the discussion as to our readers. It is clear that the roundtable to a large extent merely served as the impetus for reflection on diverse aspects of interethnic relations.

The draft CPSU platform on the nationalities question aroused great interest among our readers. They have become active participants in the discussion of language problems.

I would like to provisionally divide their letters into three main groups, regardless of which type of solution the letter writers propose to the problems we face.

### **Alternative 1: Only Russian**

#### **V. Neverov, doctor of technical sciences (Balakovo, Saratov Oblast):**

If we mean by an "official language" one which can serve as a means of official communication between the citizens of the USSR, then we must admit that there can only be one such language: Russian. It alone can guarantee each Soviet's inalienable right to choose a place of

residence in any geographic area of our multiethnic country. In particular those who espouse bilingualism (again I am referring to official instruction) are claiming, whether they like to admit it or not, the native population's monopoly on the right to live in a given republic and/or, in the final analysis, the right to secede from the USSR as well. That being the case, then let them call things by their right names.

I am a Russian; I was born and raised in the Moldavian SSR. I have lived in Kamchatka, graduated from school and an institute in Kirghizia, served in the army in Kazakhstan and worked in the Baltic republics. And it is not beyond the realm of possibility that I will move again in the future. How many languages am I "obligated" to study?

I have many friends of different nationalities. And we communicate successfully in Russian. My experience in life tells me that the language of the native nationality can only be learned on a voluntary basis. New arrivals should not be placed in a situation with no options; that would be disguised coercion. My opinion is not dictated by the fact that I belong to the Great Russian people, but solely by the rights of citizens of the USSR.

**V. Postnikov (Ufa):**

The reason that the Chuvash or the Bashkirs do not want to learn their own language is not because they do not love it, but rather because there is no need for it. Languages flourished and peoples survived as long as they lived cut off in a homogeneous territory, within the traditions of their age-old ways of life...

If the participants in your "roundtable with sharp corners" could and would reply frankly to the question in the title—"What language do you speak?"—then the answer unfortunately would be: the language of ethnic hatred, ethnic exclusiveness and ethnic isolation. But that "tongue," unfortunately, will not lead one to Kiev, but instead to much less pleasant places—like Auschwitz or Beirut... And that despite the eloquent speeches or noble intentions of those who wittingly or unwittingly sow ethnic hatred.

**N. I. Petrov, party, war and labor veteran (Alma-Ata):** One does not have to be a prophet to be able to predict even now that the day is not far off when all of humanity will speak a single language. That is simply convenient. National languages will continue to exist, as long as individual peoples continue to need them.

What is the reason for the present attraction of the "intelligentsia" to national languages, an attraction which, I am convinced, runs counter to the will of the majority? It is caused by prejudices regarding the future significance of ethnic factors and, most importantly, by economic ignorance and poor understanding of the laws of social development. Those who champion national languages do not understand that the global division of labor between our country's republics and regions has created billions of rubles in economic and financial

operations. In what language would they have the documents filled out? In what language would the state census and negotiations be conducted? What language would the Soviet Army speak? Or forget that—let us take the most simple, everyday thing and ask ourselves in what language one would send a telegram from Kazakhstan to Latvia? In what language would one write the address on an envelope? When one thinks about it, it is really not difficult to see the quagmire toward which the state is being pushed by the "figures" of the national "renaissance."

A multiethnic state with a unified economic complex cannot function normally without an official language (one that is the same for all peoples).

Strange. For 70 years everything went along normally, everything was fine. Yet now we suddenly have this "language malady"? We must not deceive ourselves. "Language" is an excuse for well-disguised but militant nationalism. I am convinced that the USSR has created all the essential conditions for study of any national language on a voluntary basis, based on the highest principle of human interrelations: study it if you want to. Is that not enough? It is simply impossible to do more without introducing an element of coercion. Yet voluntary study of national languages does not suit nationalistic extremists. They prefer "the charm of the knout." But where does that lead? Demonstrations and inflamed sentiments today, zealotry tomorrow.

...We must not confuse the terms "language" and "culture." Language is not in itself culture, merely a means of expressing and perceiving culture, a means of communication. National culture will be preserved in any case, independent of language, and represents one component of general human culture.

It seems to me that we have simply become bewildered by the onslaught of outrageous manifestations of nationalism...

**S. M. Kravchenko (Frunze):**

I am not going to express my own thoughts; I shall merely provide an example about correspondence between the cities of Kiev and Frunze, and I think that will suffice to express my attitude toward a so-called "official language." Well, say for instance citizens of Kiev were to make an inquiry of the Kirghiz SSR Ministry of Finance. In Ukrainian. The staff at the Ministry of Finance would bring in Ukrainians to figure out what the request was about. Finally someone would translate it into Russian and then—in accordance with current guidelines—would send a reply in Kirghiz, the official language. Soon a request from Kiev would be received in Russian, asking that a Kirghiz translator with a knowledge of Russian be sent, since otherwise no one will be able to decipher the letter from the Kirghiz SSR Ministry of Finance. Here is what I think: what if all the peoples of the USSR began using only their own languages? Now schools are introducing mandatory study of the language of the republic in which one resides. Why? Let those who are interested in it or have a need for it

study it. When I was a child I, too, was forced to study Uzbek, as a result of which we came away not knowing more than 10-15 words, and all of those curse words...

#### **Alternative 2: To Each Person His Native Tongue**

**V. V. Lizanchuk, docent in the Department of Journalism, Lvov State University:**

The logic of restoring the health of socialism and creating a morally healthy, humanistic society is such that the state of society will depend upon each individual's intellectual world. One of the sources of an individual's endurance, courage and nobility is the culture of his native people and its language. A language continues to live so long as its language lives on in the mouths of its people...

No one people in our country is to blame for the deformation of ethnic relations which has occurred. To blame was the bureaucracy under Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, which ignored Leninist principles of nationalities policy. And it is a well-known fact that bureaucracy is not an ethnic group; it is a social group. It carries out any order unquestioningly. All N. S. Khrushchev had to do was say on the steps of Belorussian State University that "the sooner we all speak Russian, the sooner we will be able to build communism" and immediately not only subservient Belorussian, but also Ukrainian officials commenced the realization of this illiterate and in every regard harmful attitude. What was the result? Communism has not been built and we are having to revive socialist values, yet there are scarcely any schools left in Belorussia where Belorussian is the language of instruction. The realm in which the Ukraine's native language functions has shrunk, an intellectual heritage that was centuries in the making has been forgotten, and history, traditions and customs have been castrated...

The people's movement to solve socioeconomic and ecological problems and to revive Ukrainian culture and language and give that language priority throughout our republic, a movement headed by the creative intelligentsia and with a majority of communist supporters, has been aggressively rebuffed by cosmopolitan Arkharovites [from N. P. Arkharov, late 18th century Moscow police chief] of various ranks. They have spread Jesuit-like fabrications. Supposedly everything would be just fine in the Ukraine if it were not for writers. Instead of writing and carrying out the Ukrainian CP Central Committee's resolution on intensification of internationalist and patriotic education among working people, they are agitating in favor of official status for Ukrainian in the Ukraine. Thereby they are allegedly undermining our socialist foundations and hampering restructuring. By doing this the writers are supposedly muddying the waters of the clear internationalist pond. Supposedly many Ukrainians, seeing that their language has no future, themselves do not want to see Ukrainian-language schools and kindergartens established...

And there are those among blue-collar workers and collective farmers who support their cosmopolitan leaders and

their anti-scientific, anti-Leninist, anti-humanistic ideas. They are unaware that ethnic nihilism, just like chauvinism, nationalism or Zionism, cause irreparable harm to social development and sow mistrust of the party's shining ideas and the genuine spirit of internationalism. For the international is an outgrowth of the national. There is no non-national internationalism!

#### **F. Fattakhov (Suzak, Kirghiz SSR):**

Language and thought are interconnected, and human culture is their offspring; therefore harmonious development of these foundations cannot occur if they are isolated from one another. Our intellectual potential, various axioms, the exact sciences and the humanities are secondary, i.e. they are inaccessible to us except through language and thought. Efforts to destroy small languages and merge them into a unified, hothouse type of mono-language are above all an intellectual loss, and hence a loss of thought. If any effect is indeed possible it will be temporary and illusory in historical perspective.

If the language of a people perishes, then that people also de facto ceases to exist.

#### **A. V. Pashko (Dnepropetrovsk):**

A number of articles published in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA reflect the authors' commercial attitude toward this sensitive issue. Supposedly the main issue is how much all this is going to cost, or how many languages children should have to learn. Of course this is no simple matter! But no combinations of bilingualism or trilingualism, no half-measures, no bureaucrats or financial experts are going to solve this problem. This is an issue of state significance, and it should be resolved by the state, proceeding on the principles of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the nationalities question.

For some reason little attention has been focused on the destructive policy of violent or forced mixing of people of various nationalities which apparently continues to flourish today. This is chiefly manifested, of course, through the training and work assignment of young specialists by educational institutions. I do not know why it is beneficial, or to whose benefit it is, to send an Uzbek to Kirghizia, a Georgian to the Ukraine, a Russian to the Baltic republics or a Ukrainian to Siberia. We will not discuss the fact that over half of all young specialists "run away" from their original assignment within one year. Let us consider only the moral aspect of this matter. For it is no secret that no matter where a person comes from he will regard alien places and alien people as alien. And he is hardly going to get excited about an alien culture, natural environment or language. He is a person without roots; he is not going to plant roses in someone else's garden. All that will remain in his spirit is a consumption-based attitude, conformism and careerism. No matter if he does not make it at first; he will be transferred to other regions. How many people do we have who are wandering about in search of a well-feathered nest: losers, people looking for an easy living, or quite simply grabbers and swindlers...?!

Yet my spirit aches for the Ukraine...

During the most terrible years, the years of repression, hunger and occupation, the people not only cried, but also sang!

Today you will not hear any songs in our villages. We have forgotten the songs of our mothers, forgotten the smell of mint! Only the bitterness of Chernobyl, the burnt smell of metallurgical combines and the stifling smell of stagnant manmade seas...

Can it be that we do not see today that which would be plain even to a child: that to become a person he needs only one language, that of his mother? And that when he has become a person he can then learn any language he needs, even Chinese if need be...

**L. L. Fedoseyev, CPSU history instructor, Riga Polytechnical Institute:**

There is no normal state anywhere where the language of immigrants is official (the exceptions are countries where immigrants have destroyed the native population or where as a result of a cruel colonial yoke the colonialists have deprived the people of their language, as for example in Ireland). Therefore only colonizers could put forward the demand that Russian be made the second official language of the republics.

I feel that Russian is the language of **federative** relations in the USSR, not the language of interethnic communication, as is erroneously claimed. In federative relations all correspondence is conducted in Russian (that is a fact), but to require people of various nationalities to speak only Russian is either Great Russian chauvinism or great stupidity.

In the Baltic republics those who disdain the native peoples' languages hide behind proclamations of Russian as the language of interethnic communication. So it turns out that in Latvia Latvians are supposed to speak Russian with the Russians... And this monstrous state of affairs has persisted for decades; a Latvian or Estonian (in their own homeland) can speak their native language freely only in their own home. At a meeting all that is necessary is for one person to say that he does not understand and everyone immediately starts using Russian. People go on for decades without knowing the language of their republic. It is time we put a stop to this.

Yes, the Russian language will continue to function in federative relations, and leaders should know it, but in interethnic relations a native has the right to demand that immigrants know his language. In all other cases no regulation is required: speakers will choose their own language when speaking to one another.

**I. Taumuratov, staff member, AMUDARYA magazine (Nukus):**

In our villages hardly anyone knows Russian. Yet when people submit written appeals to their rayispolkoms or to village soviets they are forced to write them in Russian... In collectives which do not have a single Russian worker meetings are interpreted in Russian.

Neither the speakers nor those attending understand what is being said, yet the minutes are written down...

Workers and collective farm members ask those who know even a little Russian to translate their petitions and pay them money to do so... It is scandalous that this practice still exists...

### **Alternative 3: Real Bilingualism**

**M. M. Mikhaylov, professor and doctor of philological sciences, head of Russian Language Department at Chuvash State University:**

The non-Russian peoples of the USSR have achieved real successes in mastering Russian, and as the language of a majority of our country's population Russian is fully capable of serving as a means of communication between Soviets in all areas of life. A rich mosaic of various forms and types of national-Russian bilingualism has come into being and is presently functioning; this bilingualism is our invaluable cultural-historical and moral-political capital.

The situation is less bright in regard to development of national languages, which have come to be used in a markedly curtailed realm. This has even outraged some people, who ask: is bilingualism destroying my native language? Locally people have begun seeking a solution to this problem by passing legislative acts proclaiming the languages of national republics official...

Is this justified? I think not. An official language is a language which is mandatory for all official correspondence, courts, schools, etc.; it gives one people a privileged status and infringes on the status of the rest. An official language is not a passive symbol; it is an active and polyvalent (many-powered) factor. It is strict, forced regulation. That is precisely why Lenin, as is well known, was opposed to proclamation of Russian as official language.

The RSFSR has no official language, and it is not appropriate to have one in the other republics and autonomous areas. Introducing such legislation could lead to unforeseeable consequences. Is it worth it to take this risk in the ethnic-linguistic realm? A people's language is the focus of many factors: political, economic, cultural-historical, moral and psychological. The national and the international are tightly interwoven into a single fabric. Should perhaps, as an extreme case, one or two republics or autonomous areas adopt an official language temporarily, for one or two decades, as a sociolinguistic experiment? In all the others the language of interethnic communication remains completely adequate for the time being; what is needed is legislation defining the status, functions and area of applicability of both national languages and Russian as a means of interethnic communication. Harmonious bilingualism is a realistic alternative to the dictate of an official language.

In order to revive the development of national languages and make national-Russian bilingualism harmonious, we must improve language teaching in schools, expand



the press published in national languages and actively promote national culture and language, socialist internationalism and patriotism among the public. It is important that we stir among Russians an interest in the culture and language of the region where they permanently reside. And that can only be achieved in one way: through successes in development of the economy, culture and arts of a given people. Appeals for coercion in this regard are useless. For we study a language (or languages) according to a strictly determined (well-reasoned) principle: in childhood in order to communicate with parents and peers; in school in order to receive an education; independently (foreign languages) in order to study the scientific and artistic literature or to communicate with foreigners without an interpreter; and we study any other language which is not our native tongue if we are attracted by the material and spiritual culture of those who use it.

In all these cases, as we can see, what is absent is the element of the imperative (coercion).

Harmonious development of national-Russian bilingualism is hampered by so-called ethnic nihilism—an arrogant attitude by individual speakers toward their native culture, language, customs and rights. Knowledge of one's native language is no great feat, but to neglect it is profoundly immoral.

#### **B. K. Zyuzin (Ryazan):**

Writers in the union republics are correct in raising the national language issue. But this should apply only to literary and everyday language, not to the language of communication between the representatives of our entire country, the language of all-union laws. Physics, chemistry, mathematics and other subjects should be taught in one language. How much simpler it would be to publish textbooks and various reference books without having to worry about numerous translations from one language to another. There would no longer be a need to introduce new terms into every language. The thing that can unite peoples is a common language, not the other way around. It is unthinkable to know all the languages of our country! And when someone arrives in a different republic and asks a question but no one responds, then this produces a completely contrary impression: a negative one. It is one thing to free oneself from bureaucratic dependence and quite another to get rid of a means of communication.

#### **T. N. Burlutskaya (Fergaka):**

Why should a mastery of two languages (Russian and one's native tongue) decrease a people's cultural potential or hamper development of the national culture? Why have language and culture become synonyms? And since when has a "short circuit" around one language or limiting oneself to one's "own" culture represented the ideal conditions for the development of culture? How can we develop without communicating? And how can we communicate with everyone in their native language?

Recently we have been seeing more and more frequently in the press the idea that maybe one's people should not be constantly brought to mind in every aspect of life, from birth onward. Do we perhaps not need republics, krais and oblasts? All these negative incidents are occurring in our country solely as a result of territorial tensions...

Of course we are all in favor of development of the masses' political activism, of revival of ethnic self-awareness and national culture and language. We are in favor of free discussion of all issues, but not of bans and forced "ejection" of the Russian language. Why not follow this principle: "Speak and write in the language which you know best, but understand both languages."

#### **L. M. Ustyugova, docent in a Russian language department (Moscow):**

I think that in order to resolve the question of the status of Russian and national languages we must hold referendums. The people are getting tired of experiments. They themselves should decide, not hysterical groups of the national intelligentsia. It seems to me that a majority would come out in favor of bilingualism. Considering the present rate of migration it would be impossible to do otherwise.

#### **Ye. Svidchenko, head of Socioeconomic Problems Department at the newspaper KOMSOMOLETS TADZHIKISTANA (Dushanbe):**

Presently only one language is official in each republic. As a result the members of all other nationalities are subjected to discrimination, both in regard to educational opportunities and to employment. Is this fair, since each republic presently has representative of two, three or even more nationalities?

As is well known, there are a total of 56 million people in the Soviet Union who live outside the boundaries of their own national territorial formations. Should all these people be deprived of their rights?

It appears as if the Biblical myth of the Tower of Babel could become a frightening reality: all the Russian-speaking population of our republic—who represent dozens of nationalities—would begin migrating in search of their fair share. Do we not already have enough refugees from Armenia and Azerbaijan?

I propose that Russian—the language of interethnic communication—be given the status of official language as soon as possible, so that bilingualism will become a reality in all republics.

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There are the letters. Naturally just a few of the many received by our editorial offices. In order to get a more complete picture, add a couple of dozen more letters to each category (in approximately equal proportions). We have attempted to select the most typical sections of readers' letters; those who did not see their thoughts and suggestions represented here should not be offended. In any case, thanks to all of you! We would merely like to note that analysis of our mail indicates that we often lack

patience, restraint and political insight. And kindness. We do not know how to listen to one another or to empathize with the interests of those with whom we share this earth. National ambitions should be replaced by **trust**. For there is nothing more precious than the connection between one human being and another, regardless of what language each one speaks. Among the thoughts that came to us as we read our mail there is one more that continues to trouble us: how little we know about one another, about the history of our country and the people who inhabit it. We are all very diverse. Yet for such a long time they tried to make us all uniform. But that did not happen! Because lack of identity is a monotonous grey, desolation, stagnation and, in the final analysis, degeneration.

Now all we need is to rid ourselves of the last traces of patriarchal feudalism and learn to **respect one another**. This is difficult, immeasurably difficult. But let us recall that not only language and hands have been given to us so that we can communicate with one another, but also Heart and Soul.

And if we speak the language of our hearts, then we will surely understand one another.

#### **Means to Improve Russian Language Schools Proposed**

*18300782 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Sep 89 Morning Edition p 2*

[Article by V. Novichkov: "The Russian School At Home and Abroad"]

[Text] How many times have I heard people in Georgia and Kazakhstan, Lithuania and Kirgizia say, "I am studying in a Russian school." Don't think that these words reflect the reality of the situation. They only mean that the school conducts its studies in the Russian language. There is reason for this conceptual difference. For a long time we adults as well have split the Soviet school into "Russian" and "national," while in reality we have neither.

For long decades in our minds the Russian school meant the official state school. For those many decades we have essentially been building a certain kind of national school.

In all union and autonomous republics the Russian school has maintained internationalism as a sort of one-way street—moving only toward mastering the language of multi-nationality contact. While taking pains in this area, for example, schools in Belorussia have almost totally eliminated the Belorussian language. And many areas in the Ukraine are successfully moving toward that goal. For years people's educational agencies have been foiling attempts to open native-language schools for the children of Greeks, Gagauz and many other nationalities. And today we really feel the costs of this short-sighted policy. It has created a moral and psychological situation in which a Russian-language speaker does not have to worry about not being understood by the native

population in any remote corner of the country. This situation has freed the "older brother" from making the efforts necessary to study the language and culture of the fraternal people.

The Russian-language school has been one of the champions of this type arrangement. The school is the same in any republic, i.e., it is immune to the culture of its national surroundings. However it is this immunity that has been killing it. Everything in the Russian-language school has gradually become progressively less strictly Russian and native.

As strange as it may seem, this loss was not first felt in Russia. Representatives from the Baltic area directed the attention of delegates to the All-Union Conference of Pedagogues that took place last year in Moscow to the fact that they had found no place for the national school, to include the Russian school, in the new concept of secondary education.

I spent several weeks in Estonia very recently. Objectively speaking, the small country of Estonia has one million Estonians living side by side with approximately 600,000 Russian-speaking inhabitants. And the Estonian and Russian schools are located very near one another. What links them? The common concerns of our country, the Estonian land and the values common to all mankind. But values common to all mankind are reinforced in a culture. This is the basis for the idea of a dialogue between Russian and Estonian cultures. To get this dialogue we have to convert both of these schools into bearers of the national cultures.

First a platform for reconstructing the Estonian school was developed. In August of that same year teachers from Russian-language schools in Estonia assembled in Narva. They raised the question of how things were going in the republic's Russian school.

They spent five days collectively mulling over this. For five days Russian and Estonian experts worked in close cooperation, groping for common methodological approaches to solving this problem. They had to take into account the historical experience of the best Russian scientific institutes. This experience dates back to the Slavic-Greek-Latin academy and the rural tsarist lyceum. These teachers had to understand that it is possible to work out the very essence and core of the educational content in the renovated Russian school. But this was not an easy problem because we still did not have a scientifically-based concept of the essence of national education.

The work that was started in Narva concerns more than just Estonian problems. One becomes more and more convinced of this when reading the draft CPSU platform "The Party's National Policy under Contemporary Conditions." It is clear that the primary direction of the draft that has been made public is toward establishing political prerequisites for further creative legal work. Therefore every word in this document becomes more critical and it is more important that the processes now taking place in the republics are very thoroughly reflected in it. It is

still not possible to use the summarized wording of the published draft to get an answer to the question "Who will define a developmental strategy within the sphere of education and culture?" If we feel that this is a matter for the center, will the center be able to consider the specific educational and cultural requirements in Estonia or Evankiy? And if these areas remain within the republics' purview, what is the role of all-union departmental staffs?

To date the center has been approving the content of training plans and textbooks on national history and geography. A school had to get approval from the center for one training period or another. It would be difficult to combine preserving this method with republican financial self-sufficiency and self-financing and with the basic trend toward sovereignty for the republics. While among the ruling circles of national education one more and more frequently hears discussions about how we need republican ministries and committees within this sphere not only for themselves, but also to protect against the center's expansion. This is a difficult position. But it is a position that has its origin in fertile ground. Many republics have already developed their own national cadres. They are able to independently resolve problems that arise in the educational and cultural sphere. And the republican departments are ready to turn to the center in dealing with problems that are actually common to all, to include looking for the center's creative experience in school construction, scientific support for future developments and so forth.

There is a note in the draft that says "Soviet citizens must feel at home at any location in the country—this, you could say, is the supreme and final goal of all the work in developing harmony within inter-nationality relations," and it raises some doubts. Of course, none of us can and should feel like a migrant in our state. The topical nature of this requirement is more than evident.

But I mean something else—should a man outside his home feel as if he has not gone anywhere? Are we ready to allow people to lose their feeling of attachment to their native land, national culture and spirit? It should be better somewhere outside the home, where a man can feel like a guest. This feeling will engender in him a respect for his hosts and a sensitive attitude toward the traditions and procedures of others and will stop a person from wanting to impose his rules when in other people's areas. Then we can count on the emergence of mutually-respecting, civilized relations between the representatives of the various nationalities in our enormous country.

The national school can be a guide for such attitudes and should educate people with these feelings. But in order to do this the schools must really be national. The Russian school has an especially difficult task in this regard. At this time there are more than 24 million Russian speaking people living outside the boundaries of the RSFSR. It is perfectly clear that the Russian school in Latvia will not be exactly like the one in Udmurtiya or Uzbekistan. They will agree only in terms of culturological and moral-ideological foundations. But those things that support interaction with the other culture must be totally different. Otherwise the school as a cultural institute for education will become an obstacle to harmonizing inter-nationality relations.

Throughout time the school has reinforced in educational practices that which has become the achievement of culture. One of the most valuable achievements of socialist culture today is the new understanding of equal rights and cooperation in relationships among nations. This new understanding gets its origin from the new political thinking. We must reach the point where the Russian school, just as any other national school, can pedagogically orchestrate this.

### **Narcotics Trafficking Becoming More 'Organized, Interregional'**

18001590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
6 Sep 89 Second Edition p 6

[Article by A. Urvantsev: "The Battle Against the Venomous Drug—A United Front Against Crime"]

[Text] We have exposed a dangerous group of narcotics dealers that has kept well in the shadows and had strong interregional ties. Internal Affairs agencies have seized firearms and approximately 200 kilograms of hashish from the criminals and 11 active members of the drug Mafia have been arrested. The operation was conducted by the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Main Criminal Investigation Division along with Internal Affairs workers from Kirgizia and Karaganda, Rostov and Volgograd Oblasts.

Drug addiction as an illness and a crime is progressively scattering its metastases more widely and deeply into the soil. An analysis conducted by USSR MVD services indicates that a total of 15-20 percent of all narcotic substances are pulled out of illegal circulation. At the present time the country has 121,700 people registered as drug users and 60,000 of them are drug addicts.

During the course of the raid Internal Affairs agencies uncovered 1130 thefts of medical preparations containing narcotic substances. The majority of these transgressions of the law were carried out by medical establishment, medical base and pharmacy officials and people who were materially responsible. Here are some specific examples. The Mosgorispolkom [Moscow City Executive Committee] GUVd [Internal Affairs Main Directorate] was recently excited by a criminal matter involving Pharmacy No. 168 manager Yu. Lastenko. He had sold virolet preparations and other medicines worth 800 rubles. After prescribing medicines for patients, Nurse O. Padchenko in Dneprodzerzhinsk City Hospital No. 5 stole 1194 ampules of morphine and 718 ampules of promedal. First aid station medical attendant V. Starosotnikova in the city of Mogilev stole 300 ampules of medicines from patients. These and other cases were cited yesterday at the regularly scheduled USSR MVD briefing.

And there are cases of thefts involving narcotic substances in scientific institutes. For example, a group of narcotics businessmen was uncovered in the city of Frunze this year.

Another avenue for spreading this poison is narcotics derived from natural substances. For example approximately 55,000 opium poppy-seed bushes were discovered in a cotton field at the "50 Years of Turkman'skoy SSSR" Sovkhoz. Police workers assisted by aviation found 3,169 poppy seed bushes in an inaccessible mountainous massif in Ashkhabadskiy Rayon. And another 5,615 bushes were found on the grounds of the Rossiya kolkhoz in Tadzhiik SSR's Shaartuzskiy Rayon.

The USSR MVD GUUR [Main Directorate of the Criminal Investigation Division] has created and is

successfully operating a temporary interregional department to combat the illegal circulation of narcotics in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. Similar subelements will also be set up in other regions very shortly.

But despite the measures that are being taken, the number of people who are detected and registered as loving these "acute" sensations is increasing in the country as a whole.

And what is alarming is that the activities of these narcotics businessmen are taking on a progressively more organized and interregional character. "Black market" businessmen are setting up their own underground laboratories to manufacture narcotic substances. And unfortunately the effectiveness of the measures that are being taken and the end results of the battle against this evil are still minimal. According to Internal Affairs agency workers the time has come to establish a national program to combat this negative social phenomenon and set up both a single fund to reach these goals and an agency to coordinate and monitor this work on a country-wide basis.

And, as before, many ministries, departments, agencies and organizations are still making a very small contribution to the battle against the narcotics business. Police workers still lack the necessary technical means. And we still have the critical problem of developing diagnostic equipment to determine when someone is under the influence of narcotics.

### **Recent Drug Eradication Efforts in Tajikistan Examined**

53001013 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian  
29 Aug 89 p 4

[Article by I. Semykin: "Operation 'Mak-89:' For a Sack of Flour and Other Goods in High Demand, Dealers are Trying to Get Raw Materials for Drugs"]

[Text] Militia statistics show that the number of drug users is increasing each year. The number of cases of growing, storing and selling narcotic substances is also on the rise. Our freelance correspondent in Tajikistan participated in the operation "Mak-89" ["Poppy-89"]. Today we are publishing his report.

In the course of only the first phase of the operation in Ordzhonikidzeabadsk rayon, 5,431 opium poppy plants and one India hemp plant were found and destroyed. Twenty-two cases of growing and storing narcotic substances were disclosed.

"How should we understand these figures? Is it that you have begun working better, or have they begun growing more?", I asked the senior official in charge of the rayon, militia Captain M. Zakirov.

"I would say both one and the other. Undoubtedly, we now have more experience as compared with 3-4 years ago, when our service was just being organized. Yet at the same time I must admit that there are more narcotic-containing plants being grown in the rural areas. We are

more often finding plantings which we call untended, i.e., in remote areas with difficult accessibility, in ravines, orchards, near roads, and even in cemeteries. Yet it is quite evident that these plants are tended and even watered. In every such case we conduct a long-term surveillance of such sectors, trying to identify the owner. We involve the community and the youth, and use the most current technical means, including helicopters, in our work.

The section inspector, militia Captain M. Ubaydullayev, and officer in charge of operations E. Musulmonov found 1,228 opium poppy plants belonging to citizen Khikoyat Khalimova. They were growing in a field among the onions and other vegetables at the Sovkhoz imeni 50th Anniversary of the Komsomol. The previous day they found 44 opium poppy plants growing in Makhmad Shamsiddinov's garden plot at the Dzhomeril kishlak of the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin. Here for purposes of camouflage the poppies had been sown together with onions grown for seed. On 65 bulbs there were clearly visible slits, i.e., the owner had already harvested part of the opium. Shamsiddinov said that he was growing it for himself. However, such confessions are traditional: "For myself", "I am sick", and even "my doctor recommended it", and "I did not know that these were opium poppies".

It is difficult to imagine how many people Mekhri Sakhibova from the Kabirobod kishlak of the "22nd Party Congress" kolkhoz could have hurt if she had been able to sell all of the opium obtained from the poppies grown in her garden plot. Even experienced operative workers were surprised. They confiscated 1,700 (!) poppy plants from this old woman. Last year there were 1,730 plants found on the territory of the entire rayon, and there were that many on this plot alone.

...Disrupting the quiet of the mountains, the helicopter takes us farther along the deep gorge. For the second day, for a total of over 10 hours now, the search continues for drug-containing plants in the vicinity of Dushanbe. On the first day the most remote corners of Tursunzadevskiy rayon were thoroughly investigated, and on the second day—the far reaches of Ramitskiy gorge. As evidenced by the reports of operatives, the largest plantations of opium poppies and Indian hemp are found specifically in such difficult to reach niches. It is simpletons and first-timers who grow these plants in their garden plots or in the sovkhoz fields in the valley zone. First of all, you cannot grow much there. Secondly, the neighbors can see everything. But in the mountains there is plenty of land, and fewer prying eyes.

After a half hour of flight, the expanses of the Alpine meadows extend before us. Today the masters here are shepherds with their flocks and the beekeepers, who by some miracle have managed to get up here with their apiaries on wheels. There are few kishlaks [Central Asian villages] here, although there are a few. One can drive here only in the summer. Guests such as us come here very rarely.

Above one of the kishlaks, which stands on the bank of a small river, the helicopter, as usual, circles around a few times. I counted only about 10 mud houses and a few cultivated plots of land. Curious boys ran out onto the roofs. Off to the side we see men working.

Militia Senior Lieutenant Sh. Shodmonov looks closely through the binoculars. His attention is attracted by a sizeable plot located for some reason away from the others. When the helicopter was making its routine circle, one of the men stopped what he was doing and ran toward it. The group leader, militia Major S. Niyezov, gave the order to land. The helicopter commander, Il'khom Nisorov, second pilot Akhmad Karimov and mechanic Yuriy Kopakov quickly selected a site and landed. The clean mountain air infused with the smell of April grass, the bright colors of the carpets of flowers, picturesque sites... But there is no time to admire this beauty. The members of the operative-search group investigated the gardens, confiscated the drug plants which they found, filled out paperwork, and explained in detail to the people about the criminal responsibility for growing, storing and selling the "forbidden grasses".

After that we once again got into the helicopter and set out to continue our search.

In Ramitskiy Gorge we found several patches of opium poppies, including wild-growing ones. It is in just such small valleys, lost between the mountains, that the latter may be found. They are very easily seen from the helicopter, which flies at low altitude. But, unfortunately, it is not possible to land everywhere. There are mountains all around, dangerous canyon cliffs or dense thickets of Lombardy poplar. The operative workers thoroughly noted the area of the planting on maps, and literally the next day a car was sent out to these areas to destroy the plants.

It is in such kishlaks that today the raw material is being sold for making drugs. It is sold not for money, but in exchange for goods which are in high demand—for a sack of flour or sugar, for roofing slate, for lumber or cement. The people want to build new houses, but they cannot buy building materials anywhere. Then a stranger comes, brings a truckload of lumber, and in exchange asks for grass... You must agree, it is difficult to resist the temptation to grow narcotics for barter. Well, the local organs of authority must draw conclusions from all this. Inattention to the demands of the people living in remote corners of the republic plays into the hands of the dealers—the buyers and sellers of drugs who know how to make use of the sluggishness of those who in the course of their official duty should supply the residents of mountain settlements with everything they need.

The opium obtained from the poppies grown on the territory of Tajikistan spreads along invisible channels throughout the entire country. In order to put an end to this, in the course of conducting operation "Mak- 89", special teams were created in all the rayons of the republic. These teams were comprised of workers of the

law enforcement organs, the community, and Gosagroprom specialists. Mobile groups have checked literally all the garden plots of rural residents and most of the cultivated lands of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the republic. Mobile check-points have been set up along all the central main highways, roads and routes, checking cars and baggage. What is the result? Let us look at the summary of operations for the results of the first stage of the project. Altogether, over 10 hectares of cultivated and over 90 hectares of wild-growing drug-producing plants have been found and destroyed; 118 people have been brought to administrative responsibility for planting narcotic-containing plants; 10 dealers have been exposed; 2 drug traffickers have been detained, and a total of 2 kilograms 85 grams of drugs have been seized.

### **Uzbek Supreme Soviet Forms Special Crime Committee**

#### **Committee Formation, Membership**

90US0052A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
22 Aug 89 p 1

[Decree of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the Formation of an Interim Committee for Fighting Crime in the Uzbek SSR, issued 17 August 1989]

[Text] In accordance with the 4 August 1989 USSR Supreme Soviet decree "On the Decisive Strengthening of the Fight Against Crime," the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

to form an interim crime fighting committee in the Uzbek SSR made up of the following personnel:

#### **Chairman of the Interim Committee**

Mirzaolim Ibragimovich Ibragimov, chairman of the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet and a USSR People's Deputy.

#### **Members of the Interim Committee:**

Yuldash Tadzhievich Akbarov, Tashkent Avtokombinat-2 driver and a USSR People's Deputy.

Bakhadyr Gulamovich Alimdzhonov, Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice.

Khalimakhon Alimova, chairman of Uzsovsprof [Uzbek Trade Union] and a USSR People's Deputy.

Vladimir Dmitriyevich Velikanov, head of the state legal department of the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee.

Rasul Gulamovich Gulamov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, chairman of the Republic Soviet of Veterans of War and Labor, and a USSR People's Deputy.

Viktor Yakovlevich Yegorov, head of the Justice Department of the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet.

Vyacheslav Mukhtarovich Kamalov, Uzbek SSR Minister of Internal Affairs.

Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Logachev, electrician of Tekhnolog Scientific Production Association in Tashkent.

Mukhamed-Bobir Madzhidovich Malikov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Court.

Anatoliy Sergeyevich Morgasov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Committee of State Security.

Mukhammad-Sodik Mukhammad-Yusuf, mufti, chairman of the Presidium of Spiritual Administration of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and a USSR People's Deputy.

Aziz Nasyrovich Nasyrov, first secretary of the Uzbekistan Komsomol Central Committee.

Natalya Vladimirovna Nitsel, a gluer at Rezinotekhnich Angrenskiy Plant in Tashkent Oblast.

Andrey Leonidovich Pershin, excavator operator at Kungradskiy Regional Production Repair Operation Association and a USSR People's Deputy.

Boris Fedorovich Satin, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Committee for People's Control and a USSR People's Deputy.

Ruben Akopovich Safarov, editor of the Republic Newspaper PRAVDA VOSTOKA.

Saidrahman Abdurakhmanovich Tashev, machine operator at Leninabad Kolkhoz in Akkurganskiy Rayon of Tashkent Oblast.

Dmitriy Aleksandrovich Usatov, Uzbek SSR procurator.

Robert Albertovich Khachaturov, Uzbek SSR chief state arbitrator.

Igor Vladimirovich Chirgadze, first deputy chairman of Uzbek SSR Gosplan.

Takhir Yakhyayevich Sharipov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply.

Adyl Yakubov, board first secretary of the Uzbekistan Union of Writers and a USSR People's Deputy.

*Chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, M. Ibragimov,*

*Secretary of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, L. Bekkulbekova*

#### **Legal Official Explains Purpose**

90US0052B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
20 Aug 89 p 2

[Interview with V.Ya. Yegorov, head of the Justice Department of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium by PRAVDA VOSTOKA: "Law and Order Committee"]

[Text] Yesterday a communique about a meeting of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium briefly stated: An interim crime fighting committee has been established in the Uzbek SSR which is headed by M.I. Ibragimov, chairman of Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium.

In connection with this, we asked V.Ya. Yegorov, head of the Presidium's Justice Department, to answer several questions.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] Viktor Yakovlevich, what caused the decision to establish an interim crime fighting committee in the Uzbek SSR?

[Yegorov] The need for this has appeared throughout the nation and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium issued a decree on the establishment of an interim crime fighting committee. This was done in execution of a 4 August USSR Supreme Soviet decree "On the Decisive Strengthening of the Fight Against Crime." The time is ripe to talk about the need for a search for new approaches to fight crime. The situation is extremely alarming. Eighteen percent more crimes have been committed during the portion of this year which has just passed than during the same period last year. The number of murders rose by 37 percent, robberies by 61 percent, and thefts by almost 70 percent. All of this outrages people, causes censure of law enforcement agencies, and requires decisive state approaches to crime fighting, including organizational approaches, too.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] Does the republic committee have the capabilities to handle this work?

[Yegorov] I remind you that the committee is headed by the chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium so that it can have these capabilities. There are more than 20 people on the committee, USSR People's Deputies, deputies of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, heads of republic law enforcement, trade union, and Komsomol agencies, workers and scholars. The committee's composition will be published soon. Similar interim committees will be established in the near future in Karakalpak, Tashkent, and Nukus, and in all oblasts.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] What is the role and function of these committees?

[Yegorov] The main thing in their activity is to organize practical work for intensifying crime fighting, to facilitate the development of a whole series of assets and methods for this struggle, to increase the responsibility of law enforcement and state agencies in this matter, to stimulate the initiative of workers collectives, social formations, and the population in preventing violations of the law, and to analyze and eliminate their causes and conditions. It is important to fully utilize the prestige of deputies, people's public order squads, comrades courts, and workers detachments in crime fighting. The Committee, acting on the basis of the Constitution and existing laws and not undermining law enforcement agencies, must organize work for a decisive increase of law and order. The precision of the goals, the efficiency of the reaction to the situation, and a businesslike approach is what is required of the committee. To direct the forces of law enforcement agencies and society in fighting crime and to coordinate common efforts in this matter.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] What are the primary tasks of the republic interim committee?

[Yegorov] We need to develop social initiative in every possible way, and use both new and proven in practice techniques and methods of coordination of law enforcement agencies and social formations in supporting law and order. Plans of action will be developed literally in the next few days in connection with this. They are proposing creating groups of committee representatives to go out into the most alarming crime infested oblasts, to study the situation, to plan joint actions, and to task law enforcement services and social formations to do everything to increase law and order in these oblasts. To develop specific emergency measures for other areas based on this example. Rendering material aid to law enforcement agencies and increasing their personnel with competent and honest workers is an important direction in the committee's actions. The steps adopted from the very beginning must make a real contribution. People must sense specific results in the fight with crime in the near future and they must believe in the inevitability of punishment and in a reliable defense of their rights and interests.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] What assistance does the committee expect from the mass media?

[Yegorov] You describe a lot of negative things in the fight against crime and you recall errors and miscalculations of previous leaders of law enforcement agencies. This has to be done. But truthful coverage of measures taken to maintain order and the leading experience of the activity of committees and propaganda of the work of those who stand guard over law and order and increasing the prestige of law enforcement agencies and increasing their respect will promote an increase in the effectiveness of crime fighting.

#### Uzbek Procurator Details Plan

90US0052c Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
27 Aug 89 p 3

[Interview with D.A. Usatov, Uzbek SSR Procurator by PRAVDA VOSTOKA AND SOVET UZBEKISTONI: "Interim Committee: Unusual Measure During an Emergency Situation"]

[Text] A communique was published several days ago in the republic press on the establishment of an interim crime fighting committee in the Uzbek SSR. Its composition was promulgated. On 20 August, PRAVDA VOSTOKA published an interview with V.Ya. Yegorov, head of the Judicial Department of the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, in which the reasons for establishing the interim committee, its role, functions, capabilities, and priority tasks in crime fighting were clarified.

However, numerous letters, telephone calls to the editors, and requests to the republic procurator's office even from municipal and rayon subdivision procurators themselves are evidence competent clarification is required on a number of issues—Why was the interim



committee established and does it not take the place of law enforcement agencies work?

In this regard, we requested clarification from the Uzbek SSR procurator.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] Dmitriy Aleksandrovich, first of all, what caused the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On Decisive Strengthening of the Struggle Against Crime" and the establishment of interim committees in the nation, in the republics, and locally?

[Usatov] I also heard this question during my meetings with the collective at the Surkhan Plant and at meetings of the Makhallinskiy committees in Chilanarskiy Rayon. I am sure that the peoples genuine interest, high civil consciousness, and their sincere concern for the fate of perestroyka is visible in this and that it is directly related to the universal consolidation of the rule of law, discipline, and organization, and with an attempt to influence these processes.

I would like to share my understanding of the issues raised in the resolution of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. First of all, this is the concern of the supreme agency of power, elected by the people, about further strengthening the peoples' social and legal protection. The resolution itself is one of the unusual state measures undertaken during an emergency situation—an explosively dangerous rise in crime.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] Is this precisely how you assess the crime situation in the nation and in the republic?

[Usatov] It is difficult to assess it otherwise. Judge for yourself. Last year we noted a trend toward an increase in practically every type of crime in the nation and in the republic. And today we have not succeeded in halting this process. During the first six months of this year the number of recorded crimes increased a little more than 17 percent and reached 39,400. The increase in serious types, these are premeditated murders, serious bodily harm, rape, robberies, gang attacks, and thefts of personal and state property, causes particular alarm. It destabilizes the socio-political environment, undermines the peoples' faith in the ability of the government to protect life, dignity, and property of the population, and gives rise to mass dissatisfaction. These types of crimes increased by 35 percent in the republic. The workers are justifiably expressing their indignation against law enforcement agencies. All the more so since crime among juveniles increased by 13 percent, recidivism by 20 percent, group crime by 30 percent, and crime due to drunkenness by 33 percent. The situation on streets and in public places has worsened and crime has begun to take on a bold nature right up to torture and the use of weapons. During the first six months of the year, 10,000 crimes have not been solved.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] Those are cheerless statistics and it is impossible to reconcile ourselves to them. But since they are so acute, does it not seem, as we heard in several of our readers' letters, that the resolution "On Decisive Strengthening Crime Fighting" itself is a step

backward under conditions of the proclaimed policy toward building a legal state? Will it not damage the humanization of law and judicial practice? Finally, will we not damage consolidation of the single law by having subordinated the procurator and judicial agencies in the republic under interim committees—the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and in oblasts and cities—chairmen of ispolkoms of local soviets?

[Usatov] I will tell you frankly—these fears are unnecessary. And I will explain this in detail. Precise requirements are defined in the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution to create real possibilities for workers of internal affairs agencies to decisively end the activities of criminal elements and to develop a system for employing exclusive measures against criminals in critical situations including the use of weapons, to increase the number of USSR MVD troops for taking steps during cases of massive disobedience of criminal elements, and to equip the militia with modern equipment. While drafting new criminal law in the near future, the need will be precisely defined to provide steps to increase criminal liability for encroachments against the lives and dignity of militia workers and other individuals fighting crime and violations of social order. In many nations of the world, policemen are inviolable individuals. And in accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution, questions are already being raised about what if on-duty militia workers had standards weapons, truncheons, handcuffs, chemical defense and decisively used them when necessary.

Now about interim committees and some peoples' fears that they will replace or disparage the role of law enforcement agencies. In Uzbekistan, as in other republics, the heads of the procurator's office, internal affairs agencies, KGB, courts and justice, and USSR Peoples Deputies have become members of interim committees. The leadership has been assigned to the chairman of the Presidium of the republic Supreme Soviet. And this is what causes the greatest number of questions. People, and especially lawyers, are afraid that, having entrusted the leadership of interim committees to leaders of Soviet government, we will embark on the path of subordinating procurator agencies, which according to the Constitution of the USSR are independent from local government agencies, to the committees. Judicial system and security agency employees express similar fears.

There is no basis for such fears. The interim committees are only crime fighting organizers. They are tasked with mobilizing the efforts of all state agencies, social organizations and formations, and economic leaders for a decisive fight against crime. We are talking about a consolidation of all forces but we are in no way talking about subordination of procurators, courts, internal affairs agencies, or KGB government agencies which will not be interfered with in carrying out direct law enforcement functions. And we are not talking about improving the activities of law enforcement agencies through the interim committees, nor about their accountability, but about the adoption by all unusual decisive and, when

necessary, emergency measures for inflicting a real blow against criminal activity. Incidentally, there are questions which are more easily resolved within the committees than individually by the procurator, the courts, or the militia. For example, about work and social adaptation of those previously convicted or individuals who are deviating from socially useful labor, about increasing the activity of the peoples' brigades, comrades courts, prevention soviets, about activating workers collectives, Komsomol, trade unions, and economic leaders in the fight against crime.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] Dmitriy Aleksandrovich, some of our readers' lack of understanding is caused by the committee's name—interim.

[Usatov] The interim nature of the committees is not evidence of just another campaign but emphasizes the need to take urgent, immediate measures already today so that the workers more quickly sense a reduction in crime when it is possible that the need for these committees will cease. Incidentally, crime prevention must become one of the main directions of their activities.

It is very important that all steps which the interim committees take are carried out strictly in compliance with the law. Under these conditions, the procurator's position is simple—having solved urgent problems in the committee, the procurator in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR and the Law on Procurators of the USSR, must carry out overall supervision over constitutionality as a whole and also insure the legality of all steps, including emergency steps, in the interim committees' activities. Of course, law enforcement agencies, taking the emergency crime situation in the republic into account, are in turn obligated to radically change their attitude toward the matter, to conquer the timidity which has been manifested in crime fighting, and to increase professionalism in solving and investigating crimes. And the main thing, they must carry out one of the requirements of the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee in every way possible—increase discipline and organization within their ranks and increase responsibility for the assigned task. The interim committee and the law enforcement agency heads who have become members of it must be guided by the requirement of the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution on the maximum strictness during review of cases of robberies, theft, and other serious crimes and not show leniency toward dangerous criminals, recidivists, organizers, leaders, and participants in criminal groups. But this does not mean a renunciation of our legal process' humanistic principles. In cases of crime through carelessness which do not pose a great social danger and also in cases of juveniles, the procurator agencies and the courts, as previously, will conduct a policy of not incarcerating such people in prison, but of educating them in society and in workers collectives. Avoidance is inadmissible in this matter.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] What powers does the interim committee have to become totally functional?

[Usatov] The interim committee is a new institution in the life of our society and is caused by the existing situation. It requires a careful approach to the organization of its work and to the allotment of its defined powers. I know that clarifications are being prepared in this regard in the USSR Supreme Soviet and in the Union Procurator's office. However, it is obvious even now that the committees do not have to be transformed into bureaucratic agencies for fans of endless meetings, reports, orders, and "measures." This must be a working agency for consolidation of all forces in fighting crime. The area of its concern are the problems of crime in general and specifically key directions in the struggle against it so that workers perceive stabilization in the near future and after that even a noticeable improvement in the state of affairs in society.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] We will hope that our republic interim committee and local committees will become precisely such agencies and we wish them success in carrying out the unusual measures during the current emergency situation.

### **Dollar Counterfeiters Apprehended in Vilnius**

18001712 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA  
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 16 Sep 89 p 4

[Article by I. Yermakov: "They Were Selling Counterfeit Dollars"]

[Text] ...They tried not to attract attention to themselves. They talked in undertones. They kept their eyes averted. Finally, they came to an agreement and extended their hands toward each other. In one were Soviet rubles. In the other, US dollars.

However, the precautionary measures did not help. Several seconds later, following a brief struggle, these hands were in handcuffs.

"The group of counterfeiters from Minsk," said the deputy head of the department of the Administration for the Struggle against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, N. Ponomarev, "were caught red-handed in the streets of Vilnius." Citizen Polshi presented the other side of this illegal financial operation. The counterfeit US banknotes prepared by the criminals from Belorussia in 1-, 20-, 50- and 100-dollar denominations were exchanged as usual for Soviet money. The exchange took place at the black market exchange rate: twelve rubles to the dollar. The counterfeiters were exposed by members of the Administration for the Struggle against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation of the Belorussian Ministry of Internal Affairs, M. Antsipovich, M. Sazonov, I. Zholnerchik and I. Savchuk. And the police action was supervised by deputy head of the republic's Administration for the Struggle against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation, Ya. Ilnistkiy...

Unfortunately, there was an unpleasant aspect to the important process of expansion of international contacts. It turned out that the group had also had previous contacts with foreigners. At present, it is difficult to judge the scale of the phenomenon as a whole throughout the country, but this specific case will provide a great deal of food for thought. During the arrest of the group of criminals and search, almost five thousand counterfeit dollars, as well as weapons, were seized. The group's statement of "service" also included the burglary of one of the "clients". And the cooperatives, whose employees were among the criminals, were excellent places to "wash themselves clean" of the money they had acquired.

### Disappearances of Soviets in Paris, Madrid Unexplained

18001637 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Sep 89 p 6

[Article by A. Urvantsev: "Top Secret: The Mystery of the Disappearing People"]

[Text] It was reported in the press that a collector of pictures, G. Basmadzhan from France, who was staying at the hotel Rossiya, disappeared under mysterious circumstances. I heard that such a fate has befallen some of our compatriots abroad. Tell us about this in more detail. (A. Ignatyev, Moscow.)

Our story has a detective beginning and a tragic outcome. On the 1st of March of this year, an employee of the Soviet trade delegation in Paris, B. N. Levkovskiy, disappeared. According to the testimony of his colleagues, he got into his car at the end of the working day and went home. His co-workers had never seen him more alive...

The next day, what had happened was reported to the police prefecture. And yet after two days, our workers by chance noticed his automobile on a bridge across the Seine. It was parked near the bus stop. From that moment there arose the questions, answers to which the Soviet side has not to this time received answers.

According to the evidence of eye-witnesses, the police examined the automobile and its contents. It was Soviet citizens who first informed the embassy of the USSR about the discovery of B. Levkovskiy's car. The impression took shape that notwithstanding our persistent demands about speeding up the search for the missing Soviet citizen, the police had not made energetic steps in this plan. And here is the finale: the body of B. Levkovskiy was discovered by workers in the Seine on 22 March. This time employees of the embassy and trade delegation were invited to identify it.

A preliminary forensic-medical examination was made by French authorities. It established: death had come approximately seven days after Levkovskiy's disappearance as a result of mechanical suffocation, after which the corpse was evidently thrown into the river. We note that such a conclusion was made by the French themselves.

Then began the incomprehensible. The Soviet side expressed anxiety in connection with the obvious delay in issuing the official forensic-medical examination report on the causes of death of the employee of the trade delegation. It was only in the middle of June that copies of these documents were received.

And contrary to the first conclusion in the official from Paris, it was written that B. Levkovskiy's body was found in the river not two, but three weeks later, and that the car was parked by the bridge on the day of his death. And that its owner allegedly threw himself into the water. The suicide version is refuted by the fact that [kistological] aspects were discovered in the lungs of the deceased which testify to a violent death previously.

Notwithstanding the many obvious contradictions, the French court did not raise it as a criminal matter but qualified the end of B. Levkovskiy as a suicide.

"This is completely absurd," said K. Medvedev, deputy general director of V/O Vneshposyltorg of the Ministry of External Economic Ties. "I have known Boris Nikolayevich for many years in joint work in the union. Over the course of seven years he headed the firm Promtovar. He was respected in the collective, they loved him for his kindness and responsiveness. He was a cheerful person by nature. He did not take decisions in the heat of a moment, he weighed his every step thoroughly. As a specialist, he knew all the subtleties of our business. This was his second long posting in France. He did not have enemies, he established friendly business relations with the firms. The trade delegation elected him deputy secretary of the party organization. His colleagues often turned to him for advice and help. I often talked with B. Levkovskiy on the telephone concerning work. And if something serious or a more fateful difficulties had arisen in his life, then he would have told me without fail, as an old friend, or he would simply have hinted at them. His death is an inexplicable tragedy. To whom was it necessary?"

And here is the testimony of his wife:

"On that last day he came home to eat lunch," Galina Dmitriyevna says with tears in her eyes. "At 14:00, as usual, my husband left for work. I waited for him until late in the evening. But later I felt that something was wrong, and I started to phone the trade delegation, but I did not get through. I stood waiting thus by the window all night. Early in the morning my son and I ran around looking for him, he on one street, I on another, in hopes of seeing his car. I remember now with horror how I decided to send a 14-year-old boy to search for his father on a deserted street early in the morning. In the morning I roused everyone at the trade delegation to their feet..."

There is one more detail of no small importance in G. Levkovskaya's story. Galina Dmitriyevna recalled:

"My husband once told me that the security services were interested in him. Their representatives came to some firm with which he had business relations and

asked what kind of person he is. Why did he previously have a green-colored car but now a white one? My husband drove an old green-colored Zhiguli. But then the trade delegation received new cars. They assigned one of them to him.

### **Baltic Military District Concern to Minimize Environmental Damage**

*18010890C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Sep 89 First Edition p 4*

[Article by V. Biryukov and V. Zenkovich, TASS correspondents: "The District Is Not On the Sidelines"]

[Text] **Recently the Presidium of the Latvian Supreme Soviet adopted a decree to set up in the republic a work group to investigate the consequences caused to the environment by the actions of army subunits.**

Has there been such great damage to the Latvian economy from the activities of the military that a special review is required?

Of course, the army is far from the "civilian" industrial magnates, however its negative impact on the environment has been noticed, commented the deputy chairman of the Latvian State Committee for the Conservation of Nature [Goskompriroda], G. Liyepa.

But the problems related to protecting the environment in the process of the daily life and activities of the troops are also of concern to the command of the Baltic Military District. One must also be concerned with this in the process of the cutback in troops. Take, for instance, the putting back in order of the places of the former unit positions. In Liyepaya, for example, a deconstituted unit left behind piles of rubbish and barbed wire....

"We are trying to work in close contact with the environmental bodies," said the chief of the Inspectorate for the Protection of the Environment in the Baltic Military District, Maj V. Romanenko. "Together with the leaders of the Latvian Goskompriroda, we have held a conference at which complaints were voiced about us. In particular, in the village of Rumbula, where previously there were both military and civilian airfields, their collective gardens have now been distributed. Their owners have discovered aviation kerosene in the ground water. At present it is impossible to establish to whom this belongs—the army or Aeroflot, but we are ready to assume responsibility for improving the area. And a second question is being settled: a tank firing range located in the dune zone of the coast is to be moved to a different site. Generally, according to the data of the republic Goskompriroda, the 'contribution' of the district to polluting the environment is around 1 percent of the total for Latvia. Our inspectorate has also discovered violations. The guilty parties are being held materially liable for emergency discharges, for the leaking of oil products and illegal felling of timber and compensation is being paid to the injured party. Although these indicators may seem meager, I am far from merely trying to defend the 'departmental uniform'."

At present, the district is implementing a comprehensive plan of measures designed up to the year 1995. In particular, on Latvian territory they have already put into operation five large treatment facilities. Their total cost exceeds 2.5 million rubles. Construction is continuing. According to a schedule, the boiler facilities will

be converted to ecologically cleaner types of fuel and they will be equipped with scrubbers. A great deal is also being done to prevent the leaking of oil products. Each year around 5 million rubles are spent for these purposes. In truth, the district does not have a special conservation item of expenditures in the district budget, and much will have to be done by drawing on allocations for social needs.

There are also difficulties with the situation of the inspectorate itself. Its aim is to organize nature conservation in the district. But how can this be done if the service has just two men? And the proper equipment does not exist. We have been waiting a year now for the promised laboratory.

The first steps have been hard to take by the recently organized ecological service of the Armed Forces. Many tasks confront it. But since we have assumed our share of responsibility for the purity of the nature surrounding us, we must set to work effectively.

### **Goskompriroda Official on Organ's Project Review Function**

*90US0089A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 41, 14-20 Oct 89 p 8*

[Response by S. Revina to letter to editor]

[Text] *In response to the public's demand, the Main State Board of Ecological Experts has been created at USSR Goskompriroda [USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection]. But, for some reason, nothing is known about its activities.*

*A. Mironova, Kiev*

### **The work of this subdivision is discussed by Chief Expert, Candidate of Chemical Sciences S. Revina.**

During the year we carried out approximately 60 nondepartmental expert evaluations of plans for economic-technical activities and technical-standard documents to ascertain their conformity to ecological security.

In the city of Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast, we studied the plans for remodeling the biochemical plant of USSR Minmedprom [Ministry of the Medical and Microbiological Industry] and came to the conclusion: they do not not preclude the ejection of noxious substances into the atmosphere. If it is impossible to eliminate this shortcoming, the plant should have its area of specialization changed.

This evaluation was also given to the plans for the Pavlodar BVK [protein-vitamin concentrate] Plant. Another plant that should change its area of specialization is the biochemical plant in the city of Drogichine, Brest Oblast. I would like to note all these enterprises belong to USSR Minmedprom. The USSR Minlesprom [Ministry of the Timber Industry] system also has its violators of the environment. Thus, we recommended not building the second phase of the new production entity for soluble woodpulp at the Ust-Ilimsk LPK [timber industry complex]. A decision was also made

concerning the Slonskiy TsBK [woodpulp and paper combine] that is polluting the health resort of Yurmala.

Plans for the construction in the city of Budennovsk, Stavropol Kray, of an entity for the production of polypropylene in the Stavropolpolimer Association have been sent back for modification. Plans for the construction of the Berezovka Chemical Plant in Odessa Oblast and the Zheleznogorsk Chemical-Pharmaceutical Plant in Kursk Oblast have been rejected. Jointly with specialists from USSR Gosplan and USSR Gosstroy, experts made a decision concerning the undesirability of raising the levels of the reservoirs of the Nizhnekamskaya and Cheboksarskaya GES higher than the existing level, which has been taken as being the constant level.

I would like to dwell also on the expert evaluation of projects in energy engineering. Our workers proceed first of all from considerations of ecological security. It was for that reason, therefore, that the recommendation was made to limit the capacity of the Yuzhnoukrainskaya GES in Nikolayev Oblast, to stop the construction of the Konstantinovskiy Hydroelectric Power Center with GES-GAES, and to rework the plans for constructing the Tashlykskaya GAES.

At the present time additional ecological evaluation is being carried out for the plans for the Severnaya TETs that is under construction in Moscow. The makeup of the commission includes, in addition to specialists, representatives of the public. They will submit their findings to USSR Council of Ministers.

You have probably noticed that, in our conclusions, our expert commissions have to be satisfied with the words "it has been recommended," "it is proposed," etc. Unfortunately, these formulations will continue to exist until the Statute Governing the Procedure for the Conducting of Reviews by Commissions of Ecological Experts has been approved. But that document is not being adopted, inasmuch as a statute governing USSR Goskompriroda is also not yet in existence. The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution, entitled "The Fundamental Restructuring of the Job of Protecting the Environment in the Country," is not being fulfilled completely. Not all the environmental-protection functions have been transferred to our committee from the former "environmental bosses"—USSR Minvodkhoz [Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources], USSR Minrybkhkh [Ministry of the Fish Industry], and other departments.

#### **Salykov, Vorontsov Comment on State Environmental Budget**

90US0089B Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA  
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 10 Oct 89 p 1

[Article by S. Panasenka: "But Who Pays?"]

[Text] The ecological situation in the country will worsen, although possibly not too swiftly. That is the conclusion from a press conference given by representatives of USSR Goskompriroda [State Committee for

Environmental Protection] and the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Questions of the Ecology and the Efficient Use of Natural Resources.

The main reason for this is well known: the continuing economic disintegration. Only a healthy national economy is capable of allocating, without any detriment to itself, the necessary production capacities, and the intellectual, financial, and material resources that guarantee the desired result within the assigned period of time. It is no accident that the substantial improvement of the ecological situation in the United States coincided with an overall economic upsurge. And whereas in the United States in 1985 the nationwide expenses to combat environmental pollution came to \$73.8 billion, by no means the last reason for this is the fact that the American economy painlessly (and even partially with benefit for itself) withstood those expenditures.

It is, of course, possible, following the statement made by A. Chernoyarskiy, director of the Ekologiya [Ecology] All-Union Scientific-Research and Information Center, to compare these 73.8 billion dollars with our appropriations in 1988 for the same purposes—9.3 billion rubles—and complain about the colossal gap. Strictly speaking, however, this kind of comparison does not explain anything, inasmuch as, first, no one knows how these amounts are formed. Identical equipment and identical environmental-protection technology in our country and in theirs might cost differently. Therefore the attainment of an equal result here and there might cost different amounts of money.

Secondly, in the Soviet economy, rubles by no means have the same meaning as dollars do in the American economy. K. Salykov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee, reported that in the next fiscal year the appropriations for environmental protection will reach 13 billion rubles. However, he immediately admitted that even the previous capital investments were used terribly badly by the ministries—only 25-45 percent. What, then, will increasing that part of the budget achieve?

N. Vorontsov, chairman of USSR Goskompriroda, replied to this that larger appropriations for ecological needs will mean a great opportunity for the country and for the committee to exert a powerful influence on the situation and to act in the role of a well-to-do customer. Massed state production orders, as everyone knows, are capable of causing a noticeable change in the situation in a particular sector of the national economy. According to the 1990 State Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR, 180 environmental-protection projects are included in state production orders. Unfortunately, the discussion of the draft versions of this plan by the deputies indicated that the material-technical "covering" of many of the principles stated in it is speculative, rather than realistic.

Finally, the State Committee itself currently is scarcely capable of playing in the Soviet Union the same role that is played in the United States by the Environmental

Protection Agency. Under the new leader it, unfortunately, is just as helpless as it was under its previous one, and N. Vorontsov admitted that completely. N. Vorontsov links his most serious hopes with the Environmental Protection Law, the draft of which was developed by his department. However, the enactment of that law is being postponed until the distant future: as the chairman of Goskompriroda noted, "if we submit the law to the Supreme Soviet for the autumn 1990 session, we shall be very satisfied."

Unfortunately, from everything that was heard one gets the impression that environmental protection continues to be the concern exclusively of the state, and both committees—the parliamentary one and the state one—have become reconciled to this situation. Meanwhile, as the government searches in a budget that is splitting at the seams for additional billions for environmental protection and thinks about how those billions can be used to correct all the errors immediately, approximately 60 billion rubles have accumulated in the enterprise accounts, but the labor collectives at the plants are not rushing to expend them on the ecology. Might it not make sense—if our environmental protection actually needs money—to find a means, by way of taxes, to shake these billions loose? The expenses to protect the environment, to produce equipment to purify the air and water, and to introduce technological schemes for environmental protection must be borne primarily by those who are polluting the environment.

#### **Yablokov on Supreme Soviet Environmental Committee Priorities**

90US0089C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Oct 89  
Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with A. Yablokov, by Ye. Manucharova, under rubric "A Deputy's Position": "Aleksey Yablokov: The Salvation of the Environment and the Law"]

[Text] *[Ye. Manucharova] Aleksey Vladimirovich, what is your committee currently working on? That is, the Supreme Soviet's Committee for Problems of Ecology and the Efficient Use of Natural Resources.*

[A. Yablokov] For the past two weeks, from morning to night, we have been engaged in an analysis of the draft of the State Plan for Economic and Social Development, and also in an analysis of the country's budget for 1990. For this purpose we had to listen to reports at committee sessions from all the country's environmental-protection departments (primarily USSR Goskompriroda [State Committee for Environmental Protection] and USSR Goskomgidromet [State Committee for Hydrometeorology]), and also from the ministries whose activities are most dangerous for the environment (metallurgy, timber industry, chemical and petrochemical industry). In addition, USSR Gosplan, USSR Ministry of Finance, and GKNT [State Committee for Science and Technology].

And this is what is terribly alarming for us: next year it is impossible to expect any real improvement of the situation, any noticeable shifts in the purification of the water

or the air. The appropriations for environmental protection have increased, but they cannot be used, inasmuch as there is no support with material-technical resources. Incidentally, both this year and last year it proved to be impossible to expend all the funds allocated for environmental protection. Only slightly more than half those funds were used... Thus, within the near future the situation not only will not be stabilized, but will even become worse.

*[Ye. Manucharova] Is there reliable and complete knowledge about the situation that currently exists?*

[A. Yablokov] I shall list only a few of the sore spots so that the situation will become more understandable.

Last year the discharge of harmful substances into the atmosphere came to 100 million tons. In 103 cities with a population of approximately 50 million persons, the maximum admissible concentrations of harmful substances were exceeded by a factor of 10 or more. Several times more raw materials, energy, and water are expended per unit of output than in the developed countries.

The condition of two-thirds of the water sources does not meet the sanitation and ecological standards. Six hundred cities do not have standard purification of runoff water. At structures of the present-day Minvodstroy [Ministry for Construction of Water Facilities], as much as 21 percent of the total volume of the water collected is lost. Despite the government's decision to reduce water consumption within the next few years by 15-20 percent, the departments are planning to increase the water-collection area by the year 2005. More than 5 million hectares of the most fertile land has been taken from agricultural circulation as a consequence of flooding or salinization. Approximately 10 million hectares of very valuable bottom land has proven to be covered by reservoirs. In 1987, pesticides in dangerous concentrations were discovered in 42 percent of the products used in children's dairy kitchens, and were discovered in mother's milk.

The worsening of the quality of the environment has caused an increase in the disease rate. We share the 47th and 48th places with regard to the average life expectancy, and occupy the 44th place with regard to the children's death rate in the world. We now have "ecological refugees." The area around the Aral Sea and the Caspian Sea, the south of the Ukraine, the Kuzbass, many of the resort areas, and a number of other regions are on the brink of ecological catastrophe.

The disturbing ecological situation—one of the causes of the increase in social tension in the country, and the extremely ineffective use of the economic potential, of which it is a part—is the result of inefficient management.

*[Ye. Manucharova] What can the deputy corps do? The Supreme Soviet? Because, after all, this is by no means a new situation.*

[A. Yablokov] To save the health of the land, it is necessary to change our legislation. Among the majority



of people, the ecologization of their thought processes has occurred. And the laws must become ecologized just as quickly. Because the law reflects the interrelationships among people, and also between people and property. All these interrelationships, without exception, must now be viewed through the ecological prism.

For example, at the first session the Supreme Soviet was confirming the Statute Governing USSR Trade Representations Abroad. Our committee demanded (and those demands were satisfied) that the statute take into consideration the ecological safety of the technology and technological schemes being purchased. It is no secret that many foreign companies would like to use (and some have even been successful in doing so) our country as a test area for developing ecologically dangerous production entities.

The plans of the Committee for Questions of the Ecology include the development of a new law that could be called a law to protect the habitation environment. Its enactment must be accelerated: it must guarantee the country's ecological safety.

*[Ye. Manucharova] Will that law include the concept of ecological crime and the concept of ecological disaster zones?*

[A. Yablokov] Definitely. We are attempting to include these concepts in criminal legislation. However, it is very difficult to formulate the corpus of an ecological crime in the precise formulation that is needed by jurists.

*[Ye. Manucharova] Even if a catastrophe has occurred? On the Volga last year, thousands of sturgeon and millions of other species of fish perished. Is there any ambiguity about this? Wasn't no one brought to accountability?*

[A. Yablokov] Nothing happened. And that is terrible. What we need is not only punishments, but also the real compensation of the losses incurred both by the environment, and by people's health. All this is possible, as is demonstrated by the experience of other countries. Because when the Rhein River was contaminated several years ago, the Swiss company that had poisoned the river was caught immediately, and it paid for the losses inflicted on all the land through which the Rhein flows. Ecological crimes in our country remain unpunished, primarily because the natural resources here are actually free and ownerless. In the interests of the economy itself, it is necessary to establish ecological landmarks—they invariably prove to be most profitable from the positions of the economy, without allowing it to roll along the path of cannibalism (when the department itself uses a considerable part of its output for its own needs).

In the developed countries, industry is actively changing over to technological schemes without waste products (at such time the waste products from one type of production become the raw materials for another type). That is why it is possible there to obtain from one ton of raw materials much more output than we do in our country. For example, from one cubic meter of timber Canada and Sweden produce 5-6 times more final output than we do.

*[Ye. Manucharova] Can we adapt those principles that force the capitalists to change over to the most improved technological schemes for environmental protection?*

[A. Yablokov] Yes, we can. They include, first of all, a well thought-out system of taxation. If it becomes known that some kind of new technological scheme that is easier on the environment (or some kind of more effective purification technology) has been invented, but a particular company is dragging its feet in converting to it, that company has a ruinous tax imposed on it. In addition, one principle that operates well is "the polluter pays." He pays in the full volume of the damage caused—not just a fine, but the amount of money needed to restore the health of the environment and people's health. For the time being, this is not done in our country. Last year, in the State Arbitration system alone, more than 500 million rubles were assessed as fines from enterprises that had destroyed natural resources. But that money was not used to restore the environment that had been destroyed. Instead it was simply paid into the budget. It is necessary to change this situation immediately and to make the preservation of the resources economically profitable for the local soviets.

We cannot do without economic mechanisms for restoring the environment. They must be firmly established in the laws governing territorial cost accountability, local self-government and self-financing, property, and taxes. In addition, one of the important functions of USSR Goskompriroda (a function that it is not yet carrying out) is in locating and supporting those technological schemes in production that are profitable for the environment.

*[Ye. Manucharova] The board of Goskompriroda has been reviewing the long-term All-Union Ecological Program. Will you be discussing it?*

[A. Yablokov] Yes, we will. And so will you. All the citizens of the country. The program must be brought up for national discussion. Its results will be considered by our committee and by the Supreme Soviet. Work has been done for a long period of time on the program draft. That work began as the summing up of the ministerial and departmental recommendations that came in over the old, well-worn rails, and therefore I have serious apprehensions that, even in its new version, the program will not be a serious obstacle for the further worsening of the environment.

The chief shortcoming of the program is the lack of any clear-cut concept. And without that it is impossible to bring our country out of its ecological crisis.

I would like to see in the program clear-cut requirements made on the branches. For example, in the designing of motor vehicles. In the near future they must expend two to three liters of gasoline per 100 kilometers of run, instead of the current eight to nine liters. It is necessary not only to reduce, but to stop completely, the emission of chlorofluorocarbons (in order not to destroy the

protective layer of the ozone), and to reconsider the necessity of such a tremendous amount of energy as is currently being produced.

*[Ye. Manucharova] Throughout the world, the "Greens" movement has been getting stronger from year to year. What is the situation in our country?*

[A. Yablokov] We are "greening" rapidly. In our country the public ecological movement is developing actively, or, I might say, is maturing. We have real "Greens" (in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Ukraine, and in a number of parts of Russia), and also numerous ecological clubs, sections, associations, and societies. Recently a Soviet Branch of the the famous worldwide Greenpeace organization was organized in the USSR.

*[Ye. Manucharova] Isn't that a rather large number of disconnected organizations? Wouldn't it be better for all the ecological organizations to unite?*

[A. Yablokov] Definitely not. The ecological movement must have a large number of nuances and directions. Unification would dry out its soul. Worldwide experience indicates that it is much more effective to have individual combined actions to resolve certain specific tasks. (For example, the fight against the Volga-Chogray Canal, the saving of the tropical forests and the Indian tiger).

*[Ye. Manucharova] But what can be done urgently to achieve the ecological improvement of our country?*

[A. Yablokov] It is necessary to adopt emergency short-term programs for the rapid improvement of the environment in the areas of ecological disasters. That is what is needed first of all. In addition, it is necessary to stop completely the construction of industrial and energy giants—the entire world stopped doing this long ago.

It is necessary to create a mobile team of ecological experts, to provide the ecological certification of the existing enterprises, to determine the degree of ecological danger of the technological schemes being used, and to develop specific measures for replacing them with new, safe ones.

The complete glasnost and accessibility of information concerning the state of the environment and all types of pollution, including radioactive, is an important measures that will help to concentrate the public's opinion on what are truly the first-priority tasks of each area.

In general, the program of actions is clear. We must carry it out. But problems do exist. First of all in the insufficient understanding of the acuity of the ecological problems by the people who are making the decisions. At the Congress a large group of delegates—dozens of them!—demanded the adoption of a special resolution on the ecology. But nothing happened. But at the present time (true, with tremendous efforts!) it has proven possible to include on the agenda of the current session of USSR Supreme Soviet the discussion of the draft version of the resolution entitled "Urgent Measures to Improve the Ecological Situation in the Country." True, it is question 34, the very last one. Nevertheless it is a tremendous victory. The resolution is vitally necessary—both in order to give a program of actions to the government, and in order to support the people who had despaired of saving the habitat in which they live.

*[Ye. Manucharova] So it's a case of "heavy is the head that wears the crown"? You are a scientist and a corresponding member of USSR Academy of Sciences, and you have crossed over into professional political activity. Don't you regret it?*

[A. Yablokov] Definitely not. It was a completely thought-out step and it is linked with the complication of the situation in the country. I want to take decisive steps to replace my position as critic by my position of builder. That is first of all. Secondly, I hope to return to science (after the end of my term as deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Committee for Questions of the Ecology). By that time various ideas that I have contributed to the job at hand should yield their fruit.

But I arrived in politics even before I was elected as deputy. I was led to politics by my scientific profession itself. I am a zoologist and for that reason alone an active ecologist. Ecology is the healthy reaction of society to the technocratic development of civilization. In essence, ecology has grown into the political philosophy of all the people who are concerned about the present state of the environment. You might recall that at the Congress every third person who spoke (if not every second person) mentioned ecological misfortunes. Several candidates for appointment as ministers were rejected by the Supreme Soviet on the grounds, in particular, that their actions had been marked, to put it mildly, by ecological shortsightedness. And in many strikes, ecological questions have been included among the first-priority ones.

Because the ecology has been an urgent political problem, a problem of health and of life itself.

## OKTYABR Attacked for 'Russophobic' Publications

### 'Anti-Russian' Works Assailed

18001612 Moscow *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA* in Russian No 31, 4 Aug 89 p 4

[Letter to editor from M.F. Antonov, candidate in technical sciences, V.M. Klykov, winner of the USSR State and RSFSR State Prizes, I.R. Shafarevich, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and winner of the Lenin Prize: "Letter to the Secretariat of the Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union"]

[Text] Every journal today is trying to develop an image of its own and to attract the interest of its readers through publication of new works. At the same time, each journal, each publication is an organ of one or another social organization and thus is expressing the views of that organization. What are the views of the Russian Writers' Union as demonstrated in the most important of the works recently published in, for example, the journal OKTYABR, the organ of the republic's Writers' Union?

Russian readers are not the only ones surprised by the consistently anti-Russian politica of the journal. After all, it was OKTYABR that published excerpts from the scandalous, infamous lampoon by Avram Terts (A. Sinyavskiy) "Strolls with Pushkin." The man who offered the West the terrible alternative—"Either the world will survive, or Russia will", who has referred in print to "Russia-the-bitch" has found refuge in the organ of the Russian writers' organization.

Are they not using such works to test public opinion? After all, the ideas being accepted and approved by the Writers' Union of Russia met with sharp rebuff when they were offered in emigre circles. How else can one understand the publication of Avram Terts' work in the journal OKTYABR?

The reader had a respite of less than a month before this journal again treated him to the next Russophobic work—Vasiliy Grossman's story "Everything Passes." This story is prefaced by a long article by G. Vodolazov, entitled "Lenin and Stalin," explaining the journal's position. This article, which serves as a philosophical and sociological commentary to the story, to no less a degree than the story itself, calls attention to the line the journal is deliberately following in publishing such works. It speaks of the fact that the editors of the journal do not agree with certain of the positions adopted by the author and of the fact that the story contains some "lamentable pages." (The references here are to pages where the author is not in complete agreement with Lenin.) The main thesis of this work, that the characteristics of the Russian soul were engendered by lack of freedom, that the Russian soul is the soul of a "millennium of slavery," is nowhere disputed by the commentary. The whole article is devoted to individual points of disagreement with the author, but there is not a word about the main idea of the story. And no consternation is

expressed, for example, at the statement: "It is time for those who would understand Russia to realize that the mystic Russian soul has been created by a millennium of slavery and nothing more." Can it be that the editors of the journal, along with the administration of the Writers' Union of Russia, of which OKTYABR is the organ, agree with this assertion? Is it possible that they agree with the idea that this thousand-year-old Russian slave was responsible for German and Italian Fascism, since the "European apostles of national revolution saw the flame from the East. The Italians and then the Germans began to develop the ideas of National Socialism in their own ways"? Let us imagine for a moment that, for example, *LITERATURNAYA GRUZIYA* [Literary Georgia] published a work that harped on the baseness of Georgia as a nation, or some other similar rubbish. How would the Georgian Writers' Union react to this?

OKTYABR has printed an announcement concerning the forthcoming publication of a work by A. Yanov, the author of the most militant and, blatant anti-Russian works, which have been justifiedly criticized by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.

"Strolls with Pushkin," "Everything Passes," the works of A. Yanov, etc.—not *ZNAMYA*, *DRUZHBA NARODOV*, not even *OGONEK* [journals known for their liberal policies] has published such a series of blatant and ideologically unambiguous works.

And so, the Russian journal has taken the lead in demonstrating the decadence of the Russian people and Russian geniuses. Is this the position of the editor-in-chief, A. Ananyev, or the position of the secretariat of the board of the Writers' Union of Russia? As far as we know, the journal OKTYABR is far from being a cooperative, autonomous publication. Indeed, the editor-in-chief and the chairman of the board of the Writers' Union of Russia have a close personal and professional relationship. However, does this justify indulging the editor to this extent?

And yet the entire secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union is accountable for the policy of the journal OKTYABR.

We would not have publicly called attention to this accountability if it were not for the fact that other creative unions associated with the writers' union and their printed organs, are also taking part in this new phenomenon, that is, Russophobia. The malignant signs of this perverted phenomenon have also sprung up in many other mass media, the movies, the stage, the radio, and television. But writers and journalists have always set the tone in our country. The entire cultural and scientific community listens to them first of all.

We request that the secretaries of the Writers' Union of Russia be shown this letter and that it be published.

The secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union considered this letter at their meeting on 31 July of the current year. It was decided to publish it in the next issue of *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA* and evaluate the work

of the editors of OKTYABR at an expanded meeting of the RSFSR Writers' Union secretariat of the board to be held on 5 October of the current year.

### Chief Editor Ananyev Protests

18001612 Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 35, 1 Sep 89 p 14

[Letter signed by A. Ananyev, editor-in-chief, of the journal OKTYABR, secretary of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union: "Criticism or Denunciation"]

[Text] The editorial office received responses to the "Letter to the Secretariat of the Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union," written by M.F. Antonov, candidate in technical sciences, V.M. Klykov, winner of the USSR State Prize and RSFSR State Prize, and I.R. Shafarevich, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, winner of the Lenin Prize, which appeared in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA on 4 August of this year. Since this letter came to the editors from the secretariat of the board and was published with its permission, preceding the expanded meeting of the board to evaluate the work of the journal OKTYABR, we sent all reader responses to the secretariat for its members' information and consideration. At first we were planning to do the same with a letter received from the editor-in-chief of the journal OKTYABR, A.A. Ananyev. But Anatoliy Andreyevich wrote yet another letter at the same time—to the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union—containing an insistent demand that his words appear in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA. He appealed to the CPSU Central Committee on the same matter, and they called us. He also called the editorial board in person. And all this—in spite of today's "perestroika pluralism and despite the fact that LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, when it submitted one or another work appearing on the journal's pages to critical analysis, had no plans for any printed public evaluation of all the work of the OKTYABR editors (this of course, is not within our purview)—has impelled us to honor Anatoliy Andreyevich's request to bring his words to the attention of our readers.

The commentary we felt compelled to give can be found below.

To the editors:

In your paper of 4 August of the current year, you published a letter signed by three individuals, Antonov, Klykov, and Shafarevich, which made serious accusations about the editors of OKTYABR, and the decision of the secretariat of the RSFSR Writers' Union on this issue. Since I was not invited to the meeting of the secretariat, although I am a secretary of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, and was not informed that they had received a denunciation from this troika (please excuse my use of this term - "troika," reminiscent of the well-known trial, but the letter was indeed signed by a troika (group of three) and furthermore the tone and nature of the denunciation was very symptomatic); and since other secretaries of the RSFSR Writers' Union who

are members of the journal's editorial board were also ignored, I consider it necessary to express our opinion on this issue and I request that you publish it on the pages of your newspaper.

First of all—concerning the letter: we understand that everything published in newspapers and journals does not have to please everyone, or to be more precise, be accepted by everyone. Thus, the letter written by Antonov, Klykov and Shafarevich could have been considered to belong to this class of disturbing letters, if only, first of all, it had not been trouble-making and denunciatory in nature and, secondly, if the leadership of the RSFSR Writers' Union, without bothering to investigate or seek clarification or further information, had not made such a hasty decision, endorsed by five or six secretaries (which for some reason was kept secret from us) when there are officially 55 on the board. What is the evidence against the journal? In the first place, publication of a story by V. Grossman "Everything Passes;" in the second, the mere fact that the journal dared to include as authors, certain forbidden names—A. Sinyavskiy and A. Yanov. Furthermore, we only published excerpts from A. Sinyavskiy's book "Strolls with Pushkin," and have announced future publication, but have not actually published A. Yanov, so that no one other than the editors is yet familiar with his article "Invitation to a Dialogue", and thus cannot judge it. We thus have a situation similar to the one in the story about the gypsy: there is neither mare nor colt in the yard, but the gypsy is already beating his son with a whip and saying, "Don't you dare ride the colt, or I'll break your back!" But seriously, this poses the question of whether it is possible that the secretariat of our RSFSR Writer's Union again has a "black list" of writers. If so, why has it not been made public, so that editors are prevented from committing a mortal sin and from overstepping the line of what is permitted or, in the worst case, why did they not circulate the list in secret, as they used to in the past, with a label reading: "For the directors only, secret, keep locked up"? Both A. Sinyavskiy and A. Yanov are accused of Russophobia, as are the editorial board and its editor-in-chief (and I repeat, all because of a work by Yanov that has not yet been published and fragments, that's right only fragments, of a book, for which we are, as we should be, ready to accept responsibility.) "Strolls With Pushkin" by A. Sinyavskiy is called a "scandalously infamous lampoon." But since this "infamous lampoon" has not yet been published here, the reading public cannot make any judgments about it, and yet suddenly certain experts appear out of nowhere and make this judgment, without permitting any doubt about their own infallibility. LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, for the sake of credibility, offers its readers a review by some fellow called Gul, published in the Western press 30 years ago, and if this review is to be believed, then A. Sinyavskiy should truly not be allowed anywhere near our literary press. But this would all be true, no more no less, if it were not for one inaccuracy (in our view of course, far from accidental) as a result of which many readers of the newspaper were simply deceived. The fact

is that the review, intended to cast a Russophobic shadow on the workers at OKTYABR, was published with so many distortions and deletions, concealing information which would have cast a far different light on A. Sinyavskiy's book and on the character of Gul himself. We do not wish to be like the writers of the letter and blacken Gul's name. He is a complex and contradictory writer. However, for the sake of truth, we will try to restore the omissions and distortions made by LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in this article by Gul so that the readers of OKTYABR and of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA can form a clear and complete idea of the true nature of the issue. Again let me emphasize that we are speaking not about material published in the journal, but of the work of A. Sinyavskiy, who, we believe, has a right to his own voice. He is being incriminated by the phrases: "Either the world will survive, or Russia will" and "Russia-the-bitch." Although once again they are speaking of A. Sinyavskiy's personality, we consider it our literary and civic duty to defend him. A word ripped from its context is one thing, and a complete quotation is something else entirely. Here is how it sounds: "Russia-the-mother, Russia-the-bitch, you must answer for this child who is obviously yours, nurtured by you and then thrown out on the trash heap in disgrace!..." Perhaps this is still not what would have been desired, but nonetheless, the meaning is completely different. And this was written of the Russia of Brezhnev and Suslov which forced many talented people who did not suit it—A. Solzhenitsyn, I. Brodskiy, M. Rostropovich, G. Vishnevskaya, O. Tselkov, M. Shemyakina, and many others—to abandon their fatherland.

Now let us turn to V. Grossman and his story "Everything Passes." This is a writer with an international reputation whose works are widely read. They are appreciated by the most widespread and diverse critics both abroad and here at home. Anyone who decides to become familiar with the story and approaches it without bias will have no trouble understanding what its main idea is. I do not know how V. Grossman would react to the reproaches and accusations of the troika, whether he would be with us, but I think that he would say with consternation that in his reference to slavery, even a millenium of slavery, and in his general treatment of the terrible, but real evil in our history, he is not saying anything new; many of the major writers of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries have dealt with this theme (and done so repeatedly), ("Country of slaves, country of masters...") But after all, I repeat, this is not the theme of the story: it is against Stalinism, against coercion, in any form, directed at any people. It seems to me that here too the shadow of the forbidden black list is falling on the grave of the great, internationally acknowledged writer. I cannot understand what the troika is proposing in its letter. That we should have edited V. Grossman's story (as, for example, LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA did with Gul's article)? Or that we should not have published this work at all, thus denying the people their artistic legacy? But in that case, first of all, we would simply have been violating the

resolution of the USSR Writers' Congress concerning restoration of the "gaps" in literature and, secondly, would not have been performing our civic obligation to future generations. And, in general, how can V. Grossman not be published? I, for one, viewed the decision of the secretariat of the USSR Writers Union on Solzhenitsyn with deep satisfaction and believe that all the work of our outstanding contemporary should be published, without any omissions or corrections.

Now—let me speak of the so-called resolution of the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union. We cannot accept it as either legitimate or legal. The haste and secrecy with which it was made (Things have gotten to the point where, in spite of today's democracy and glasnost, we even had difficulty learning the names of the secretaries present at the meeting: Bondarev, Larionov, Kunyayev, Safonov\*, and our request to be allowed to see the transcript met with the response that there was none yet available, and this was almost 10 days after the resolution was accepted.) are not merely surprising, they raise questions that go far beyond the boundaries of the relationship between OKTYABR and the above group of officials of the Writers' Union. Pluralism and difference of opinion—these are what the times dictates today—and if it is acknowledged that an artist is an individual and that the world can only become work of art when it passes through his artistic perception, then it becomes obvious that neither the leadership of the RSFSR Writers' Union, nor the editors of journals can be required to "vouch for every line" which they prepare for publication. Whatever level of writer heads the union, they have no right to dictate their own literary canon and tastes. This would lead to a situation where literature would simply cease to exist. Groups of writers form around journals, the so-called core authors, and this core develops the direction which the journal follows. There is NASH SOVREMENNİK and there is OKTYABR. Why should OKTYABR be turned into just one more NASH SOVREMENNİK or LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA? We see that efforts have been made in this direction for a long time and in a very deliberate way, but, I think, such measures will scarcely be accepted by the literary and readers' community of Russia. In economics, in all other spheres of life, we are trying to move away from the administrative-command method; but in the Russian Writers' Union, it looks as if someone is desperately anxious not to lose the position that he fought so hard to attain. It is obvious that it may become a question of the status of journals and their editorial boards and in general of a review of the entire structure of today's "ossified," if I may be permitted to use the term, literary leadership.

Respectfully,  
A Ananyev

#### Footnote

\* E.I. Safonov is not a secretary of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, he is a secretary of the board of the Moldavian Writers' Organization (Editor's note).

### **Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn Denunciation Recalled**

18001612 Moscow *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA* in  
*Russian No 35, 1 Sep 89 p 14*

[Reply by the editors of *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA* to Ananyev's letter]

[Text] It is doubtless unnecessary to explain to our readers that by publishing (in an abridged form) the article by Roman Gul, "Strolls by a Boor with Pushkin," the editorial board was pursuing a specific goal: to show that, even in the West, writers whom it would be difficult to suspect of sympathy "for the Soviets" were offended by A. Sinyavskiy's (A. Terts') work ridiculing Aleksandr Sergeyevich Pushkin, a name dear to Russia. The literary community assessed this dubious work of Sinyavskiy's long ago, and this work written by our former countryman has itself long since been lost in oblivion, like all the other malicious lampoons that pursued the great Russian poet during his lifetime and after his death. For this reason, we were extremely surprised by the appearance of attacks on Pushkin on the pages of a Russian literary journal.

This, we imagine, makes everything clear. Although, we might note that it is scarcely appropriate for the editor-in-chief of the literary journal to express himself in such a haughty and disdainful fashion about Roman Gul. The name of this "fellow called Gul" has been cited in the leading journals of the country (*NOVYY MIR*, *ZNAMYA*, and others), along with the names of other Russian emigres who are now returning to the Fatherland. Of course, he, like the majority of white emigres, is not neutral in his political opinions. But in his opinion on Pushkin, on the genius of Russia, he is, without a doubt, on a higher and nobler level than Sinyavskiy and his defenders.

It is astonishing that the editor-in-chief of OKTYABR can assert that no one but the editors of his journal is familiar with the openly anti-Russian works of A. Yanov, one of the active authors of the journal *SINTAKSIS*, published by Sinyavskiy's wife

And another thing... Today, boldness with regard to A.I. Solzhenitsyn - which is finding universal social support—is not such a brave thing after all. Following in the footsteps of others, today A.A. Ananyev, subsequent to the famous resolution of the secretariat of the board of the USSR Writers' Union, calls Solzhenitsyn "our outstanding contemporary." However, let it be remembered that in his time, when he was already editor-in-chief of OKTYABR, he was in a hurry to put his two cents in, denouncing the "literary Vlasov" (wartime Soviet traitor disseminating antiSoviet propagands for the Germans) Solzhenitsyn. His stern letter was published in *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* (30 January 1974) under the completely unambiguous title "A Corrupt Soul." That's name-calling for you! ("...who is he, does he remember on what land he was born, in the name of what does he revile all that surrounds him?").

We would never have brought this up if A.A. Ananyev was not now engaging in political name-calling. After all,

all it took was for certain individuals, who are renowned for the social achievements, to express their consternation and disagreement with certain tendencies in what OKTYABR publishes, for Anatoliy Andreyevich to "put them in their places" immediately, resorting to the "tried and true" political lexicon: "threatening letter with three signatures (evoking in memory the unforgettable "troika" of Stalin's day)"; "it appears as if these 'patriots' are attempting to resurrect so-called 'black lists' of writers..."; "this whole story is the next distortion..."; etc. (cf. *NEDELYA*, No. 34).

Name-calling! name-calling!

However, we are curious as to how readers are supposed to judge the actions of Anatoliy Andreyevich himself. What "troika" or, in this case "gang of seven" did he belong to when, far after Stalin's day, he signed collective letters—for example, one protesting against the actions of academician Sakharov, with whom he now, as a people's deputy of the USSR, sits in the same hall? (cf. *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*, 5 September 1973—"We angrily denounce.")

And would it not be better, more productive, to avoid unnecessary fabrications and forbear from engaging in a competition as to who can attach the most scathing labels, but instead to evaluate everything—what existed in the past and what we encounter now—as a normal manifestation of the social literary process in which each person has the right to express his own opinion and be heard, without arrogant and aggressive rebuttals?

He who demands truth and justice must himself be just and true to principles.

### **RSFSR Writers Union Defends Journal Review**

18001612 Moscow *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA* in  
*Russian No 35, 1 Sep 89 pp 14-15*

[Reply of the Secretariat of the Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union]

[Text] Because A.A. Ananyev's letter contains many accusations concerning the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, we have asked the Secretariat for clarification.

We are publishing their official reply.

As is well known, the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union resolved to evaluate the work of the editors of the journal OKTYABR at the expanded meeting on 5 October of this year. This resolution unexpectedly evoked an emotional reaction on the part of OKTYABR's editor-in-chief, A.A. Ananyev, who in his letter to *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA* calls the secretariat's resolution "neither legitimate nor legal." While withholding comment on the extremely impolite, sometimes even abusive, letter written by Ananyev, we consider it essential to express ourselves concerning the issue itself.

Regular evaluation of the work of the print media is an indispensable part of the activity of the secretariat of the

board of the RSFSR Writers' Union. Only recently we heard reports from the editors of NASH SOVREMENNIK, PODYEM, and NEVA. We had planned to evaluate OKTYABR a year and a half ago, but postponed the evaluation at the urgent request of its editor-in-chief. After receiving the letter from M. Antonov, V. Klykov, and I. Shafarevich containing a number of criticisms of the journal OKTYABR (published in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA of 4 August of this year), the secretariat decided to return to the question of a report on the creative activity of this organ of the republic's Writers' Union.

Thus, there is nothing "hasty" about our action, rather the reverse. In addition, the following must be remembered: after reading Antonov, Klykov, and Shafarevich's letter, in spite of what Ananyev asserts in NEDEL'YA, we did not form any judgement at all, since the seriousness of the problems raised in it demanded a careful and open consideration in a forum such as the extended meeting of the secretariat, as is in complete accord with the democratic standards now observed in society. As for the issue of the legitimacy of such a resolution, first, as was already stated, it was made a year and a half ago, and, secondly, as everyone knows, evaluations of our print media is part of the function of the secretariat. This is what they call a "working," i.e., purely administrative decision, one which does not require convening the entire secretariat. Especially since we were dealing here only with confirmation of a resolution accepted earlier. For this reason we consider A. Ananyev's acerbic and disrespectful criticism on this issue inappropriate.

In the aforementioned letter signed by three authors, the major accusations are addressed to the secretariat of the RSFSR Writers' Union and this impels us to deal with their criticism. At the same time, we must also try to understand Ananyev's objections, his attempts to answer the statements made about OKTYABR, and there is no doubt that when the journal is evaluated, its editor-in-chief will be given every opportunity to express his point of view. The substance of the evaluation of the journal OKTYABR will be reported on in the pages of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA.

And finally, Ananyev complains that he was not invited to the meeting of the secretariat. Here, it must be remembered that Ananyev, as a secretary of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, is regularly invited to the meetings of the secretariat. However, in 1986, of 15 extended meetings, Anatoliy Andreyevich attended only 1. In 1987, of 16 meetings, he was present at only 4, and in 1988 he came to only a single meeting out of 14. During the first half of 1989, there were eight extended meetings, but Anatoliy Andreyevich was not seen at one of them.

The emotional protest of the editor-in-chief of OKTYABR against the planned discussion of the creative activity of his journal, and this is his second attempt to exempt the journal from public attention, in no way accords with the spirit of perestroika. Exceptions must not be made for the journal headed by Ananyev.

The unexpected and insulting objections made by the editor-in-chief of the journal with regard to the planned creative report, his attempts to go against the collective organ gives rise to a feeling of deep regret.

One feels embarrassed for Ananyev reading the unproven allegations on the pages of the latest issue of NEDEL'YA (no. 34), that "both the Russian and the Soviet Writers' Unions, unfortunately are at the tail-end of perestroika"; that "the Writers' Union secretariat of the board has too much power. The same people—10 or 15 individuals—are in command...," "another approach is needed... so that no writer is in charge of anything for longer than a year ..."

Without contesting, Ananyev's rash, to put it mildly, allegations, let us note only that all these criticisms, if they are appropriate at all, should be addressed to himself, he bears the brunt of social responsibility, since, you will recall, he is one of the "10-15 people" who is a secretary of the board of the USSR Writers' Union, a secretary of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, and a member of the board of the Moscow writers' organization, and has been "in charge of" a literary journal not only for "longer than a year," but for 15 years. And for this reason, shouldn't we consider Ananyev's piece in NEDEL'YA as healthy self-criticism? "With all the strength I have I will fight for democratization of life in our writers' union," writes Ananyev in NEDEL'YA. Why not start this fight with himself?

### Ananyev Defends Publishing Policy

18001612 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 37, 13 Sep 89 p 7

[Letter by Anatoliy Ananyev: "To the Secretariat of the USSR Writers' Union; To the Editors of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA"]

[Text] To the extent that the leadership of the USSR Writers' Union could not find anything better to do than speak with the editors of a Russian literary journal through a newspaper; since OKTYABR does not have the sort of subordinate organ that the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union has in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA; and since the issues touched upon in the conflict that has arisen, in our view, go far beyond the boundaries of a mere departmental quarrel, and are a matter of principle, important to the literary process of today, I request that you publish my view of the situation that has arisen.

Our country is in a state of economic, political, and moral crisis. In this difficult time one cannot approach either social or national or spiritual questions without understanding the whole complexity of today's situation. As never before, today we need to be guided by good will and mutual consideration. As never before, we need a broad social dialogue based on acknowledgment of universal human values, on the basis of universal democratic laws, before which we are all equally accountable. And today, as never before, an approach to the solution of the vital unsolved problems of today that is based on



parochial group interests can lead to even greater estrangement and schism in society. I am compelled to speak of this by the policies of the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union. Instead of facilitating normal, free development of the literary process, consolidation of all creative efforts, and increase in spiritual values, the secretariat (or a particular group within it), working through LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, is trying to drag the journal OKTYABR into group discord, inciting dissatisfaction and hostility, and exacerbating an already tense situation in the life of society. Unfortunately, as occurred in the past, the command-suppression method of managing (or rather, stifling) literature is being brought into play; dictates are issued concerning which authors can be published, and which cannot, what sort of leadership the writers' union can have, and what sort it cannot. The resolution of the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, in response to the letter written by Antonov, Klykov, and Shafarevich (LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, No. 31), is a sad testament to this fact. This is the way everyone sees it, no matter how the secretariat tries to veil its position today (LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, No. 35).

I was not surprised by this old technique—avoidance of discussion of the matter at issue by focusing on Ananyev's "dossier," instead. It is a tried and true technique.

Yes, I am guilty. One, of course, could refer today to the fact that all of society was receiving disinformation, that under conditions of total lack of openness and all-encompassing secrecy, it was not difficult to lead people astray, to manipulate them ideologically and control them like marionettes. One could also allude to the fact that most people at that time did not have access to the actual documents that would let them know the whole truth. We can remember how they gathered signatures—through pressure, unceremoniously, frequently by telephone, followed up by anonymously "printed" text. All this is true. But this is a weak and unworthy excuse. I do not share the point of view of those who believe that as long as everyone is implicated, no one specifically is answerable and there is no need for repentance. I am in no way trying to cast off my guilt for the past—I am ashamed of my actions. I humbly beg Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov and Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn for forgiveness.

But I believe that personal repentance is not enough. One must atone for one's sins. Especially, if one is in the post of editor-in-chief. This is precisely why OKTYABR was one of the first to break through the armor of the ban, and to set a policy of publishing works of those whose lots in life have been tragic, bitter, and hard, and who in many respects were ahead of their time: "Heavy Sands" by A. Rybakov, "The Sad Detective" by V. Astafyev, "Requiem" by A. Akhmatova, "Life and Fate" and "Everything Passes" by V. Grossman, the diaries of M. Prishvin. Here we strongly uphold the point of view that these works must be published in the form in which they issued from their authors' pen, and not doctored so as to suit political aims. And we have learned something else from the past: not to make any

judgements of works that have not yet been published and are not known to our readers, especially not to shape the "likeness of an enemy" out of quotations taken out of context and selected with a particular aim in mind. This position has been endorsed by our readers. This is demonstrated by the growing list of subscribers to OKTYABR and by our mail. Thus, it is not for the facts cooked up by LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, that I make my public apology today. My repentance occurred somewhat earlier, it can be found in the position the journal takes and in our literary policies.

Through their decision with regard to the letter written by "troika," they again want to throw us back to old times—the times of slander, threats, suppression of journals, and thus, the annihilation of literature and culture in general.

It is astonishing that when OKTYABR, during times we all remember, was the bulwark of orthodoxy and conservatism, it suited the secretariat of the RSFSR Writers' Union; when I, forced to obey, in unison with others signed the letters the authorities wanted us to sign, the journal never got criticized; but when, after much effort, OKTYABR finally managed to develop a voice of its own and earn the allegiance of its readers, it immediately stopped suiting the leadership of the Russian union.

We are against return to the past. We are against departmental command over literature, writers, and journals and believe that, in our fateful time, journals have no right to waste their strength on strife, on seeking justification and defense against denunciatory letters. We must do our common duty as citizens and facilitate free development of the literature that was so gravely wounded in past years.

### Soviet PEN Members Protest

18001612 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 37, 13 Sep 89 p 7

[Announcement signed by A. Rybakov, president of PEN CENTER; vice presidents, A. Vitov, A. Voznesenskiy, Ye. Yevtushenko, I. Vinogradov, F. Iskander, A. Strelyanny; and executive committee members, B. Akhmadulina, S. Kaledin, A. Kurchatkin, V. Lakshin, B. Okudzhava, Ye. Popov, T. Tolstaya: "Announcement of the Executive Committee of the Russian Soviet PEN-Center"]

[Text] On 4 August 1989, the newspaper LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA published a letter by citizens Antonov, Klykov, and Shafarevich, and also the decision of the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union resolving in response to this letter to evaluate the work of the editors of the journal OKTYABR at the meeting of the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union.

The authors of the letter assert:

"Every journal, every printed periodical is an organ of one or another social organization and thus expresses the views of this organization. What are the views of the Writers' Union of Russia as demonstrated in the latest

important articles in, for example, the journal OKTYABR, the organ of the republic's Union of Writers? Is this the position of the editor-in-chief, A. Ananyev, or the position of the secretariat of Writers' Union of Russia?"

On this point, we have the following to announce.

Every work expresses, first and foremost, the views of its author. An attempt to compel the creation of a writer to be contingent upon the position of an organization is a violation of creative freedom, an attempt to institute departmental censorship. The call to take administrative measures against the editor-in-chief of the journal OKTYABR cannot be considered anything other than a challenge to glasnost and democracy, than nostalgia for the command-repressive system. The demand that all the writers of Russia have the same views is a retreat from pluralism to the forced unanimity of Stalin's time.

We consider the resolution of the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union of 31 July and its announcement of September 1 1989 to constitute agreement with the positions of the authors of the letter.

We consider this resolution to be an intention to return literature to the pathway of crude administrative control, an attempt to frighten writers and editors, to turn the printed media into silent executors of the dictates of their group.

### **Georgian Religious Affairs Chief on Autonomy of Orthodox Church**

18001673 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 5 Sep 89 p 4

[Interview with Anzor Tsiklauri, plenipotentiary of the USSR Council of Ministers Council for Religious Affairs for the Georgian SSR, by ZARYA VOSTOKA correspondent: "What Prevents the Full Independence of the Georgian Autocephalous Church?"]

[Text] Always, at all times, Georgia has been distinguished by its tolerance of beliefs, recognizing each individual's right to profess any religion. Seventeen different religions exist today in the republic. As regards the Georgian Orthodox Church, one can say without exaggeration, that of late, it is attracting more and more people to its bosom.

Two and a half years ago there were 45 working churches in the Georgian Orthodox Church. Today that number has grown to 250. People in many cities and towns continue to appeal to the appropriate authorities with petitions to revive the churches closed as far back as the years of the Stalinist terror.

What facilitates as well as hinders this process was the subject of a discussion between our correspondent and Anzor Tsiklauri, plenipotentiary for the USSR Council of Ministers Council for Religious Affairs for the Georgian SSR.

[Correspondent] What problems are there to be resolved today?

[Tsiklauri] The informals are raising this question with increasing persistence today: if the Georgian Orthodox Church is autocephalous, then why are its activities controlled from the country's center and not by the republic? The title of my position, by the way, is evidence of this. In reality in order to resolve the issue of opening a working church in any area of the republic, for example, it is necessary to go through these steps: first, the people must go to the local authorities, then the local authorities to the republic's Council of Ministers; from there documents are sent to us for resolution, after which the Georgian government forwards them to the USSR Council of Ministers Council on Religious Affairs. And only after a favorable decision has been made at the very top can the request from the local people be satisfied.

I will cite another example, also characteristic, to clarify the problems that are continually presenting themselves.

The Society of Pentecostals in Tbilisi has been requesting a release from registration for two years now having to do with a disagreement over some of the articles of a law currently in force on religious organizations. Specifically the Pentecostals object to an accounting of their activities before the state. They also cite the fact that in the Gospel, nothing is mentioned about the so-called "religious twenty," which by law are necessary for registration of a religious organization. We have been trying for two years now to somehow settle our mutual relations with the Society of Pentecostals, but ...

[Correspondent] What could be preventing this?

[Tsiklauri] What? By and large an outdated law whose different provisions conflict with the very mood of perestroika. But I want to note that renewal has already also touched this part of life. In August, not long ago, the USSR Council of Ministers Council for Religious Affairs reviewed and issued a new draft law on freedom of conscience. It must be assumed that before the government of the country presents it to the second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet for examination, this draft law will be promulgated for broad discussion.

[Correspondent] Could you address briefly the essence of the key provisions of it?

[Tsiklauri] There are many of them. In effect, the law is being completely rewritten. For example, the rule on registration of religious organizations will be significantly simplified. Moreover, registration will be voluntary and not mandatory as it is now. Registered organizations will have the right of legal entity, but this means that, if necessary, they can turn to a court for resolution of conflicting issues. Atheists and believers have equal rights: in the past the former could disseminate propaganda, but the latter were deprived of this opportunity. The ban on philanthropic activities of the church in effect for many decades is being abolished. It is obtaining the right to property, to religious instruction for children, naturally on a voluntary basis.

[Correspondent] What are the most important events taking place in the Georgian Orthodox Church today?

[Tsiklauri] Along with the people's demand for mass openings of working churches, the issue of clergy cadres has come sharply to the fore. In the past annual admission of students to seminaries was limited, no more than ten applicants were permitted, but now this restriction has been lifted. As was already reported, last year the Ecclesiastical Academy opened in Tbilisi for theological instruction. The Tbilisi State University imeni I. Dzha-vakhishvili whose best professional teaching forces are being sent to the Academy to lecture, helped in this activity and continues to help.

In December, the competition for the design of the Grand Patriarchal Cathedral in Tbilisi will conclude. Along with architects from the republic, architects from other countries expressed a desire to take part in the competition. However, the Catholicos Patriarch of All Georgia, Ilya II, declared that this right should be granted only to Georgian specialists.

**Mufti Mukhammad-Yusof on Reopening of Mosques, Muslim Role in Society**

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[Interview with Mufti Mukhammad-Sadyk Mukhammad-Yusof, chairman of the Presidium of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, by Igor Belyayev, political observer of *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*: "Consolidation, and Not Dissidence"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Belyayev] If we take into account our new social and economic realities and the acute need for the harmonization of inter-nationality relations, then among the obvious priorities, which here determine a great deal now, we must also mention, I believe, the problems of spiritual life. They are organically connected with the further development of nationality consciousness and with the nationality policy in present-day conditions. And for this reason, my first question to you, Sheikh Mukhammad Sadyk, perhaps will sound by no means impartial: How are the Muslims of the Soviet republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan inclined today, are they finding the state of spiritual calm?

[Mufti] Significant events took place in our republics at the beginning of the year. The 4th Congress of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan took place. Representatives of all republics and oblasts took part in its work. During the congress democratic and open discussions are held concerning those questions which are of concern to the believers, and some of their aspirations and demands are satisfied. The Muslim believers shared with us their innermost thoughts, how to live further. In the conditions of socialism. The state returned to us our sacred object—the Koran of the Caliph Osman, which is now exhibited in the Museum of the History of the Peoples of Uzbekistan in Tashkent. This gesture of the Soviet government we perceived as respect for the Muslims and their feelings.

After the 4th Congress, we began to work in a new way, the Spiritual Administration restructured its activity. You see, we live among Muslim believers. Still recently, there were disagreements between the Administration and the believers, now we are striving harder to answer their spiritual needs. The opening of mosques has begun, which was a very acute and painful question; here, too, the state came to meet us half-way. Old mosques—sacred objects of Muslim architecture—have been returned. Among them the Mosque Koran in Bukhara, the Mausoleum and Mosque of Bakhaiddin Nakshbandi in the outskirts of Bukhara, the mosques in Namangan, Kokand and Andizhan. The tomb of Imam Abu Saat-Termezi has been returned. . . . Basically the changes concerned Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Less so—Turkmenia.

And in general I want note: If a total of more than 2,000 Christian temples have been open during the year, and during the same time only about 200 mosques, then it is worthwhile to ponder not only the fact that somewhere the number of mosques has begun to increase compared to elsewhere, the correlation as a whole, as we see, is not in favor of the Muslims.

[Belyayev] I believe this is unfair. All religions should have equal possibilities. And the creation of the conditions for this must become the concern of the authorities at the local level. But, in your view, how many old mosques should be opened from among those which were closed previously during the years of the persecution of believers? And if they are insufficient, how many of them would the Muslims like to build in Central Asia and Kazakhstan?

[Mufti] Every aul and every kishlak wants to have its own mosque. As you know, Islam makes it obligatory to have collective prayers. But if there is nowhere? To open "parallel" mosques is against the law. Frequently old men travelled 100 kilometers in order to perform only one prayer. Moreover, the mosque is not only prayer, but also introduction to social life. Today we discuss in the mosques, who needs help, and how to help. We want to create centers of education. Questions of charity are very important to Muslims. We need to help each other, to put human relations right.

They returned an old mosque in Tashkent to us. It had been used as a warehouse for vintorg [wine trade association]. The manager of the warehouse remarked: "Look, all windows are broken." I asked: "Why is that so here?" He answered: "The lads in the street don't let us live. We put in new windows, and they at once break them." If it will be a mosque, the lads will not throw stones. They treat old men with respect. And this is good and useful. For this reason, every kishlak should have its own mosque. . . .

[Belyayev] Tell us, how many believers, in your opinion, are there in the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan? All in all, the believers in the Soviet Union are estimated at 20 percent. I believe there are more.

[Mufti] As you understand, this is a difficult question. 20 percent believers—that is from the point of view of those who are conducting atheistic work. In our republics there was even a period when they started to count as believer everyone performing a Muslim rite. For example, during funerals. It turned out, it is performed by all or almost all. One way or another, but they are performed. Does this mean that they ought to be equated to those who are going to the mosque for prayer? We cannot say what percentage of believers there are in every people.

[Belyayev] It is believed that in our country there are believers and non-believers, but there are people who do not determine their attitude to religion and at the same time observe religious rites and customs. Many call them simply national. Such a thing exists among Russians and Kazakhs. Such a thing exists among the Central Asian peoples. . . . I shall explain my thought. Some of our fellow-citizens can be included in the third category: During a rather long period of their life, they do not determine their attitude to religious customs, but they adhere to religious traditions.

[Mufti] Yes, we have such people in Central Asia and in Kazakhstan. They have Muslim names, members of their family call themselves Muslims, but they themselves do not perform Muslim rites. There are also those who mix religious rites with national rites. They somehow need to be delimited. Previously they were threatened with troubles at work and at home for certain reasons. But now life has its effect, as it should be.

[Belyayev] The noble Koran teaches the good. In it there is a great deal of makes the—for all Muslims sacred—book a universal achievement. Share with the readers of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA: What steps have you taken to spread charity?

[Mufti] Charity is one of the fundamental postulates of Islam both in relation to man and in relation to the environment. You know, among Muslims the working day begins with an appeal for charity. In this lies one of the most notable qualities of our religion. We are called upon to be charitable not only to one another, but also to all mankind, to nature, to the animal world, and to the plant world. Man is the creation of Allah—God. According to the Koran, he is the deputy of God on earth. And he must have his place. And Allah serves as reminder for us to make man noble.

For this reason we are members of the Charity Fund. The aspiration to charity is reflected in my pre-election program. Now we have begun to help people who are in need of a good deed. In the future, we want to attach needy Muslims to their mosque, take them under our care. We already have contacts with some boarding schools and homes for the aged.

[Belyayev] In its foundation, the Muslim tradition is always a peaceful tradition. I lived in the Near East for 15 years, I closely observed the life of the believers. Where they do not mix Islam with politics, there peace always reigns. Unfortunately, during the last years events have been taken place that make one uneasy. How could

it happen that in Fergana and in other towns Muslim Uzbeks began to act against their coreligionists. In what, in your opinion, lie the reasons for what has happened, how can one explain that young people not only behaved outrageously, but even killed people?

[Mufti] In these events, Islam played no role. The young Uzbeks did not have a Muslim upbringing. If they had had any any sort of concept of Islam, about the charity of Islam, about the fact that it is prescribed to Muslims how they should treat others, then the unfortunate events would not have taken place. The true reasons of the tragedy are now being studied. Who is responsible? This question will be answered by the investigation and the court. What happened has deep roots and a variety of reasons. Everyone understands them in his own way. Economists say that the basic reason is economic difficulties. Others talk about shortages. I think, there will be a complete answer pm;u after a responsible party will study everything thoroughly. And I hope the results will be announced nationwide.

It is necessary to eliminate all reasons for the unfortunate events in Fergana and the other towns of Uzbekistan. And the quicker, the better. We favor taking part in this work. However difficult it may be.

[Belyayev] I was struck by three things. Not so much the broad participation of young people in the events we are discussing, as the large quantity of weapons set in motion by them after they had dispersed some and arrested others. Some had used drugs, some—liquor. And what is the most objectionable—the struggle began to extend to the most diverse strata of the population. The Meskhetian Turks were the first victims, then they started about the Russians, the Bukhara Jews, and the Armenians. They shouted to them: Get out of our republic! I am used to consider the Uzbeks very hospitable people. I was in Tashkent twice and I felt like home there. What happened?

I have always treated believers with respect. In the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, in teaching a course on Islam, my teacher, Professor Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Belyayev, taught us not to regard religion from the positions of those who are conducting anti-religious propaganda. I remember this, and the precepts of my teacher help me understand a number of religious problems. Living in the Near East, in particular in Cairo and Damascus, being in Kuwait, India, and other cities and countries, I went to the mosque on Fridays, visited the homes and families of Muslims with whom I was acquainted, and tried to experience their peaceful customs. Once in Baghdad I went to the Shiite al-Kazmiya Mosque at the height of the [not further identified], the tension of religious and human passions. The imam of mosque walked up to me. I told him that I am a Russian, I opened up the Koran and read in Arabic the first sura. The imam was surprised and asked me: "You are a Muslim?" "No," I answered, "I simply would like to look at the mosque." The imam showed me the entire mosque. Al-Kazmya is very interesting, but the passions were boiling there, and nothing happened to

me. But in our country all of a sudden some extraneous features. How, in your opinion, is the wind blowing, and from where?

[Mufti] Muslims, including Uzbeks, have always been and remain hospitable. As far as the Meskhetian Turks and the Crimean Tatars are concerned, they were resettled to us 45 years ago. Our people accepted them as respected guests and shared with them bread and butter. And for how many years there were no incidents. All lived peacefully and in friendship and respected one another. The Meskhetian Turks gave their daughters in marriage to Uzbeks, lived in the same quarter, or as neighbors. Muslims grasp such things very well. After all, we are all of one human family.

The pre-election campaign was characteristic in this sense. My constituency is non-Muslim to the extent of 40 percent. The Russians and the others understood me very well. And I am extremely satisfied that among the persons empowered to act for me was a representative of the Russian Orthodox Church—the Tashkent-Central Asian bishop. And all of a sudden the Fergana events. . .

[Belyayev] I know that the most widespread word in the Koran is the word "sabr" [patience]. It is encountered in the Koran more than 900 times. Now the difficulties are not only in Uzbekistan, but also in other republics, in particular in the Russian Federation. And I believe that patience is needed by everyone as never before. In order to overcome the difficulties that have arisen.

[Mufti] I want to underscore: Our society is in great need of spiritual intercourse. Of moral upbringing. In very great need. Man may fall into a difficult and complex situation. But if he is spiritually pure and morally educated, he will not take part in a disgrace. This is why I raised this question in my pre-election campaign. Glasnost, democracy, and restructuring today are declared to be the basis of our life. I think that the people is not yet ready to accept democracy fully. Some understand it only as the right to hold meetings, to take part in demonstrations, to speak out against each other. In actuality, this is not so. Democracy is democracy, freedom is freedom. But our Muslim philosophers say that the boundary of your freedom exists to the point where my freedom begins. But we must not forget that we live side by side with other people. We must know how to respect one another.

[Belyayev] I agree, there must be mutual aspiration to mutual understanding. But you have not paid attention to the fact that in recent times an aspiration for consolidation of the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen, Kazkhs, and other nationalities which inhabit the republic, has been noticed! But this trend is not to everyone's liking. But, you see, the opponents of consolidation are a clear minority. With whom does the Muslim clergy side?

[Mufti] Consolidation is vitally necessary. I suggest that we have not experienced such a need previously. The consolidation of our society in all spheres of life is

extremely necessary. It is perfectly clear that the Muslim clergy is for its strengthening.

[Belyayev] Today there is frequent talk first about the Islamization of politics, then about the politicization of Islam. I think that neither the one nor the other reflects precisely the essence of what is happening. In the Islamic world, many are captivated by politics: Kings, heads of government, and presidents of republics. Take the events around Afghanistan. Our troops are not there, but the war, unfortunately, is continuing. . . . Incidentally, how do you regard the Wahhabism that has appeared in Central Asia? A Wahhabite heads the counterrevolutionary "transition" government of Afghanistan. Behind him stands Saudi Arabia, and behind it the Americans, who recently appointed a special representative with this government. I do not want to exaggerate and sound the alarm to no purpose. But it seems to me that that the activity of the Wahhabites in the Central Asian republics is not accidental. It appears, it is connected with the attempt to create an "Islamic barrier" on our southern frontiers. I would like to find out your opinion about this.

[Mufti] Although your question is connected with Afghanistan, I would answer your question more generally, for all the events in the region, including the Iranian Islamic revolution, do indeed also influence the Soviet Muslims. Well, and the West is the West, this we know very well. And to these questions we must be very attentive. They are inciting people against the Soviet Union. Very sensitively, very adroitly. Western journalists and Sovietologists bring up various reports, various ideas, and various doctrines to us. Literally until recently, they said that the Soviet Union, it seems, destroyed Muslims, that they had nothing, and that Islam supposedly was prohibited. Now they have started to say that the Muslims in Soviet Central Asia are very developed. Their Muslim feeling is also developed. And it is a good thing that they constitute a majority in the Soviet Army. Some day will come, and they will supposedly speak out against Moscow, they will stir up armed rebellion. I think they want to kill two birds with one stone. To threaten our government and to spoil the relations of the Muslims with Moscow. But, first of all, we are not conducting any subversive activity against our state. Secondly, such activity is simply unthinkable. They continue to affirm what is theirs. In these conditions, the people must be very vigilant. It is necessary to follow attentively the events on our southern borders.

As far as the Wahhabites are concerned, their doctrine is well known. Its founder lived in Saudi Arabia. He directed his doctrine mainly against superstition. Everyone knows this. But time passes, and someone perceives the nuances of the dogmas already in a different way. Old men have their own understanding of Islam, young people—theirs. The majority of the youth is opposed to superstition, to magnificent rites. And when the old men saw that the young people act in the Wahhabite manner, they called them Wahhabites. At first the young people rebelled—why do you call us that?

But then they got used to it and now many themselves accept the name of Wahhabites.

[Belyayev] In conclusion, I will ask about you—what year were you born, where did you study, and with what did you begin?

[Mufti] I was born in 1952 in Andizhan Oblast. My father is a sheikh, he serves to this day in a large mosque. He himself raised us spiritually; it is from him, for example, that I learned the Arabic language, the fundamentals of Islam and the Koran. In short, he prepared me for enrollment in the Bukhara Madrasa. Later on I studied in the Tashkent Islamic Institute. For a year I worked on the editorial board of the journal MUSULMANE SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA. Then they sent me to Libya, to the Islamic Faculty, from which I was graduated in 1980 with distinction. After my return to the homeland, I worked in the international department of the Spiritual Administration for the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, then I was appointed pro-rector of the Tashkent Islamic Institute, later rector. At the 4th Congress of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in March 1989, I was elected head of the Spiritual Administration and mufti.

[Belyayev] I wish you great success in the new career. This pursuit is now one of the most important, I have in mind the spiritual life of people.

[Mufti] Thank you. But I would like to add one important motif. We have begun preparation for the 1400th anniversary of the appearance of Islam in our part of the world. Up to now, it is true, the preparation has not gone beyond the stage of discussion. People's deputies, including myself, at the time of the 1st Congress of People's Deputies, addressed a proposal to hold an anniversary holiday to Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev. And it was supported. I want to announce this piece of happy news in your paper.

For the first time, Muslims appeared in Central Asia in the Turkmen city of Mary. As far as other places are concerned, we must study the historical documents. And we will study them. It is necessary to specify everything and to carry out comprehensive preparation for the celebration of the 1400th anniversary of Islam. This will be a very big holiday, I think. We have experience in the country—not long ago, the 1000th anniversary of the christening of Russia was observed. And we took part in it. The people was very happy that such a holiday took place. It will be just if we will celebrate our Muslim holiday as widely. We hope that Allah will give us the opportunity to observe the significant holiday as it should be, with dignity.

Next year, we are planning to celebrate the 1200th anniversary of the Imam At-Termezi. He is the great author of one of the six authentic books of the Hadith of the prophet, he was born in Termez and was buried near this town. His books are read by the whole world. Every Muslim theologian and scholar (ulam) regards his personality with respect and to this day uses his works in his activity. And we, too, want to utilize the books of such an

outstanding Islamic authority. We are planning to carry out anniversary festivities under the motto "Imam At-Termezi and the Present," in order to explain the views of Islam on our urgent human, ecological, cultural and other problems. . . .

And the last thing. I have high regard for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, I never miss an issue. I believe that your paper is doing fruitful work on behalf of perestroika. I wish the contributors of the paper success and express my best wishes to its readers.

[Belyayev] Thank you for the discussion. I think it will call forth considerable interest in all places where Islam is disseminated in the Soviet Union. And as it is accepted in the East—"Peace to you! Salaam aleikum."

### Unemployed Youth Add to 'Army' of Vagrants

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[Report by V. Tyurin, senior inspector of the USSR MVD GUOOP, V. Fokin, senior scientific worker of the USSR MVD VNII: "Not a Crime, But a Misfortune"]

[Text] Last year 110,528 people were detained for vagrancy.

We will begin with the statistics. From 1984 to 1988, the number of those detained for vagrancy in the country decreased by more than one third (from 172,709 to 110,582). But the problem of the homeless [bomzhi], naturally, will remain and it needs an out of the ordinary overall solution.

In the meantime, the homeless are taken up by the workers of the internal affairs organs, i.e., the departments whose main work is ending administrative wrongdoing and criminal offenses, and not the social protection of vagrants. Also, recently, a preventive service was created in the internal affairs organs, which will include studying ways to prevent vagrancy.

On the average from the number of those detained for vagrancy in the country, two thirds are sent to be placed in a job, up to two percent to boarding houses for the aged and invalids, six to seven percent are accommodated in medical dispensaries, five percent in medical institutions (such as tuberculosis, skin and venereal diseases and others).

A large number of the vagrants annually are established to be wanted persons, including criminal recidivists. Of the number of those accommodated in the reception-distribution centers in 1987, 63.7 percent had previous convictions, and in 1988 - 66.3 percent. Approximately every fifth "client" of the reception-distribution centers has been freed in the course of a year from a correctional-labor institution. This one more "reserve" from which the ranks of the homeless are replenished.

In itself, this phenomenon, of course, has been brought about socially.

Often the phenomenon of vagrancy is connected with the consequences of migration, especially seasonal migration. By way of organized recruiting in the regions of Siberia, the Far East, and the Far North, thousands of citizens are moved every year, and it often happens that they have earned big money and quickly squander it in restaurants and bars - remember the hero of Vysotskiy's song about the river Bach. At first they stay "to hibernate," but gradually they degenerate.

In our view, the movement for more humane legislation promoted to some degree the spreading of vagrancy. Thus, in December 1984, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium issued the decree "On the Procedure for Implementing Article 209 of the RSFSR Criminal Code." Analogous decrees were issued by the Supreme Soviets of other union republics. In them it was explained that a vagrant may live without providing any benefit to society, provided that his means of livelihood are not obtained by illegal means. We think such an approach to the problem of vagrancy must be changed, since it results in impunity.

At one time, restrictions on compulsory registration after a previous conviction were introduced in the large cities, in the first instance, in Moscow and Leningrad. As a result of this, thousands of people found themselves social outcasts, without a home, family, or work, after coming out of imprisonment.

Among the vagrants there has also been a significant increase in the number of people deprived of parental rights, especially young women. In the first instance this is connected with the growth of women's alcoholism. The extreme measure of depriving drunks of parental rights, is accompanied by their eviction from their living space. Thus, it turns out that the spreading of vagrancy is connected in many respects with the imperfection of our legislation.

With the conversion of enterprises and organizations to full cost-accounting, the questions of job placement become more significantly acute, and the army of the homeless began to be augmented by unemployed youth.

Thus, every sixth teenager who committed a crime in 1989 neither studied, nor worked.

There remains open the question of what can and should be done today in order to correct the situation? We think that before everything else, it is necessary to develop a system of hotel-type homes for the temporary residence of citizens who for various reasons find themselves without the means for existence, lodging, or a residence permit. Thus, it is proposed to open doss houses in Leningrad and Yaroslavl.

Until the problem of residence permits and job placement is solved, the majority of clients of the doss houses could carry out work within their power. For example, in 1988, the work of the homeless kept in the reception-distribution centers brought in more than 1.5 million rubles. Moreover, they worked voluntarily, although on low-paying but easy work - they wrapped packages, put packaging together, etc. Unfortunately, the USSR Ministry of Finance regarded the idea of stimulating the homeless financially with disapproval. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the work would be higher if each received on release a fixed allotment of earned credits. They would either be transferred in the sort of fixed percentage to the payments account of the hotel-type home in which the released person was to live until resolution of the problems of residence permit, job placement, etc.

Apparently there is an intent to expand the system of boarding houses for the aged and invalids who served criminal punishment or who have been released from reception-distribution centers. The work experience of such home in Zhitomir oblast in the Ukraine and Novosibirsk oblast in the RSFSR showed that joint housing of former homeless is entirely possible. In any case, this is better than lodging them by the aged in ordinary boarding houses.

Apparently, it is also necessary to narrow the legal authority of the organs of internal affairs in the struggle with vagrancy. They must only expose and intersect the vagrants' violations of the law. The remaining questions evidently should be transferred to the organs of public health and social protection.